



2013 CENTER FOR ARMY LEADERSHIP ANNUAL SURVEY OF ARMY LEADERSHIP (CASAL): MAIN FINDINGS

TECHNICAL REPORT 2014-01

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14. ABSTRACT CASAL is an annual survey sponsored by the Combined Arms Center to assess the quality of Army leadership and leader development. 2013 findings are based on responses from 27,605 Army leaders, including 21,956 sergeants through colonels from the Active component, US Army Reserve, and Army National Guard. The 2013 study has additional coverage on mission command, methods of influence, unit trust, distributed learning and mentorship. Getting results, preparing one self, and stewardship are the most favorably rated competencies from leadership doctrine. The Army Values, professional bearing, Warrior Ethos and self-discipline are the highest rated attributes. Develops others continues to be the competency most needing improvement. Three-fourths of leaders are rated effective at demonstrating the principles of mission command. Trust among unit members is mostly moderate to very high with most concern among junior NCOs. Subordinates trust superiors who effectively build trust, demonstrate mental agility, live the Army values, lead others, demonstrate empathy, and lead by example. The percentage of Army leaders demonstrating negative leadership behaviors to the degree they would be deemed toxic continues to be low. Morale and career satisfaction remain steady and unchanged. Levels of commitment continue to be very high. More than half of active duty captains intend to remain in the Army until retirement or beyond. Operational experience is the most favored leader development method while favorable attitudes toward self-development have declined. Nearly two-thirds of leaders engage in mentoring which is greater than levels observed in 2000. The currency, quality and instruction at Army courses are viewed favorably by two thirds or more, though fewer graduates rate courses effective on being challenging and improving their leadership.								
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2013 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): Main Findings Executive Summary

Purpose

The Center for Army Leadership (CAL) conducts an Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) on the quality of leadership activities and the effectiveness of leader development experiences. Since 2005 CASAL has captured assessments from the field about leading and how well leaders are developed. CASAL has been a dependable source to inform senior leaders about the level of leader quality and any upward or downward trends. The information affords leaders the option to make course corrections or take advantage of strengths and opportunities. Other stakeholders and individuals have access to feedback specific to their interests.

Method

Standard scientific approaches are used for survey development, sampling, data collection and analysis. Survey items are chosen based on past usage, input from stakeholders and development of new issues. Sampling practices produce results with a margin of error of +/- 2.5% or less for the nearly 600,000 Army leaders represented. Survey respondents during Nov. 14 through Dec. 10, 2013 consisted of 21,956 globally dispersed, active duty and reserve component sergeants through colonels and 5,649 Army civilian leaders. Data analysis includes assessment of percentages by cohort and ranks, analysis of trends, comparisons across experiences and demographics, coding of short-answer responses, correlations and regressions. Other surveys and data sources are consulted to check and clarify results. This report concentrates on uniformed leaders, and a second report presents findings from Army civilian leaders.

Summary of Main Findings

The following sections summarize results on key aspects of leadership and leader development. For most items, percentages are used to summarize the level of responses and show trends across time. As an aid in interpretation, favorability levels have been set based on past CASAL and other surveys. Results are considered favorable if the positive response choices (e.g., *effective* plus *very effective*) sum to 67% or greater. Unfavorable levels are considered to be negative categories at 20% or more. Across nine years of CASAL, several common patterns have emerged that provide a backdrop to aid in understanding specific findings.

- Favorability of leadership and leader development tends to increase with the rank and length of service of the respondent.
- Ratings on items that are close to the rater conceptually tend to be more favorable than ratings for ones that are farther away and general.

- Results from active and reserve component leaders tend to be similar (meaningful differences are noted where applicable).

Satisfaction and Commitment

Leaders are positive about the environment in which they operate. About four fifths of uniformed Army leaders have favorable attitudes towards such organizational factors as the ability of their unit to perform its mission, effective collaboration of team members and treating one another with respect. Over 85% agree with the importance of being a professional, and over 95% are committed to their teams because of personal loyalty.

Seventy-three percent of leaders agree that standards are upheld (e.g., professional bearing, adherence to regulations) in their unit, while 18% indicate there is a discipline problem. Frequencies of the types of problems and causes are detailed in the body of the report. Ratings for adherence to unit standards and discipline show steady improvement since 2011.

A less favorable indicator is an increase in leaders who report that workload stress is a problem. While stress has a verifiable negative impact on leader well-being and work quality, seeking help for stress-related problems is better accepted and encouraged than it was in 2011.

Morale levels have remained steady since 2010. About one half of AC leaders and 63% of RC leaders rate their current morale as high or very high, and a quarter of AC and of RC leaders rate it neither high nor low. About three quarters of leaders report they are satisfied or very satisfied with their Army career.

These positive attitudes are reflected in the desire to stay in the Army. Of leaders not currently eligible for retirement, 68% in the AC and 81% in the RC intend to stay in the Army until eligible for retirement or beyond. Fifty-six percent of AC captains intend to stay –until they are retirement eligible or beyond; the largest percentage observed through CASAL by 7% to 17% over the past eight years (lowest was 39% in 2007). The positive attitudes from the field about the Army can imply their following responses about leadership and leader development represent the respondents' genuine interest in having an Army of quality.

Leadership

Around 75% of respondents rate their superiors, peers and subordinates as effective or very effective leaders. Since 2005, no more than 9% of leaders have rated their peers or their subordinates as ineffective leaders, and no more than 16% of leaders have rated their superiors as ineffective. Leadership attributes and competencies (ADRP 6-22) demonstrated by their immediate superior are rated by 72% or more of the AC respondents as effective or very effective, with the one exception - *Developing Others*. Even though *Developing Others* is below a two thirds threshold of favorability, it and all other competencies and attributes have been trending higher over the last five years (e.g. from 59% assessing their leaders effective/very

effective at developing subordinates in 2009 to 63% in 2013). The most favorably rated competencies are *Getting Results*, *Preparing Oneself*, and *Stewardship of the Profession*.

Since 2009, *Developing Others* has been one exception for which less than two thirds of respondents assess their immediate superior effective. There is other support for this finding. Twenty percent of leaders report that formal and informal performance counseling never or almost never occurs. When performance counseling is done, only 52% agree it was useful for setting goals. Up to 3 in 10 respondents indicate their immediate superior does not provide feedback on their work, talk with them about how to improve performance, or help prepare them for future assignments. Also 4 in 10 leaders say they do not currently have a mentor.

The 2013 CASAL results also confirm that the demonstration of effective leadership attributes and competencies makes a significant and positive difference to unit and individual outcomes, like unit cohesion, team discipline, individual motivation, work quality, and commitment.

Influence

Influence is at the core of the Army's definition of leadership (ADRP 6-22). Larger percentages of leaders use the preferred methods of influence to gain commitment as compared to compliance-gaining methods. More than three-fourths of leaders effectively demonstrate *rational persuasion*, *collaboration*, *appraising*, *legitimating* and *participation*. The fewest leaders are rated effective at using *exchange* (65%) and *inspirational appeals* (69%).

Command

When asked what behaviors make commanders effective, direct subordinates of company, battalion and brigade commanders wrote in elements that matched ones already identified in doctrine as leadership competencies, leader attributes or supporting behaviors. The characteristics listed were consistent across the three levels of command. The most frequently mentioned attributes distinguishing effective commanders were: *Sound judgment*, *expertise*, *Warrior Ethos*, *empathy* and *Army Values*. The competencies most frequently represented were: *Leads others*, *creates a positive environment*, *communicates* and *leads by example*.

Mission Command

About three-fourths of respondents assessed their leaders effective at demonstrating behaviors consistent with the mission command principles. Favorable implementation of mission command is also indicated by ratings that subordinates are enabled to determine how best to accomplish their work and that they are encouraged to learn from honest mistakes. Fewer Jr NCOs agree these actions occur in their units. Most brigade and battalion commanders rate their subordinates effective at taking action in the absence of orders and when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise. Nearly four out of five commanders rate their staff effective at distilling information related to warfighting functions that allow the commanders to visualize,

direct and command. Strong statistical relationships exist between effectively exercising mission command and high levels of trust and demonstrating leadership competencies.

Trust

Conceptually, trust is the basis for effective relationships between leaders and those they influence. From 80% to nearly 100% of respondents across rank groups have moderate, high or very high trust in their subordinates, peers and superiors. Ratings of trust in one's immediate superiors are strongly associated with positive ratings of their superior's *values, empathy, mental agility, leading others, leading by example, and trust building*. Three fourths of leaders are rated effective at trust-building behaviors which in turn are positively associated with subordinates' motivation, work quality, commitment, and morale. Levels of trust are lower for respondents' superiors two levels up; reasons given include excessive self-interest, integrity issues, poor communication, and low concern for subordinates. CASAL results show that trust exists where unit members help protect others from harm, treat others with respect, do their share of the work and deliver on what they say they will do.

Negative Leadership

CASAL results show that negative leadership behaviors are strongly associated with lower levels of cohesion, discipline, and mission command. Respondents rated their immediate superior on eight key behaviors and only 4% were at or below a negative threshold set on a composite score. Three percent of company and battalion commanders and 1% of brigade commanders scored at the negative level. About 4% of specialists, corporals, or NCOs, rate their squad leader, platoon sergeant or first sergeant poorly on the same composite. The level of negative leaders has been similar for the last three years.

Leader Development Domains and Practices

As in past years operational experience is the most favored (80% rating it effective) of the three leader development domains. In the last three years the percentage of leaders rating self development as effective has dropped from 78% to 69%. The drop has been greatest among NCOs. Levels of favorable ratings for institutional education have remained lower than the other two domains and from 2013 data are at 61%. Consistent with past assessments, informal practices (like opportunities to lead others, on-the-job training, deployment operations, learning from peers, and mentoring) are viewed as having the largest positive impact on the respondents' development as leaders.

Combat training centers (CTCs) are intended to provide a rich environment in which to train and for individuals to develop. Fifty-three percent of active component leaders and 37% of reserve component leaders have attended a CTC at least once. Army leaders with recent CTC experience rate it effective for improving unit mission readiness (75%) and for improving their leadership skills (68%).

Leader Development Programs

Four leader development programs that are available to all Army leaders were evaluated through questions on the 2013 CASAL.

America's Army - Our Profession (AAOP) is an education and training program intended to improve understanding of the Army Profession. Ninety-five percent of leaders report having some or greater understanding of the five essential characteristics of the Army Profession. Far fewer leaders (26% of AC and 14% of RC) were aware of the AAOP program. Of the 14% of AC leaders who indicated that their unit conducted AAOP training, 30% reported it had a large or great impact on their unit.

The Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback (MSAF) program is designed to enhance leader adaptability and self-awareness and to identify strengths and developmental needs (AR 350-1). Fifty-four percent of AC and 42% of RC leaders participated as an assessed leader. About 60% of assessed leaders indicate the experience was effective at increasing their awareness of their strengths and developmental needs, and 37% rate it effective for improving their organization. One in ten leaders have used the leadership training materials in the Virtual Improvement Center (VIC), and 63% of users rate it effective or very effective for improving their leadership.

The Army Career Tracker (ACT) provides a web-based system to manage professional development and to monitor progress toward education and career goals. Usage of the Army Career Tracker (ACT) increased since 2011, especially among NCOs, of whom 63% rate the tool as effective at providing a single point of access to career development information.

The Army Training Network (ATN) is a portal that provides tools and resources for unit training. Four in ten leaders have used the ATN which they rate as effective at providing resources for planning and executing unit training (71%), self-development (66%), and unit leader development (62%).

Professional Military Education (PME)

Seventy-three percent of recent PME graduates rate the quality of the education they received as good or very good, however, the level drops when they are asked about being prepared to assume new levels of leadership (only 61% of AC leaders) or improving leadership capabilities (only 49% of AC leaders). Courses that fall below a two thirds favorability level on challenge and relevancy are: WLC, ALC, SLC, WOBC, WOAC, WOSC, BOLC B, and CCC. With the exception of WLC, ratings of these courses are also below a two thirds favorability level on improving leadership and providing feedback on leadership.

Distributed Learning (DL)

CASAL surveyed the perceptions that leaders have about their - and their subordinates' - use of required DL. Access to DL is not universal; 69% of AC and 57% of RC leaders indicate access is

sufficient. Almost two thirds of AC leaders felt they can allow subordinates adequate duty time to complete required DL. Just over half of AC leaders completed DL themselves in the previous month with the average time being four hours. Only 40% of AC and RC leaders agree that DL enhances subordinates' abilities to perform their duties.

Personnel Management as Leader Development

When personnel management is carefully designed, personnel management practices can meet manning needs while also complementing development. Levels of ratings on personnel management are consistent for 2011, 2012 and 2013. In 2013 from 61% to 65% of active duty leaders believe that the sequence of assignments and amount of time in key developmental assignments are appropriate to prepare them for future, desired assignments. However, about half rate the Army effective or very effective at supporting the development of leaders through personnel management practices. Less than half of senior leaders (44%) agree the Army successfully provides leaders with an individualized approach to development, a principle espoused in adult learning theory and talent management systems. Tailored management and utilization of leaders can enhance the development of competent, adaptable leaders.

Conclusions

Army leaders hold favorable attitudes toward climate and commitment. Levels of perceived workload stress and current morale, especially among active duty leaders, could be more positive. All assessed areas of mission command and leadership are rated favorably with one, persistent exception – developing others. About 2 in 10 leaders do not receive performance counseling, 3 in 10 do not receive performance feedback, and 4 in 10 are without a mentor.

Informal leader development practices and domains are consistently preferred over formal leader development activities. Universal leader development programs, like training on the profession, Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback, Army Career Tracker and Army Training Network are effective but are under-subscribed. Professional military education courses are rated favorably for the quality of education, but most junior grade courses are rated less favorably on relevance, challenge, and leadership improvement. Less than half of leaders report that required DL improves their subordinates' performance.

Analysis and comparisons among factors provide sound evidence that quality leadership, trust among leaders, and effective development have positive relationships with individual and unit outcomes. The patterns of findings from 2013 and the previous years support three areas where action is recommended and that could produce positive returns for the Army.

Recommendations

Recurring problem. *Developing others* is a recurring shortcoming that should continue to be addressed. Materials exist to assist leaders with conducting developmental counseling, obtaining feedback, setting developmental goals and guiding self development. The materials

such as the new OER, forthcoming NCOER, new counseling publication (ATP 6-22.1), and counseling training should be endorsed by senior leaders, schools and unit leadership, in order to catch the attention of leaders as ways to improve the occurrence and quality of counseling. If leaders are not fully engaged in developing subordinates, subordinates can take steps to become more proactive by seeking developmental counseling from their rater, initiating mentoring relationships, obtaining 360° feedback, and conducting self-development. Those that show a desire for development are undoubtedly easier for leaders to guide and develop.

Under-utilized opportunities. Army leaders perceive the operational domain of leader development as having the most impact. As such, learning from experience serves as a top opportunity for improving leadership in the Army. Best practices outside the Army involve extensive use of carefully planned progression of responsibilities in successive assignments and stretch assignments within positions. Mentoring can be promoted through participation with junior leaders rather than talking about the importance of finding a mentor. Also, a unit leader can make large strides in developing subordinates by setting a climate for learning where new behaviors can be developed without fear of recrimination. Time spent individually and with others reflecting on everyday experiences will pay dividends for development.

High risk. The greatest risk to professionalism may be complacency toward leadership performance, given the large number of leaders who are rated effective or very effective (in the range of 70 to 90% across individual competencies and attributes). Leadership can be learned and improved, but there is not much attention given to the development of specific leadership skills in PME, training, or developmental assignments. The skills and attributes with highest average ratings may be those which become most dangerous when they are lacking or fail even among the few (e.g., commitment, adherence to Army values, fair treatment of others, confidence/humility, or mitigating negative leadership's destructive effects). Leadership skills at a lower level of quality are also important to target for improvement, such as the alignment of purpose and methods across organizations, assessing developmental needs of subordinates, applying influence, interpersonal tact, and removing work barriers.

Summary

CASAL can be viewed as a “waypoint” to mark the level and change of perceptions about leadership and leader development. Like any waypoint it is one of several possible checks on status and progress toward a goal. CASAL provides an accurate account of the field’s perceptions and provides verifiable results to inform decision makers and stake-holders about the condition of leadership. Leader development is a top priority of the Army, and CASAL continues to contribute to the understanding of its strengths, areas for improvement and other opportunities to enhance its potential.

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
Organization of Findings	1
1. Quality of Leadership.....	5
1.1 Perceptions of Leader Quality.....	5
1.2 Indicators of Leadership Performance.....	8
1.2.1 The Leadership Requirements Model.....	8
1.2.2 Characteristics of Leader Effectiveness	12
1.2.3 Leader Influence.....	16
1.2.4 Expectations for Commanders	20
1.3 The Effects of Climate and Situational Factors on Leadership	24
1.3.1 Morale, Commitment, Career Satisfaction and Career Intentions	24
1.3.2 Characteristics of the Working Environment	30
1.3.3 Mission Command.....	36
1.3.4 Trust	46
1.3.5 Negative Leadership	56
2. Quality of Leader Development.....	64
2.1 Army Leader Development	64
2.2 Subordinate Development.....	70
2.3 Mentoring	78
2.4 Leader Development Practices and Programs	84
2.5 Personnel Management System	92
2.6 Institutional Education	95
2.6.1 Quality of Army Education.....	97
2.6.2 Course-Specific Findings	102
2.7 Distributed Learning (DL).....	110
2.8 Unit-based Training.....	114
Conclusions and Recommendations.....	118
References	125

2013 CENTER FOR ARMY LEADERSHIP ANNUAL SURVEY OF ARMY LEADERSHIP (CASAL): MAIN FINDINGS

Organization of Findings

The CASAL was administered online to a representative sample of Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard officers (O-1 to O-6), warrant officers (W-1 to W-5), and noncommissioned officers (E-5 to E-9) who were globally dispersed. In addition to uniformed leaders, Army civilian leaders have participated in CASAL since 2009 (findings for Army civilians are presented in a separate technical report). In November 2013, the survey invitation was sent via e-mail to a random sample of 142,874 Army leaders within the uniformed and civilian cohorts, of whom 28,125 participated, for a response rate of 19.7%. The online survey was accessible to participants for four weeks and closed the second week of December 2013.

The level of sampling precision met the desired standard for each of five rank groups (field grade officers, company grade officers, warrant officers, senior NCOs, and junior NCOs) for the active component (AC) and reserve components (RC) (i.e., within sampling error of +/-1.6% to +/-2.5%, and sampling error for entire survey across components and cohorts is +/- 0.6%). Essentially this means that 95 times out of 100 the observed percentage will be within 1% of the true percentage. The level of response to the 2013 CASAL represents the most precise findings attained by CASAL since its inception.

In addition to meeting stringent sampling error goals, CASAL data demonstrated further support of representativeness across the Army. The respondent sample closely approximated the population of the Army in distribution of component and gender as reported by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). In particular, the distribution of males and females in CASAL match the proportion of males and females in the Army (within 2%). The sample is also representative of deployed Army leaders; 55% active and 35% reserve had recent deployment experience (in the past 36 months). Further, 7% of active and 6% of reserve component respondents were serving on a deployment at the time of the survey. The population, sample, response rate, and sampling error for each uniformed rank group are presented in Table 1. Sampling procedures invited equal numbers of respondents from the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard.

This report is presented in two parts:

- The first part, *Quality of Leadership*, discusses the current leader quality in the Army, leader effectiveness in meeting leadership requirements, and climate and situational factors affecting leadership.

- The second part, *Quality of Leader Development*, discusses the current quality of Army leader development practices, programs and activities, including leader effectiveness in developing subordinate leaders, and the contribution of operational experience, self-development, and institutional education to leader development.

Table 1. Population, Sample¹, Response Rates and Sampling Error by Rank Group and Component for Uniformed Personnel.

Population Strata	Population	Sample Reached (Invitations)	Returned		Sampling Error
			N	Response Rate	
Active Component					
Field Grade Officer	29,109	6,353	2,223	35.0%	2.0
Company Grade Officer	45,857	14,637	3,452	23.6%	1.6
Warrant Officer	14,055	7,397	2,106	28.5%	2.0
Sr NCO	51,299	8,363	2,462	29.4%	1.9
Jr NCO	131,164	19,794	2,842	14.4%	1.8
Total AC	271,484	56,544	13,085	23.1%	0.8
Reserve Components (Army National Guard and US Army Reserve)					
Field Grade Officer	25,951	7,533	1,773	23.5%	2.2
Company Grade Officer	42,447	15,744	1,662	10.6%	2.4
Warrant Officer	11,665	6,791	1,865	27.5%	2.1
Sr NCO	55,017	8,754	1,996	22.8%	2.2
Jr NCO	154,179	19,826	1,575	7.9%	2.5
Total RC	289,259	58,648	8,871	15.1%	1.0
Total Uniformed Personnel	560,743	115,192	21,956	18.8%	0.6

Survey Development and Administration

Each year, survey development begins with the identification of issues of importance in leadership and leader development. As one purpose of CASAL is to adequately track trends and identify patterns over time, many survey items from past years are used without change during each administration of the survey. Other items are dropped, added, or modified in order to balance coverage on leadership topics with survey size, time to respond and respondent fatigue. In part, this is done to ensure that the survey assesses contemporary issues in the Army that change from year to year. Data are collected through both quantitative (e.g., select a response) and qualitative (e.g., type a brief answer) means. Item skip patterns and branching

¹ A sample of 520 active duty SPC/CPL E-4 participated in a shortened version of the 2013 CASAL. Responses by these participants are included in ratings of their immediate superior or supervisor. Results are reported by the superior's rank or cohort (e.g., Jr NCOs), where applicable.

are employed to tailor sections of the survey to specific ranks or to leaders with relevant experiences, a method that also helps to minimize survey length and respondent fatigue. Items cover topics on the quality of leadership and leader development to address the survey's Essential Elements of Analysis (EEA). A sampling of EEA includes:

Quality of Leadership

- What is the overall quality of Army leaders?
- How effectively do Army leaders demonstrate core leader competencies and attributes?
- How effective are Army leaders at demonstrating principles of mission command?
- How do climate and situational factors affect leadership?
- How are leaders affecting trust in units and organizations?
- What is the impact of negative leadership behavior in the Army?

Leader Development

- How effective are Army leader development practices?
- How effective are Army leaders at supporting development of subordinate leaders?
- How effective are personnel management practices for leader development?
- How effective are Army institutional courses/schools for preparing leaders?
- What are Army leader perceptions about current unit training practices?

The 2013 CASAL was administered online in November and December 2013 and was accessible for four weeks. A total of 21,956 uniformed leaders in the active and reserve components, along with 5,649 Army civilians, responded to the survey. This strong participation in the CASAL provides an overall sampling error of approximately +/- 0.6%. This sampling error, together with the stratified random sampling method used, means that the CASAL respondents are representative of the Army population. Accumulated data from the past nine years increase the clarity of interpretation. Thus, a high degree of confidence can be placed in the findings.

Within each sub-section, key findings are highlighted in text and summarized in call-out boxes. Trends are reported for items that have been asked in previous years of survey administration. Where applicable, CASAL findings are supplemented with results from other Army or DoD surveys that have assessed similar topic areas. For accuracy and simplicity, percentages are emphasized for active duty Army leaders. In many cases, findings are comparable between the active and reserve components, though exceptions are noted.

CASAL includes items that capture both quantitative (select choice) and qualitative (short answer) responses. Most multiple choice items ask participants to respond on a scale of 1-5, where 5 is the most favorable (e.g., very effective, strongly agree) and 1 is the least favorable (e.g., very ineffective, strongly disagree), with a neutral middle point (3). To ease the interpretation of results, the five point response categories are collapsed into three point scales. For example, responses of '5' (strongly agree) and '4' (agree) are collapsed and reported as the percentage of participants who "agree or strongly agree." Thus, most charts in this report display the percentage of favorable, neutral and unfavorable responses for an item or rank group.

A useful rule of thumb in analyzing CASAL data is the two-thirds favorability threshold, whereby item results that receive two-thirds or more favorable response (e.g., 66% agreement or effectiveness) are considered positive. Items where favorable response falls below this threshold and/or receive 20% or more unfavorable response are considered areas for improvement. Similarly, a 6% difference in results between years is a useful guideline for identifying meaningful change over time. While these rules of thumb may be applied as general guidelines to data interpretation, each item warrants its own consideration. Several factors impact the interpretation of item favorability and change, including the sampling error for each sub-group, cohort and component being examined, and in some cases, variation in the way items are worded between years. Additional statistical analyses are performed to aid in the interpretation of the survey domains and to draw out higher level meaning across items.

1. Quality of Leadership

This section discusses CASAL results for several perspectives of leadership performance and quality. The 2013 CASAL examined multiple indicators of leadership quality, including assessments of superiors, peers and subordinates as leaders; specific, observable leadership attributes and behaviors described in Army doctrinal frameworks (ADRP 6-22); and assessment of leader effectiveness through building trust (ADRP 1 and 6-22) and demonstrating principles of the mission command philosophy (ADP 6-0). New areas of study include the levels of satisfaction with the quality of uniformed and civilian leadership in the Army and leader effectiveness in using various methods of influence (ADRP 6-22).

The current status and trends in leader morale, commitment and career satisfaction are examined, as well as leader career intentions. Trust is a characteristic of the working environment that affects leadership and impacts both organizational and Soldier outcomes. CASAL also assesses and tracks trends on the prevalence and impact of negative leadership behaviors (ADRP 6-22).


1.1 Perceptions of Leader Quality

CASAL has consistently captured favorable perceptions regarding the quality of leadership in the Army. In 2013, a majority of Army leaders view their superiors (71%) and peers (77%) as effective leaders. Additionally, a large percentage of leaders (75%) with supervisory responsibilities rate their subordinates as effective leaders (see Figure 1). Also notable are the small percentages of leaders who rate their superiors (13%), peers (6%), and subordinates (7%) ineffective as leaders.

- Both the relative percentages and trend of more critical, upward assessments are characteristic of these data across CASAL years of administration.
- Since 2005, no more than 9% of leaders have rated their peers as ineffective leaders, and no more than 8% have rated their subordinates as ineffective leaders. Similarly, no more than 16% of leaders have rated their superiors as ineffective.

These results provide both a holistic and generalized assessment of the current level of leadership quality in the Army. Notably, these assessments are relative to the rater, and while one's direct-report subordinates are typically a well-defined cohort, the leaders who constitute one's peers and superiors are less well defined. Despite these limitations to connotation, the results are useful in gauging current Army leader attitudes about leadership quality. Given that a consistent pattern of responses have been observed for the past eight years (with only slight fluctuation) these results provide evidence that attitudes toward the quality of leadership across the Army are strongly positive.

Figure 1. Effectiveness Ratings of Superiors, Peers, and Subordinates as Leaders.



At a more specific level, most Army leaders hold favorable perceptions of the effectiveness of their immediate superior or supervisor as a leader. This is evidenced through ratings of superior effectiveness in demonstrating the core leader competencies, the leader attributes, and various other leadership behaviors. Additional discussions on Army leader performance across the doctrinal competencies and attributes and the effect these behaviors have on followers and organizational outcomes are presented in the following sections.

Satisfaction with Army Leadership

The 2013 CASAL sought to uncover new insights regarding Army leader satisfaction with the quality of leadership in units and organizations, specifically with regard to cross-cohort perceptions (i.e., uniformed leader satisfaction with Army civilian leadership and vice versa).

As a broad assessment, nearly two-thirds of AC uniformed participants (65%) are satisfied with the quality of military leadership in their current unit or organization, while nearly one-fifth (18%) are dissatisfied. Army civilian managers and first line supervisors show a similar level of satisfaction with military leadership. Smaller percentages of both AC uniformed (57%) and

civilian (61%) participants are satisfied with the quality of the civilian leadership in their current organization. Notably, similar levels of both uniformed and civilian participants indicate dissatisfaction toward either the military or civilian leadership in their organizations (about one-fifth; within 1% for uniformed respondents and within 3% for civilians) (see Table 2).

Table 2. Satisfaction with the Quality of Military and Civilian Leadership in the Army.

CASAL Respondents	Satisfaction with the Quality of Military Leadership in Current Unit/Organization	Satisfaction with the Quality of Civilian Leadership in Current Unit/Organization
Active Duty Uniformed	65% Satisfied	57% Satisfied
	18% Dissatisfied	19% Dissatisfied
Army Civilians (Managers and First Line Supervisors)	65% Satisfied	61% Satisfied
	17% Dissatisfied	20% Dissatisfied

These results reflect broad attitudes but are useful indicators not previously assessed by CASAL. Notably, satisfaction with the quality of military and civilian leadership was asked of all CASAL participants regardless of assignment type. Participants were instructed to select the response option “No basis to assess” as appropriate in instances where their unit and organization did not have both military and civilian leaders.

A series of analyses were performed to further understand the factors that impact satisfaction with the quality of military and civilian leadership in units. Of particular interest was whether the same factors affect within-cohort ratings of satisfaction (e.g., AC participant satisfaction with military leadership) compared to cross-cohort ratings (i.e., AC participant satisfaction with civilian leadership). Participant attitudes toward several characteristics of their working environment, their current states (e.g., morale, career satisfaction), and ratings for the effectiveness of superiors and peers as leaders were examined through multiple regression analyses.² Results showed that overall these factors explained a significant amount of variance

² Multiple regression analyses were conducted using the enter method and examined the following variables to determine their impact on satisfaction with the quality of military and civilian leadership: agreement that members of unit/organization are committed to performing at a high level; agreement that members of unit/organization are allowed and encouraged to learn from honest mistakes; agreement that unit members are empowered to make decisions pertaining to performance of their duties; agreement that members of unit/organization work collaboratively to achieve results; agreement that standards are upheld; Disagreement that discipline is a problem in the unit/organization; agreement that senior leaders in unit would take action to address ethical violation, if reported; overall level of trust among unit members; severity of stress from a high workload; effectiveness of peers as leaders; effectiveness of superiors as leaders; participant's current level of morale; and participant's agreement he/she is committed to team or immediate work unit due to sense of personal loyalty.

in ratings of satisfaction for both military and civilian leadership. The level of variance accounted for by these factors was nearly 30% higher for within-cohort ratings (AC participants rating satisfaction with military leadership, $R^2 = .73, p < .001$; civilian participants rating satisfaction of civilian leadership, $R^2 = .65, p < .001$) compared to cross-cohort ratings (AC participants rating satisfaction of civilian leadership quality, $R^2 = .43, p < .001$; civilian participants rating satisfaction of military leadership quality $R^2 = .35, p < .001$). Ultimately, participants' perceptions of the quality of their superiors are associated with their level of satisfaction with the quality of military and civilian leadership in their unit or organization.

1.2 Indicators of Leadership Performance

The 2013 CASAL assessed indicators of Army leadership performance through the following areas:

- The Leadership Requirements Model
- Characteristics of Leader Effectiveness
- Influence Methods
- Expectations for Commanders

The focus areas of this section address how effectively Army leaders are performing, to include demonstration of the core leader competencies, leader attributes and other leadership behaviors. Leader effectiveness in demonstrating various influence methods are also examined, as well as characteristics of effective brigade, battalion and company commanders.

1.2.1 The Leadership Requirements Model

CASAL has served as the Army's benchmark in assessing leader effectiveness in demonstrating the core leader competencies and attributes described in the Leadership Requirements Model (ADRP 6-22). Since 2009, CASAL has used a consistent method of capturing upward ratings of survey participants' immediate superior or supervisor, a practice that enables trend comparisons across years³. Results have consistently shown that Army leaders reflect a basic profile of strengths and developmental areas relative to the core leader competencies and leader attributes. Also notable is that Army leaders are consistently rated more favorably across the leader attributes than on the competencies.

The Model represents requirements at four levels for leadership, e.g., goals (lead, develop, achieve), competencies, components and actions or skills. Leader attributes are described using three levels.


³ The 2009 CASAL adopted a new methodology to assess leader effectiveness in demonstrating the leader competencies and attributes. Direct comparisons to CASAL results prior to this year are not made due to this change.

Core Leader Competencies

An established pattern in the relative positioning of highest, lowest and 'middle ground' competencies remains unchanged (described as a "3-tier competency trend" in past CASAL reports). The highest rated competencies are *Gets Results*, *Prepares Self*, and *Stewards the Profession*, as more than three-fourths of Army leaders rate their immediate superior effective or very effective, while about 7% to 10% rate them ineffective (see Figure 2).

Gets Results, Prepares Self and Stewards the Profession are the highest rated competencies. *Develops Others* is the lowest competency.

Figure 2. Ratings of Immediate Superior Effectiveness on the Core Leader Competencies by Active Duty Leaders.




Six competencies continue to constitute the 'middle ground' across the profile of ratings. These include *Leads by Example*, *Creates a Positive Environment*, *Communicates*, *Extends Influence beyond the Chain of Command*, *Builds Trust* and *Leads Others*; favorable ratings include 72% to 75% of leaders, while 12% to 14% are rated ineffective.

Leader effectiveness in developing subordinates, captured in the core leader competency *Develops Others*, persists as an area in need of improvement. In 2013, 63% of AC leaders are rated effective in developing their subordinates. While this is the largest percentage observed in the past five years, one in five leaders is rated ineffective in developing subordinates. A more in-depth discussion of leader behaviors and practices related to developing subordinates is presented in the *Subordinate Development* section of this report.

Overall, perceptions of leader effectiveness in demonstrating the core leader competencies are fairly stable with subtle improvement since 2009. *Prepares Self* is the competency that shows the largest increase in recent years (2011-2013). A notable pattern in these data is that favorable ratings for leader effectiveness on the competencies have not declined over the past three years (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Comparison of Leader Effectiveness in demonstrating the Core Leader Competencies from 2009 to 2013.



Leader Attributes

Attributes represent the values and identity of Army leaders (character) with how leaders are perceived by followers and others (presence), and with the mental and social faculties that leaders apply when leading (intellect). Large percentages of leaders are rated effective in

demonstrating all leader attributes, and this is a consistent trend observed across the past several years.

Overall, findings do not indicate there are widespread deficiencies in the Army leader attributes. CASAL assessment of the leader attributes has evolved over the past several years to meet changes to descriptions within the Leadership Requirements Model (Department of the Army, 2012b) and to better reflect the underlying attribute being assessed.

Large percentages of leaders are rated effective in demonstrating all of the leader attributes.

The most favorably rated leader attributes include demonstrating the *Army Values*, *Military & Professional Bearing*, *Warrior Ethos/Service Ethos*, and *Self-Discipline* (see Figure 4). The two attributes that are consistently ranked at the bottom of the list are *Innovation* and *Interpersonal Tact*. It is important to reiterate that Army leaders are generally rated effective in demonstrating all of the leader attributes (77% to 87%) and that change noted over recent years has been a slight increase in favorable ratings (see Figure 5).

Figure 4. Ratings of Immediate Superior Effectiveness in demonstrating the Leader Attributes by Active Duty Leaders.





Figure 5. Comparison of Leader Effectiveness in demonstrating the Leader Attributes from 2009 to 2013.



1.2.2 Characteristics of Leader Effectiveness

The 2013 CASAL assessed several additional characteristics of leader performance. Beyond doctrinal competencies and attributes, the majority of Army leaders are rated effective in demonstrating various other leadership behaviors (see Figure 6). A strong positive finding is that 81% of AC leaders rate their immediate superior effective at setting the standard for integrity and character while only 8% rate them ineffective. Integrity is a key mark of a leader's character, and means doing what is right, legally and morally (Department of the Army, 2012b). This behavior is significantly related to *Leads by Example* ($r = .80, p < .001$) and *Builds Trust* ($r = .79, p < .001$), important because subordinate leaders learn by observing their superiors and seek to emulate the positive examples that are displayed.


Leadership actions or skills are bulleted items in ADRP 6-22 tables. Examples include fosters ethical climate, empowers subordinates, team building, recognizes how actions impact others, and assesses developmental needs.

About three-fourths of AC leaders rate their immediate superior effective at developing a quick understanding of complex situations (77%) and dealing with unfamiliar situations (74%). These

behaviors are positively related to *Mental Agility* ($r = .80$ and $r = .76$, $p < .001$), an attribute where a large percentage of leaders (82%) are rated effective. Leaders demonstrate *Mental Agility* through flexibility of mind and when anticipating or adapting to uncertain or changing situations (Department of the Army, 2012b).

Both the 2012 and 2013 CASAL results show that 70% of leaders are rated effective at building effective teams, and this is a notable increase from results of previous years (64% effective in 2007-08, and 65-67% in 2009-11). Finally, more than three-fourths of leaders (77%) are rated effective in emphasizing organizational improvement, while 74% are effective at balancing subordinate needs with mission accomplishment.

Figure 6. Army Leader Effectiveness in Demonstrating Various Behaviors.



Relationship between the Leadership Requirements Model and Leader Effectiveness


Implicit leadership theory (Eden & Levitan, 1975; Yukl, 2002) indicates followers' perceptions of their leaders can be impacted by follower's own ideas of what effective leadership is and how closely their leader's behaviors and characteristics align to this image. The 2013 CASAL assessed two holistic ratings of Army leader effectiveness. First, three-fourths of AC leaders (75%) agree or strongly agree with the statement 'my immediate superior is an effective leader.' Thirteen percent of leaders neither agree nor disagree, while 12% disagree or strongly disagree. Figure 7 displays the results of these ratings based on the unit position of the

immediate superior that was rated. Favorable ratings tend to increase with the echelon at which the officer or NCO superior serves. Secondly, participants provided a single judgment on the relative ranking of their immediate superior's leadership abilities compared to other leaders at the same rank or in a similar position. Results of the past three years show strong consistency in these characterizations of one's immediate superior:

- 'Best or among the best' or 'A high performer' – 65%
- 'Middle of the road' – 22%
- 'Worst or among the worst' or 'A marginal performer' – 13%

Taken together, these findings are positive as large percentages of leaders indicate their immediate superior or supervisor is performing at a high level, while small percentages suggest their superior demonstrates ineffective leadership.

Figure 7. Ratings for Effective Leadership by Position.



All 10 competencies and 15 attributes were examined through the use of stepwise multiple regressions⁴ to identify which of the competencies and attributes best explain ratings of effective leadership. Four competencies and two attributes significantly explain 78% of the

⁴ A stepwise multiple regression is an exploratory statistical approach to identify which variables provide the largest, singular contribution to the explanation of a dependent variable (i.e., ratings of effective leadership).

variance ($R^2 = .78, p < .001$) in effectiveness ratings for one's immediate superior: *Leading Others*, demonstrating *Sound Judgment*, *Building Trust*, *Leading by Example*, demonstrating *Expertise in Primary Duties* and *Communicating* are strongly associated with agreement that the superior is an effective leader. This means that these six factors best differentiate levels of effective leadership. Ratings for leader effectiveness in demonstrating the other competencies and attributes, while favorable, show less variance and are therefore less useful in differentiating levels of leadership effectiveness. These findings are consistent with those observed in 2012.

The core leader competencies have a stronger impact on ratings of effective leadership than do the leader attributes.

An important finding noted in the 2012 CASAL and observed in leadership research (Horey et al., 2007) suggests that leader traits have less impact on leadership outcomes than leader behaviors. In 2013, multiple regression analyses utilizing composite scale scores⁵ for leader effectiveness examined the impact of the competencies and attributes on indices of effective leadership. Results indicate the core leader competencies have a stronger impact⁶ on ratings of effective leadership (about 2-to-1) compared to the impact of leader attributes (see Table 3).

Table 3. Results of Multiple Regression Examining the Impact of Leader Competencies and Attributes on Indices of Effective Leadership.

	Agreement Immediate Superior is an Effective Leader	How do you rate the leadership abilities of your Immediate Superior relative to other leaders at the same rank/position
Core Leader Competency Composite Score	.60	.58
Leader Attribute Composite Score	.30	.29
Model Summary	$R^2 = .78$	$R^2 = .72$

Note. Standardized beta weight and R^2 significant $p < .001$ unless noted.

⁵ The ten items that reflect behaviors associated with immediate superior effectiveness in demonstrating the core leader competencies were combined into a single scale composite variable. Values across these ten items were summed and then divided by ten to produce a single score with a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 5. Scale scores of '5' indicate a respondent's average rating across all ten items = 5 (highest rating that immediate superior demonstrates the competencies). A composite score was only generated for respondents who rated their immediate superior on all ten competency items. This same process was used to develop a single scale composite variable for the 15 items that assess the leader attributes.

⁶ A statistic called a standardized beta weight represents the specific impact each factor within the model has on the outcome measure. Standardized beta weights are similar to correlation coefficients in that they range from -1.0 to +1.0, with size of the weight indicating the extent of impact and the direction (+ or -) of the relationship. The larger the standardized beta weight, the larger the impact scores for that variable have on the dependent variable.

Impact of Leadership on Unit and Soldier Outcomes

Effective demonstration of the core leader competencies and leader attributes is significantly and positively related to several unit and Soldier outcomes that impact mission success. The strength of the relationships between both the competencies and attributes with these outcomes is uniformly high (see Tables 4 and 5). Leaders who effectively demonstrate the competencies and attributes are viewed as positively impacting unit or team cohesion and discipline in units. Similarly, there are positive effects on subordinate motivation, work quality, commitment to the Army and morale. Importantly, there is a positive relationship between a leaders' demonstration of the competencies and attributes and the level of trust subordinates hold in that leader.

Table 4. Correlations between Effective Demonstration of the Leadership Competencies and Attributes on Organizational Outcomes.

Effect of Leader Demonstration of Leadership Competencies & Attributes on Organizational Outcomes (AC, n=7,741)	Core Leader Competencies	Leader Attributes
Effect on Unit or Team Cohesion	.83**	.79**
Effect on Unit or Team Discipline	.82**	.80**

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 5. Correlations between Effective Demonstration of the Leadership Competencies and Attributes on Soldier Outcomes.

Effect of Leader Demonstration of Leadership Competencies & Attributes on Subordinate/Soldier Outcomes (AC, n=7,738)	Core Leader Competencies	Leader Attributes
Effect on Subordinate's Motivation	.82**	.77**
Effect on Subordinate's Work Quality	.78**	.76**
Effect on Subordinate's Commitment to the Army	.75**	.72**
Effect on Subordinate's Level of Trust in Immediate Superior	.72**	.69**
Effect on Subordinate's Level of Morale	.46**	.43**

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

1.2.3 Leader Influence

The 2013 CASAL examined perceptions about leader effectiveness in using various methods of influence. Nine methods of influence are described in Army leadership doctrine, ADRP 6-22, and are presented in Table 6 (Department of the Army, 2012b).

Doctrine states “leaders can draw on a variety of methods to influence others and can use one or more methods to fit the specifics of any situation. These outcomes range from obtaining compliance to building commitment to achieve” results (ADRP 6-22, 6-2). Effective use of

Table 6. Nine methods of influence described in ADRP 6-22, Army Leadership.

<i>Pressure</i>	Makes explicit demands to achieve compliance
<i>Legitimating</i>	Emphasizes authority as the basis for a request
<i>Exchange</i>	Makes an offer in trade for compliance
<i>Personal Appeals</i>	Uses the basis of friendship or loyalty
<i>Collaboration</i>	Commits personal assistance or resources to fulfill a request
<i>Rational Persuasion</i>	Applies evidence, logical arguments or explanations of relevance
<i>Apprising</i>	Explains why an action will provide a benefit
<i>Inspirational Appeals</i>	Creates enthusiasm by arousing strong commitment
<i>Participation</i>	Gets buy-in by having you take part

influence methods ultimately depends on a leader's recognition of the outcome or side-effect of the influence (e.g., compliance or commitment) and the level of the individual(s) being influenced (downward, upward or lateral). Compliance is appropriate for rare, immediate requirements and situations where there is not a great need for a subordinate to understand why a request occurs. Compliance-seeking influence focuses on meeting and accounting for task demands. Commitment reaches deeper to change attitudes, beliefs and behavior, and generally produces longer lasting and broader effects. Gaining commitment is useful when the aim is to create initiative and high esteem within others. Commitment grows from an individual's desire to gain a sense of control and develop self-worth by contributing to the organization. Commitment-encouraging influence emphasizes empowerment and long-lasting trust.

Experts in leadership research (e.g., Yukl 2002; Yukl & Tracey, 1992) note that choosing the appropriate influence strategy or strategies should be based on two key factors: the direction of influence (i.e., is the influencer trying to influence their subordinates, peers or supervisors) and the objective of the influence attempt (i.e., is the outcome of the influence easy to obtain with little cost to either the agent or the recipient of influence, or is the outcome costly and challenging to the recipient). Yukl and colleagues (1993) further found that the sequence and ordering of influence attempts can have an effect on the likelihood of success. Leaders who utilize the appropriate strategies or sequence of strategies based on the two conditions (i.e., the target of the influence strategy and the desired outcome) will have greater likelihood of influencing others to meet their end goal. While the 2013 CASAL did not collect this level of information regarding leader effectiveness in using different methods of influence, it can be assumed that effective use of an influence method is inclusive of these considerations.

Leader Effectiveness in Using Influence

A majority of Army leaders (65% to 79%) rate their immediate superior effective at using the nine methods of influence described by Army doctrine.


- Overall, AC leaders are rated most favorably in using *rational persuasion* (79%), *collaboration* (78%), *appraising* (78%), *legitimating* (77%), and *participation* (77%).
- The four lowest rated methods of influence are use of *pressure* (72%), *personal appeals* (71%), *inspirational appeals* (69%) and *exchange* (65%).
- A positive finding is that a larger percentage of leaders report their immediate superior uses the methods of influence that aim at gaining commitment from others (i.e., *participation*, *inspirational appeals*, *appraising*, *rational persuasion*, and *collaboration*). Smaller percentages of leaders report their superior uses compliance-gaining methods (e.g., *exchange*, *pressure*, *legitimating* and *personal appeals*).

Perceptions of leader effectiveness in using the influence methods differ by rank group, as shown in Figure 8.⁷ AC field grade officers and warrant officers are rated most favorably by their subordinates across the methods of influence. Ratings for company grade officers and Sr NCOs are slightly less favorable. Ratings for Jr NCOs are the lowest, consistent with other leadership ratings for this cohort.

Between 65% and 79% of respondents rate their immediate superior effective across nine methods of influence.

⁷ CASAL participants rated their immediate superior's effectiveness in using the nine methods of influence. The results presented in Figure 8 represent the rank group of the target leader that was assessed.

Figure 8. Leader Effectiveness in Using Influence Methods by Rank Cohort.



Relationship between Influence and Effective Leadership

Army leadership doctrine is well supported, as CASAL results show the nine methods of influence are positively related to effective leadership, and specifically, effective demonstration of the core leader competencies ($r = .44$ to $.79$, $p < .001$). Of note, leader effectiveness in *Leads Others*, the competency that most prominently reflects influence behaviors, shows the strongest average correlations with effective use of the nine influence methods ($r = .53$ to $.79$, $p < .001$).

Further, the nine influence methods account for a significant proportion of variance in participants' ratings of agreement that their immediate superior is an effective leader ($R^2 = .71$, $p < .001$), and share variability with various other measures of leadership, including trust building behavior ($R^2 = .66$, $p < .001$), use of mission command ($R^2 = .72$, $p < .001$) and not

demonstrating negative leadership ($R^2 = .49, p < .001$). The influence methods most strongly linked to perceptions of effective leadership are *inspirational appeals, collaboration, rational persuasion, participation, and apprising*. These methods are characteristics of gaining follower commitment. Conversely, *pressure and exchange* are influence methods with the weakest association with effective leadership. Use of these methods is characteristic of leader attempts to gain compliance from others, rather than actual commitment.

In summary, CASAL results demonstrate that Army leaders are viewed effective in demonstrating a variety of influence methods. Larger percentages of leaders use methods of influence to gain commitment from others as opposed to compliance-gaining methods, which is a positive finding. Leaders use *inspirational appeals* to fire enthusiasm for a request by arousing strong emotions in others, and this represents the influence method most strongly associated with perceptions of effective leadership. Two-thirds of AC leaders (69%) rate their immediate superior effective at using *inspirational appeals* as a method of influence, while 15% rate them ineffective. While these results meet a two-thirds threshold of favorability, improvement of leader effectiveness in this skill is beneficial as it is positively associated with other favorable outcomes.

1.2.4 Expectations for Commanders

A goal of the 2013 CASAL was to identify behaviors of effective commanders at company, battalion and brigade levels. Specifically, CASAL sought to verify leadership requirements for the command levels, identify behaviors not currently included in doctrinal requirements, and identify any differences among command levels.

Open-ended comments were collected from the direct-report subordinates of company, battalion and brigade commanders.⁸ The comments reflected behaviors, competencies, attributes, qualities, the Army values, and other characteristics of effective commanders. In many cases, comments consisted of terms, keywords and short phrases, all of which were coded to themes. Existing doctrinal frameworks were used to arrange comment themes into categories (e.g., the Leadership Requirements Model, the Army Values). New themes were created as needed to best represent the data.

Results showed that the comment themes overwhelmingly aligned with existing doctrinal requirements for leadership, including the core leader competencies and the leader attributes. Very few comments referenced behaviors or characteristics not already included in existing

⁸ CASAL participants who indicated they were in a unit position directly subordinate to each command level were asked to comment (e.g., battalion staff and company commanders commented on effective battalion commander behaviors).

requirements, which provides additional confirmation of the current models. Importantly, the comments and corresponding themes do not represent the strengths or developmental needs of current sitting commanders. Rather, the data represent expectations of subordinates for commanders at various levels, and are therefore subject to certain biases. For example, comments tend to reflect commander characteristics that benefit the subordinate. The results of comment themes are discussed below in the context of the respective category.

Core Leader Competencies

All ten core leader competencies were mentioned in the comments. The four competencies that were described most frequently in the comments were *Leads Others*, *Creates a Positive Environment*, *Communicates* and *Leads by Example*. Behaviors and characteristics related to *Leads Others* received the most frequent mentions across the three levels of command. Comments indicated effective commanders at all levels empower subordinates by providing job latitude and allowing disciplined initiative. At the company level, comments emphasized that effective commanders let NCOs do their jobs and train Soldiers. Also frequently mentioned was that effective commanders (especially at battalion and brigade level) determine priorities and provide clear expectations, instructions and guidance (i.e., a clear intent and end state). Specific to the brigade level, effective commanders develop and share a clear vision for the unit. Other comments within *Leads Others* indicated that effective commanders challenge and motivate subordinates, set high standards, enforce discipline and build effective teams.

The competency *Creates a Positive Environment* also received frequent mention in the comments. Specifically, effective commanders at all levels care for others' welfare (Soldiers and families); positively influence the morale in the unit; remain fair and impartial (e.g., in their decision making process, in their treatment of others); support and protect subordinates (e.g., remove work barriers, 'back them up' when needed); and allow honest mistakes and failure as part of the learning process.

Behaviors related to the competency *Communicates* were also frequently mentioned. Commanders at all levels are expected to ensure a shared understanding, to communicate effectively with others, and specifically to listen well.

Comments related to *Leads by Example* emphasized that effective commanders are the standard bearers in units and demonstrate a quality of leadership for others to follow. This is done by living the *Army Values* and modeling moral and ethical behavior. At battalion and brigade levels, effective commanders also lead by example by seeking input prior to making decisions, accepting advice from subordinates and others, and remaining open to new ideas. At

the company level, comments more frequently indicated that effective commanders listen to and trust the advice and input of their NCOs.

Three competencies that received somewhat less attention in the comments were *Gets Results*, *Develops Others* and *Builds Trust*. *Gets Results* was reflected by comments indicating commanders know and understand the capabilities of their unit and Soldiers; hold unit members accountable; delegate appropriately; recognize and reward performance and accomplishments; and assess and improve the organization. Comments within the competency *Develops Others* most frequently indicated effective commanders actively develop their subordinate leaders, specifically through mentorship. At the battalion level, comments emphasized that effective commanders provide mentoring to junior officers. Additional development actions that were mentioned for all three levels of command included coaching, counseling, teaching, providing feedback and promoting leader development within the unit. Comments related to *Builds Trust* emphasized that effective commanders are trustworthy, establish trusting relationships with others, and demonstrate trust in their subordinates' abilities.

The three competencies that received some attention, but relatively less attention than the others in the comments, were *Prepares Self*, *Extends Influence beyond the Chain of Command*, and *Stewards the Profession*. These comments generally identified the competency by name and there were no notable differences between the three command levels.

Leader Attributes

All attributes within the Leadership Requirements Model were mentioned in the comments. A majority of the comments referenced the attributes by name, though some comments described characteristics or qualities that aligned with an attribute. The following attributes received the most frequent mention in the comments:

- Characteristics related to *Sound Judgment* indicated commanders should demonstrate effective and timely decision making. Subordinates expect commanders at all levels to be decisive and confident when making important decisions.
- Effective commanders demonstrate *Expertise* and domain knowledge inclusive of the relevant technical and tactical requirements of their role. This includes knowledge of unit capabilities and the MOS's and duties of subordinate Soldiers.
- The *Warrior Ethos* was emphasized through comments indicating effective commanders are committed, hard-working, and focused.

- *Empathy*, compassion and care for others are demonstrated by effective commanders at all three levels. This also related to commanders creating a positive environment by showing care and concern for Soldiers and families.
- The importance of *Composure & Confidence* was noted at all three levels of command. Specific emphasis at the company level indicated commanders should display confidence when leading others and making decisions.

The *Army values* were frequently mentioned as qualities of effective commanders at all three levels. Commander adherence to the *Army Values* was often mentioned in conjunction with the competency *Leads by Example*. All seven values were mentioned in the comments. *Integrity* was the most frequently cited value, and related to being honest with others, doing what is right, keeping one's word, and owning up to responsibility. Other values that received frequent mention include *Respect* (i.e., respect for others), *Selfless Service*, *Duty* (i.e., remaining mission focused), and *Loyalty*. The individual values that were least frequently mentioned in comments were *Honor* and *Personal Courage*, though the references to "*The Army Values*" are assumed to be inclusive of all seven values.

Finally, leader attributes that received some, but relatively less frequent mention in the comments include *Military & Professional Bearing*; *Resilience* (i.e., remaining calm under pressure); *Total Fitness*; *Interpersonal Tact*; and *Self-Discipline*. Comments generally identified these attributes by name and there were no notable differences between the three command levels.

Other Characteristics of Effective Commanders

Additional commander characteristics emerged in the comments but did not directly align with the leadership requirements model. First, subordinates indicated that effective commanders at all levels remain involved and engaged with subordinates and the mission. This related to commanders being present and visible during unit training and operations, interacting with Soldiers and showing an interest in their duties. Second, comments emphasized that effective commanders are approachable, available and personable. These comments were more prevalently directed toward brigade and battalion level commanders.

Finally, several characteristics were mentioned in low frequency but are notable as qualities of effective commanders. Subordinates commented that commanders should be authoritative, tough or stern; realistic (i.e., in what they expect from subordinates and units); adaptable and flexible; patient; attentive (i.e., attention to detail); demonstrate humility; and have a sense of humor.

Summary of Findings on Expectations for Commanders

A majority of the characteristics and behaviors that subordinates expect commanders to demonstrate align with existing doctrinal requirements for leadership. Characteristics that received the most frequent mention for three levels of command aligned with the competencies *Leads Others, Creates a Positive Environment, Communicates and Leads by Example*; and with the attributes *Sound Judgment, Expertise, Warrior Ethos, Empathy* and the *Army Values*. All other competencies and attributes were identified as important for effective commanders, but were mentioned in lower frequencies.

A secondary finding from these results is that, with few exceptions, there were no strong differences between the commander levels with regard to the characteristics. Comments reflected general consistency across the three levels of command with only subtle differences.

1.3 The Effects of Climate and Situational Factors on Leadership

The quality of leadership is influenced by numerous climate and situational factors. CASAL assesses and tracks trends on factors such as morale, commitment, career satisfaction, and career intentions, and examines the interrelationships between these factors. Additionally, leader attitudes and perceptions about characteristics of the current working environment provide context for factors that affect leadership, duty performance and mission outcomes.


The 2013 CASAL examined three areas of focus related to unit climate, including trust within Army units and organizations; leader actions and operational environments supportive of the mission command philosophy; and continued examination of the prevalence and impact of negative leadership behaviors in the Army.

1.3.1 Morale, Commitment, Career Satisfaction and Career Intentions

Morale

The 2013 CASAL found that 55% of AC leaders and 63% in the RC report high or very high morale. Overall, levels of morale by component remain largely unchanged since 2010. Situational factors such as rank and current location are known to affect leaders' level of morale. A consistent trend in CASAL results is that a larger percentage of RC leaders report high morale compared to AC leaders. The variation in the percentages of high or very high morale by rank group has also been consistent across years (see Figure 9).

Figure 9. Current Levels of Morale Reported by Army Leaders.



The following results reflect levels of morale by current duty location:

- At CONUS locations, 56% of AC leaders and 63% of RC leaders report high or very high morale, while 17% and 13% (respectively) rate morale low or very low. This is consistent with the levels of high or very high morale reported by CASAL since 2010 (55% to 57% for AC leaders; 61% to 63% for RC leaders).
- Current levels of morale at OCONUS locations vary. The location with the largest percentage of leaders reporting high or very high morale is Europe (57%), while the smallest percentages of high morale are reported in Afghanistan (48%) and Korea (47%). Low morale is reported by 17%, 20% and 24% of leaders in these locations, respectively.
- In 2013, a study by the Mental Health Advisory Team 9 (MHAT 9) found troop morale in Afghanistan to be higher than values reported in 2010 and 2012, but similar to morale reported in 2009. The study indicated 26.7% of Soldiers reported low or very low morale (compared to 20% observed by CASAL). Notably, MHAT primarily surveyed junior enlisted Soldiers serving in Afghanistan as opposed to Army leaders (Mental Health Advisory Team 9, 2013).

Commitment


Army leaders continue to report very strong levels of commitment to their teams or immediate work groups because of a sense of personal loyalty. An overwhelming majority of leaders in the AC (95%) and RC (97%) indicate agreement, with little variation between rank groups. These results are consistent with those observed in 2012 (96% AC and 97% RC) and are among the strongest observed by CASAL since commitment to teams was first assessed in 2009 (87% agreement, AC and RC). Previous CASAL findings also demonstrated that Army leaders rate high on *affective* commitment, defined as having an emotional bond or attachment to the Army (Riley, Conrad, Hatfield, Keller-Glaze & Fallesen, 2012).

Career Satisfaction

As expected, there is a positive relationship between leaders' current level of morale and career satisfaction in the Army ($r = .63, p < .001$). While significantly and positively related, these constructs differ. Morale represents leaders' current affective reaction to the environment or job in which they operate. Career satisfaction represents a compilation of affective and other attitudes regarding characteristics spanning a leader's career (Locke, 1976; Pinder, 1998).

Levels of career satisfaction among Army leaders continue to be favorable, though a consistent and expected trend in these results is that leaders with longer length of service (i.e., field grade officers, warrant officers, Sr NCOs) indicate higher levels of satisfaction than do junior-level leaders (see Figure 10). At an overall level, more than three-fourths of leaders (76% AC and 82% RC) are satisfied or very satisfied with their Army career up to this point. These percentages are consistent with results from 2012 but are slightly less favorable than those observed in 2008 (82% AC and 84% RC). At a more specific level, sixty-three percent of AC company grade officers and 61% of Jr NCOs are satisfied with their Army careers thus far, while one-fifth of leaders in these rank groups (21%) are dissatisfied. In comparison, more than two-thirds of RC leaders in all rank groups report satisfaction with their Army careers, including 70% of Jr NCOs and 73% of company grade officers.

Figure 10. Current Levels of Career Satisfaction for Active Duty Leaders.



CASAL data provide indications of the relative contribution of various situational factors to leader career satisfaction. The results of stepwise multiple regression analyses (see Table 10) both confirm findings from past CASAL surveys and identify new insights on the relative impact various factors have on leaders' level of career satisfaction. This analytical approach examines an assortment of factors to identify those that significantly contribute to an outcome (i.e., career satisfaction). The model included a range of factors⁹ that would be expected to impact career satisfaction, based on past CASAL findings and new additions to the 2013 survey.

Results indicate that eight out of twenty factors that were examined accounted for nearly 50% ($R^2 = .48, p < .001$) of the variance in AC leader ratings of career satisfaction. Of the factors examined, leaders' current level of morale was the strongest overall contributor to understanding their current satisfaction with their career up to this point. Other factors found to help explain variance in career satisfaction include: attitudes regarding one's assignment history and the assignment process; satisfaction with characteristics of one's current job;

⁹ Stepwise regression results only report factors that significantly contribute to the model, not all variables examined. For these analyses, the following factors were examined: job characteristics; unit characteristics; overall level of trust among unit members; severity of stress from high workload within the unit; attitudes regarding assignment histories and the assignment process; effectiveness of operational experiences in preparing the leader; effectiveness of immediate superior in creating or calling attention to leader development opportunities; effectiveness of self-development in preparing the leader; effectiveness of institutional education in preparing the leader; agreement immediate superior is an effective leader; current level of morale; whether the leader currently has a mentor; whether the leader currently serves as a mentor; leaders' supervisory status; and number of combat deployments in last 36 months.

effectiveness of one's operational experiences and institutional education in preparing them for increased leadership responsibility; whether the leader currently serves as a mentor to others; characteristics of the leader's current unit and the effectiveness of leaders' immediate superior in creating or calling attention to leader development opportunities. The remaining factors examined were not found to significantly explain the variation in career satisfaction.

Career Intentions

CASAL has tracked the career intentions of Army leaders since 2005. Overall, leader intentions to remain in the Army are fairly steady and unchanged. One indicator of commitment to service is that 31% of AC leaders and 45% in the RC are currently eligible for retirement but choose to remain in the Army.

- In the AC, this includes 58% of field grade officers, 57% of Sr NCOs, and 42% of warrant officers.
- In the RC, this includes nearly two-thirds of field grade officers and Sr NCOs (65% and 64%, respectively) and 57% of warrant officers.
- Of leaders in these cohorts who are not currently eligible to retire, 90% or more indicate they plan to stay until retirement eligible or beyond 20 years.

Intentions to remain in the Army are also strong among leaders with shorter length of service. More than two-thirds of AC Jr NCOs (72%) plan to stay until retirement eligible or beyond 20 years, while 17% report they are undecided (compared to 79% and 17% in the RC, respectively). AC company grade officers have historically shown the most indecision about their intentions (40% in 2013) though almost an equal percentage intends to remain in the Army until retirement or beyond (42%). Two-thirds of RC company grade officers (68%) plan to stay in the Army, while almost one-fourth (23%) are undecided. These findings are consistent with past CASAL studies. Current leader career intentions by rank group are presented in Figure 11.

Results of the 2013 CASAL indicate more than one-half of active duty captains not currently eligible to retire (56%) currently intend to stay in the Army until retirement or beyond 20 years. This is an increase of 6% compared to the 2012 CASAL, and up 11% from 2011. This also represents the highest percentage observed in CASAL studies for this rank (see Figure 12). These findings are important as previous Army studies have consistently found a large degree of uncertainty or indecision by AC captains with regard to their Army career intentions. In 2000, the officer phase of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) found that 39% of AC captains planned to stay in the Army until

Intention to remain in the Army until retirement continues to be strong. More than half of active duty captains indicate they plan to stay until retirement eligible or beyond 20 years.

retirement eligible, while 42% were undecided and 19% planned to leave (Fallesen, Keller-Glaze, Aude, Mitchell, Horey, Gramlich & Morath, 2005).

Figure 11. Career Intentions of Active Duty Leaders Not Currently Eligible for Retirement.





Figure 12. Career Intentions of Active Duty Captains from 2005-2013.



1.3.2 Characteristics of the Working Environment

Leader perceptions of the current working environment (i.e., attitudes about job duties and the organization in which leaders perform their duties) help to provide context for understanding the quality of leadership in the Army and its impact on Soldier and organizational outcomes. Results of the 2013 CASAL show that leaders generally hold favorable perceptions about their jobs and the characteristics of the working environment (i.e., the people they work with; the degree in which standards and discipline are upheld). Stress from high workload is a persistent issue for some Army leaders and effects both personal well-being and work quality.

Attitudes toward Assigned Duties


Army leader attitudes toward their assigned duties are important for several reasons. Research has demonstrated that attitudes about one's job are related to motivation, job performance, job satisfaction and turnover (Campion & Berger, 1990; Hackman & Oldham, 1976; Muchinsky, 2003). The 2013 CASAL found that AC leaders generally hold favorable attitudes toward the performance of their current duties (see Figure 13):

- 87% of Army leaders agree their assigned duties are important to their unit or organization (7% disagree).
- A majority of leaders (85%) agree they know what is expected of them in their current job (8% disagree).
- Nearly three-fourths of leaders (73%) are satisfied with the freedom or latitude they have in the conduct of their duties (13% dissatisfied).

Seventy percent of AC leaders agree they feel informed of decisions that affect their work responsibilities (18% disagree), which is higher than levels of agreement observed in past years (66% in 2012; 51% in 2011; 54% in 2010). This finding is notable as research has demonstrated a positive relationship between role clarity (i.e., understanding factors impacting one's duties) and engagement (Alarcon, Lyons, & Tartaglia, 2010).

As expected, favorable attitudes toward characteristics of assigned duties increase with rank. Nearly one-fifth of company grade officers and Jr NCOs indicate they are dissatisfied with the freedom or latitude they have in the conduct of their duties (17% and 21%, respectively), compared to dissatisfaction by 8% of field grade officers and 11% of Sr NCOs. Similarly, slightly larger percentages of company grade officers (20%) and Jr NCOs (25%) disagree they feel informed about decisions that affect their work responsibilities (compared to 11% of field grade officers and 14% of Sr NCOs).

Figure 13. Active Duty Leader Attitudes toward Assigned Duties.




Characteristics of Units and Organizations

Army leaders also report favorable attitudes toward characteristics of the units and organizations in which they operate. A majority of leaders rate their unit favorably on several indicators that reflect environments conducive to achieving goals and accomplishing missions (see Figure 14). Notably, there are two indicators that are very favorable and represent strengths within Army units and organizations:

- 95% of AC leaders (96% RC) agree they are committed to their team or immediate work group because of a sense of personal loyalty (2% and 1%, respectively, disagree).
- 85% of AC leaders (81% RC) agree that if they were to report an ethical violation, senior leaders in their chain of command would take action to address it (6% and 9%, respectively, disagree).

Also very favorable is that large percentages of leaders agree that members of their unit work collaboratively to achieve results (81% AC; 83% RC); are confident in the ability of their unit to perform its mission (80% AC; 85% RC); and agree that unit members are committed to performing at a high level (75% AC; 81% RC). A majority also indicate they are proud to tell others that they are members of their unit or organization (74% AC; 84% RC). Favorable attitudes toward unit characteristics increase with rank.

Figure 14. Characteristics of the Current Working Environment in the Army.



Two important unit characteristics that reflect climates conducive to learning and the mission command philosophy in units and organizations are viewed favorably.

- Seventy-one percent of AC leaders (77% RC) agree that unit members are allowed and encouraged to learn from honest mistakes (14% and 10% disagree, respectively).
- Seventy percent of AC leaders (76% RC) agree unit members are empowered to make decisions pertaining to the performance of their duties (16% and 11% disagree, respectively).

These characteristics are also uniquely important to building trust in units and organizations. More in-depth examinations of unit characteristics and leader effectiveness related to mission command and trust are presented in later sections of this report.

Standards and Discipline

Leader attitudes toward standards and discipline in units are slightly more favorable than those observed in past years, but continue to show room for improvement. Nearly three-fourths of uniformed leaders (73% AC; 76% RC) agree or strongly agree that standards (e.g., professional bearing, adherence to regulations) are upheld in their unit or organization. These results show positive improvement over results from both 2012 (69% AC; 72% RC) and 2011 (64% AC; 67% RC). While smaller percentages of Jr NCOs (59% AC; 67% RC) agree standards are upheld in their unit compared to other rank groups (71% to 86% in the AC; 75% to 83% in the RC), favorable ratings by Jr NCOs have also increased since 2012 (+6% AC; +6% RC).

Sixty-two percent of AC leaders disagree that a discipline problem exists in their unit or organization. A positive trend is that the percentage of AC leaders that agree a problem exists has been on the decline in recent years (25% in 2011; 23% in 2012; 18% in 2013), a positive trend. In the reserve component, 68% of leaders disagree there is a problem (up from 64% in 2012 and 58% in 2011) while 14% indicate there is a problem, and these data also show a slight positive increase in favorability. Jr NCOs in both components show higher levels of agreement that discipline problems exist, likely given their proximity and responsibility over junior enlisted personnel. In the AC, 31% agree there is a discipline problem while 44% disagree (20% and 56%, respectively, for RC Jr NCOs).

Leader attitudes toward the enforcement of standards and discipline in units have improved slightly since 2011.

As observed in prior CASAL studies, there is a strong relationship between standards being upheld and a lack of discipline problems. In 2013, leaders who agree standards are upheld in their unit also more frequently disagree there are discipline problems in their unit ($r = -.52, p < .001$). This statistical relationship is important as it shows enforcement of standards is positively associated with favorable views toward the absence of discipline problems in units and organizations.

The 2013 CASAL captured comments from the 18% of leaders that indicated discipline problems exist in their unit or organization to determine the nature of the problems.

- Comments most frequently indicated poor application and enforcement of existing standards as a reason discipline problems exist. Specifically, relaxed environments, a lack of immediate action or correction, inconsistency in the way rules are enforced, a lack of accountability, and double-standards and favoritism are associated with discipline problems (mentioned in 36% of comments).

- Ineffective leadership was also identified as a reason discipline problems exist, including leaders that set a poor example, a lack of accountability, self-concern, and poor communication (mentioned in 21% of comments).
- Unit characteristics associated with discipline problems included comments about unit apathy, low morale, a lack of cohesion, and a lack of respect for superiors and others (mentioned in 16% of comments).
- A smaller percentage of comments also indicated that leaders are either unable to appropriately address discipline problems, that enforcement was ineffective or that there was a lack of support for addressing discipline (mentioned in 7% of comments).
- Finally, comments that addressed the specific nature of discipline issues in units and organizations cited the following¹⁰ problem areas:
 - Customs, courtesies, professionalism & bearing (mentioned in 13% of comments)
 - Infractions – drugs and alcohol, fighting, domestic problems, crime (mentioned in 7% of comments)
 - Laziness, poor work ethic, attendance Issues (mentioned in 5% of comments)
 - Issues with meeting physical fitness and height/weight requirements (mentioned in 3.5% of comments)
 - Policy violations (mentioned in 3% of comments)

Overall, these findings are consistent with results of the 2011 CASAL, which identified factors that hinder or contribute to discipline problems in units (Riley et al., 2012). The results of these comments identified ineffective leadership as a primary factor, particularly when leaders failed to enforce standards or demonstrated a double-standard in the enforcement of rules and regulations. Additionally, comments cited senior leadership within their units as setting a poor example for junior leaders to follow or failing to uphold standards. Participants who disagreed that discipline problems existed commented on factors that hinder those kinds of problems, and most frequently mentioned that effective leadership in the unit curtailed discipline issues. Leaders also frequently indicated that discipline issues were inhibited due to the enforcement of standards equally and effectively within the unit.

¹⁰ Results of the discipline issues listed here should be interpreted with caution. The percentages reflect the proportion of comments (provided by a sub-group of leaders) that made mention to each respective issue as a problem. The results provide an indication of a relative frequency in which leaders perceive these issues to occur as problems. These results DO NOT reflect the percentages of units within the Army where these problems exist.

Stress from High Workload

Since 2009, CASAL results have indicated that about one-fifth of AC leaders rate stress from a high workload as a serious problem. In 2013, this includes 18% of AC leaders, while 64% rate stress as a moderate problem and 18% report it as not a problem. The important trend in these data is that the percentage of AC leaders reporting stress as a moderate problem has increased. The shift is evident in the overall declining percentage of leaders rating stress from a high workload as 'not a problem' (29% in 2009; 25% in 2010; 20% in 2011; 16% in 2012; 18% in 2013).

Smaller percentages of RC leaders report stress from high workload as a serious problem (14%), which is consistent with the past five years (13% to 16%). A similar decline in the percentage indicating stress is 'not a problem' is observed for RC leaders, though it is less pronounced (32% in 2009; 31% in 2010; 26% in 2011; 22% in 2012; 22% in 2013).

Stress from a high workload is a serious problem for nearly one-fifth of Army leaders.

Of the leaders that view stress from a high workload as a moderate to serious problem:

- About half (50% AC; 47% RC) indicate work stress has had a moderate, large or great negative impact on their well-being.
- Smaller percentages (41% AC; 40%) indicate work stress has had a moderate, large or great negative impact on their work quality.

Results of the 2012 Status of the Forces Survey (SOFS) (Human Resources Strategic Assessment Program, 2012) provide additional detail on the stress levels experienced by active duty leaders. Results of this survey found:

- 38% of Army officers and 48% of enlisted members rated the current level of stress in their work life as more than usual. Smaller percentages (17% and 15%, respectively) reported less than usual stress.
- Additionally, 34% of officers and 38% of enlisted members indicate having more than usual stress in their personal life; 18% and 22%, respectively, reported less than usual stress.
- A notable trend in these results is that stress from work life and personal life have decreased over the past decade. Smaller percentages of Army service members reported having more stress than usual in their work life from 2009 to 2012 (range of 45-48%) compared to the six years prior (range of 49-56%). Similarly, the percentage reporting more than usual stress in their personal life differed between similar time periods (range of 35-40% from 2010-2012; range of 43-49% from 2003-2009).

Army organizations respond to high workloads and stress among members by fostering a climate in which seeking help for stress-related issues is accepted and encouraged. The 2013 CASAL found that nearly two-thirds of uniformed leaders (64% AC; 64% RC) agree that seeking help for stress related problems is accepted and encouraged in their unit or organization, while only one in ten disagree. While consistent with 2012, the level of agreement is more favorable than levels observed between 2009 and 2011 (55% to 59%). Improvement is observed across all rank groups, and AC Sr NCOs have consistently shown the highest agreement (67% to 74%) that their unit accepts and encourages members to seek help for stress-related problems.

1.3.3 Mission Command

The Army's collective experience with mission command has evolved out of necessity over the past decade of conflict, and mission command has emerged as a central tenet underpinning how the Army currently fights. Mission command is a philosophical shift that emphasizes the centrality of the commander and the decentralization of capability and authority in increasingly complex operational environments. Mission command promotes disciplined initiative and empowers leaders to adjust operations within their commander's intent (Perkins, 2012). More formally, the Army's doctrine on mission command (ADP 6-0) states the mission command philosophy is exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent, to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (Department of the Army, 2012a).

The 2013 CASAL assessed Army leader effectiveness in demonstrating principles of the mission command philosophy and the extent that current operational climates in units and organizations are supportive of mission command. Specifically, CASAL sought to capture insights in support of the Army's understanding and movement toward *Strategic End 1*: All Army leaders understand and practice the mission command philosophy (Department of the Army, 2013e). The 6 principles of the mission command philosophy as outlined in ADP 6-0 are presented in Table 7.

Table 7. Principles of the Mission Command Philosophy.

<i>Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust</i>
<i>Create Shared Understanding</i>
<i>Provide a Clear Commander's Intent</i>
<i>Exercise Disciplined Initiative</i>
<i>Use Mission Orders</i>
<i>Accept Prudent Risk</i>

Mission Command Doctrine

One indicator of Army leader awareness and understanding of the mission command philosophy is the level of familiarity leaders have with Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, *Mission Command*. Overall, about one-fifth of AC leaders (19%) report they are very familiar with the doctrine, while 40% are somewhat familiar with it, 21% have heard of it but are not very familiar with it, and one in five (20%) is not familiar with it. There is notable variation by rank group, as field grade officers and Sr NCOs report the most familiarity with the doctrine (see Table 8). Awareness of mission command doctrine in the reserve components lags slightly behind the active component, as 14% of RC leaders report they are very familiar with it, 37% are somewhat familiar with it, 24% have heard of it but are not very familiar with it, and one-fourth (25%) of leaders are not familiar with it.

Table 8. Active Duty Leader Familiarity with Mission Command Doctrine, ADP 6-0.

Active Duty Leaders	Not familiar with ADP 6-0, <i>Mission Command</i>	Heard of ADP 6-0, but not very familiar with it	Somewhat familiar with ADP 6-0, <i>Mission Command</i>	Very familiar with ADP 6-0, <i>Mission Command</i>
MAJ-COL	12%	11%	40%	37%
2LT-CPT	21%	23%	39%	17%
WO1-CW5	23%	24%	40%	13%
SFC-CSM	11%	17%	46%	26%
SGT-SSG	29%	28%	35%	8%

Familiarity with mission command doctrine is slightly higher for officers with recent PME experience. Larger percentages of AC field grade officers (91%) and warrant officers (62%) who attended a course in the past 2 years indicate they are somewhat or very familiar with ADP 6-0. This pattern does not hold up for leaders in other rank groups (junior officers and NCOs). Also notable is that a larger percentage of AC field grade officers currently serving in maneuver, fires and effects (MFE) TOE assignments (94%) report being somewhat or very familiar with mission command doctrine than do officers in other assignment types (66% – 86%).

Mission Command within Army Units and Organizations

CASAL captured positive leader attitudes about several unit and organizational climate indicators supportive of the mission command philosophy. A majority of AC leaders rate the following characteristics of climate favorably (results for RC leaders in parentheses):

- 73% are satisfied or very satisfied with the amount of freedom or latitude they have in the conduct of their duties (79% RC).

- 71% agree that members of their unit or organization are allowed and encouraged to learn from honest mistakes (77% RC).
- 70% agree members of their unit or organization are empowered to make decisions pertaining to the performance of their duties (76% RC).
- 83% indicate the level of trust among members of their unit or organization is moderate, high or very high (86% RC).¹¹

There are notable and expected differences by rank group, as favorable attitudes toward each of these indicators increase with rank and length of service. Company grade officers and especially Jr NCOs rate indicators of a mission command climate much less favorably than other rank groups (see Table 9). Jr NCOs ratings fall below a two-thirds favorability threshold for empowerment, learning from honest mistakes, and satisfaction with job latitude, while company grade officer ratings are at or near the threshold.

Table 9. Indicators of Mission Command in Units and Organizations.


Indicators of Mission Command in Units and Organizations (% Favorable)	Active Duty Leaders				
	MAJ-COL	2LT-CPT	WO1-CW5	SFC-CSM	SGT-SSG
Satisfaction with Amount of Freedom/Latitude in the Conduct of Duties	84%	68%	82%	78%	62%
Agreement that Members of Unit/Organization are allowed to Learn from Honest Mistakes	83%	70%	75%	74%	59%
Agreement that Members of Unit/Organization are Empowered to Make Decisions Pertaining to their Duties	82%	66%	74%	73%	58%
Moderate, High or Very High Trust Among Members of Unit/Organization	92%	84%	87%	85%	71%

These results align with research findings reported by the Chief of Staff of the Army Leader Development Task Force (Department of the Army, 2013a), which found that junior officers did not believe that higher headquarters allowed them to exercise disciplined initiative or take prudent risks to the same extent expressed by senior officers. The study noted that these differences are potentially due to junior officers having limited knowledge and experience operating in a mission command environment, or operating in environments not guided by these two principles of mission command. These are also potential reasons for the lower levels

¹¹ The trust scale midpoint of 'moderate trust' is included in the percentage of favorable ratings (i.e., high and very high trust). Results of a 2012 CASAL follow-up survey indicated that ratings of moderate trust levels can be interpreted positively. The survey found that leaders who indicated agreement or strong agreement that unit members trust one another also frequently reported the level of trust among unit members to be moderate, high or very high.

of agreement and satisfaction by Jr NCOs on the unit indicators assessed by CASAL (presented in Table 9). A closer examination of these cohorts on unit outcomes related to disciplined initiative shows notable differences by assignment type (see Figure 15). The attitudes of company grade officers and Jr NCOs currently serving in TDA assignments are more favorable than those serving in TOE assignments. Ratings by Jr NCOs serving in TOE assignments are the lowest, and fall below a two-thirds favorability threshold for most indicators.

Figure 15. Junior Officer and NCO Ratings for Indicators of Disciplined Initiative by Assignment Type.




Leader Demonstration of the Mission Command Philosophy

The 2012 CASAL included a single item assessment of leader effectiveness in exercising mission command and found that overall, 77% of leaders rated their immediate superior effective or very effective (8% ineffective or very ineffective). The 2013 CASAL broadened this assessment to include

Between 70% and 78% of leaders are rated effective in demonstrating principles of the mission command philosophy.

behaviors reflecting the six principles of the mission command philosophy, and found that a majority of AC leaders (70% to 78%) rate their immediate superior favorably (see Figure 16). At an overall level, these results are positive as ratings for each behavior exceed a two-thirds favorability threshold, and no more than 13% of leaders rate their immediate superior ineffective in exhibiting a given behavior. Again, ratings were made on a five point scale where 1 is very ineffective (or strong disagreement) and 5 is very effective (or strong agreement).


Figure 16. Leader Behaviors Related to the Mission Command Philosophy



A majority of leaders at all ranks are rated favorably in demonstrating six behaviors that comprise a composite scale score¹² of mission command (see Figure 17). Perceptions of leader effectiveness in demonstrating the mission command philosophy (as rated by subordinates) increase with rank, which is a consistent pattern observed across CASAL leader effectiveness ratings.

¹² Six items that reflect behaviors associated with immediate superior effectiveness in demonstrating the mission command philosophy were combined into a single scale composite variable. The composite variable included the items presented in Figure 16. Values across these six items were summed and then divided by six to produce a single score with a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 5. Scale scores of '5' indicate a respondent's average rating across all five items = 5 (highest rating that immediate superior demonstrates mission command behaviors). A composite score was only generated for respondents who rated their immediate superior on all six items. A reliability analysis showed that this set of items demonstrates very strong internal consistency ($\alpha = .95$). Reliability indices above .80 are generally considered acceptable for a measurement scale while values greater than .90 are considered very strong (Guion, 1998).


Figure 17. Perceptions of Leader Effectiveness in Demonstrating the Mission Command Philosophy by Rank.



Examination of leader effectiveness in demonstrating mission command behaviors by key leadership position shows some consistency with the previously mentioned findings on rank (see Figure 18).

- Brigade commanders and battalion commanders are generally viewed strong in demonstrating principles of the mission command philosophy. Mean score ratings for these commanders are higher than the overall equivalent for COL and LTC.
- Ratings for leadership positions at company level and below show less favorability than brigade and battalion commanders.

Figure 18. Perceptions of Leader Effectiveness in Demonstrating the Mission Command Philosophy by Position.



Mission command is a focal area within the Army leadership domain, and as expected, positive demonstration of the mission command philosophy is significantly related to effective leadership. Further examination of the composite scale score shows that leaders who rate their immediate superior favorably across the six behaviors reflecting the mission command philosophy also rate their immediate superior effective in demonstrating the core leader competencies ($r = .94, p < .001$) and leader attributes ($r = .90, p < .001$), and indicate agreement their immediate superior is an effective leader ($r = .86, p < .001$). There is also a positive relationship between leaders who rate high on the favorable end of a composite score for toxic leadership behavior (indicating low/no prevalence of negative behavior) and ratings for effectively demonstrating the mission command philosophy ($r = .78, p < .001$) (i.e., leaders who view their immediate superior effective in exercising the mission command philosophy are less likely to view that superior as a toxic leader).

Leaders who effectively demonstrate principles of the mission command philosophy are less likely to be viewed as toxic leaders.

Ratings for each individual core leader competency and attribute were examined to determine the strongest contributors¹³ to effective demonstration of mission command. Results indicated five competencies and two attributes explained 89% of the variance in ratings for effective mission command ($R^2 = .89$, $p < .001$). Specifically, leader effectiveness in *Building Trust*, demonstrating *Innovation*, *Developing Others*, *Communicating*, demonstrating *Sound Judgment*, *Getting Results*, and *Creating a Positive Environment* significantly contribute to perceptions that a leader effectively demonstrates the principles of mission command.

Trust is a key element of mission command. The Army's doctrine on mission command (Department of the Army, 2012a) states that commanders build effective and cohesive teams through an environment of mutual trust. Commanders also foster a climate of open communication as they create shared understanding of the operational environment. A shared understanding and purpose form the basis for unity of effort and trust. Commanders demonstrate trust in their staff and subordinate leaders to act within the commander's intent, but follow-up with constant adjustments to the level of control, communications, risk and initiative required. In exercising disciplined initiative, subordinate leaders leverage this trust and take action in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise.

As expected, a positive relationship exists between leader trust and leader effectiveness in demonstrating the principles of mission command. Leaders who rate their immediate superior favorably on the composite scale score for mission command also rate their superior favorably across a combination of trust building behaviors ($r = .87$, $p < .001$). Specifically, there are strong positive relationships between a superior's demonstration of mission command and agreement that the superior "looks out for subordinate welfare" ($r = .79$, $p < .001$), "corrects conditions in the unit that hinder trust" ($r = .80$, $p < .001$), and "keeps his/her word and follows through on commitments to others" ($r = .81$, $p < .005$).

Building Trust is positively related to effective demonstration of the mission command philosophy.

Leader demonstration of the mission command philosophy is also positively associated with favorable unit and subordinate outcomes that impact mission accomplishment (see Tables 10 and 11). There is a strong positive relationship between leader assessments of their immediate superior exhibiting the mission command philosophy and their superior's impact on unit

¹³ A stepwise multiple regression was conducted to determine which individual competencies and attributes best explain scores on the mission command composite score. Stepwise regression is an exploratory technique to identify the variables or factors that have the strongest impact on a dependent variable (i.e., mission command composite score). Results from stepwise regression indicate only significant variables; nonsignificant variables are not included in the final model.

cohesion, unit discipline, getting results, and the level of trust among unit members. Further, there are positive relationships between leader behaviors and intended mission command outcomes, including agreement that unit members are empowered to make decisions pertaining to the performance of their duties and allowed to learn from honest mistakes; trust in one's immediate superior; satisfaction with the amount of freedom or latitude to perform duties; and subordinates feeling informed about decisions affecting their work responsibilities. There are stronger correlations between a superior's demonstration of mission command and effects that superior has on their immediate subordinates' states and processes (e.g., team cohesion and discipline, subordinate motivation, trust in that leader) than on subordinate attitudes about broader characteristics of the unit (e.g., the level of trust among all unit members).

Table 10. Correlations of Leader Demonstration of Mission Command and Organizational Outcomes.

Relationship between Immediate Superior Demonstrating Principles of the Mission Command Philosophy and Unit or Organizational Outcomes		
	AC (n=8,214)	RC (n=5,325)
Effect on Unit or Team Cohesion	.84**	.83**
Effect on Unit or Team Discipline	.82**	.81**
Immediate Superior effectiveness in getting results to accomplish the mission successfully	.88**	.86**
Perceived level of trust among members of unit/organization	.50**	.50**
Members of unit are empowered to make decisions pertaining to the performance of their duties	.49**	.47**
Members of unit are allowed and encouraged to learn from honest mistakes	.45**	.45**

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 11. Correlations of Leader Demonstration of Mission Command and Subordinate outcomes.


Relationship between Immediate Superior Demonstrating Principles of the Mission Command Philosophy and Subordinate Outcomes		
	AC (n=8,214)	RC (n=5,325)
Effect on Subordinate Work Quality	.78**	.77**
Effect on Subordinate Motivation	.82**	.81**
Effect on Subordinate Commitment to the Army	.75**	.75**
Subordinate level of trust in Immediate Superior	.72**	.68**
Subordinate level of morale	.49**	.48**
Subordinate satisfaction with freedom or latitude in conduct of duties	.44**	.41**
Subordinate feels informed of decisions affecting work responsibilities	.47**	.43**

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Brigade and Battalion Commander Perceptions of Subordinates

More than three-fourths of AC commanders at brigade (75%) and battalion (83%) levels rate their staff effective at distilling information related to warfighting functions that allow the commander to visualize, direct and command. Nine percent of brigade commanders and 5% of battalion commanders rate their staff ineffective in this regard. Similarly, brigade and battalion commanders hold very favorable views toward the effectiveness of their subordinates to exercise disciplined initiative. Very small percentages of commanders rate their subordinates ineffective at taking action in the absence of orders, either when existing orders no longer fit a situation or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise (see Figure 19).

Figure 19. Commander Perceptions of Subordinate Effectiveness in Supporting Mission Command.



Summary of Findings on Mission Command

The tenets of mission command are nested within Army leadership requirements. CASAL results show that leader demonstration of the mission command philosophy is strongly associated with leadership competencies and attributes. A majority of Army leaders effectively demonstrate a combination of behaviors supportive of the mission command philosophy and ratings of effectiveness increase with rank. There are strong relationships between effective mission

command and trust between leaders and followers. Leaders who effectively exercise mission command have a positive impact on both unit and subordinate outcomes.

Brigade and battalion commanders are rated very favorably in demonstrating the principles of mission command, and generally view their staff and subordinates effective in exercising disciplined initiative. Senior leaders view their unit climates as more supportive of mission command outcomes than do leaders at lower levels, particularly with regard to job latitude, learning from honest mistakes, and empowerment to make decisions. Jr NCOs hold the least favorable perceptions about these factors within the working environment. As senior leader proficiency in exercising mission command increases, improvement at the junior officer and NCO levels will become evident. Continued focus is needed in improving leader understanding of the mission command philosophy and effectiveness in demonstrating the principles of mission command.

1.3.4 Trust

Results of the 2013 CASAL support the understanding of trust within Army units and organizations, perceptions of leader effectiveness in building trust, and related outcomes.

The following points summarize the key findings related to trust in the Army:


- Seventy-three percent of leaders rate their immediate superior effective or very effective at building trust while 14% rate them ineffective. A majority of leaders (72% to 83%) are also viewed favorably in demonstrating trust-related behaviors including looking out for others' welfare, following through on commitments, showing trust in others' abilities and correcting conditions in units that hinder trust.
- Leaders who effectively build trust are viewed as positively impacting subordinate work quality, motivation and commitment, as well as team cohesion and discipline.
- Two-thirds of leaders report having high or very high trust in their immediate superior, peers, and subordinates (overall no more than 12% of leaders report having low or very low trust in these cohorts). Just over half of leaders (55%) report having high trust in their superior two levels up (14% report low or very low trust).
- Subordinates hold high levels of trust in superiors that effectively *Build Trust*, demonstrate *Mental Agility*, live the *Army Values*, *Lead Others*, demonstrate *Empathy*, and *Lead by Example*. These competencies and attributes explain a significant amount of variance in ratings for a superior's trustworthiness.
- Trust exists in units and organizations where members treat others with respect, do their share of the work and protect others from physical and psychological harm. Trust is hindered in units where discipline and standards go unenforced and where leaders

show favoritism, self-interest, or fail to demonstrate character. Trust is high in units where leaders empower subordinates to make decisions pertaining to the performance of their duties and where learning from honest mistakes is allowed and encouraged.

Leader Effectiveness in Building Trust


Army leaders build trust to mediate relationships and encourage commitment among followers. This starts with respect among people and grows from both common experiences and shared understanding. Trust establishes conditions for effective influence and for creating a positive environment (Department of the Army, 2012b). Results of the 2013 CASAL indicate that nearly three-fourths of leaders (73% AC; 74% RC) rate their immediate superior effective or very effective at the competency of *Builds Trust*, consistent with findings observed in the past two years (70%-72% effective). Also consistent is that larger percentages of senior-level leaders (i.e., field grade officers and Sr NCOs) rate their immediate superiors effective at building trust than do leaders at more junior levels (i.e., company grade officers and Jr NCOs) (see Figure 20).

Figure 20. Ratings for Immediate Superior's Effectiveness for Builds Trust by Rank Group.



The results of additional indices (behaviors) of leader effectiveness in building and sustaining trust among followers are presented in Figure 21. These include varying levels of agreement that immediate superiors demonstrate trust in subordinates' abilities; honor commitments to others; positively correct unit conditions that hinder trust; look out for subordinate welfare; and refrain from displaying favoritism.

Figure 21. Indicators of Trust in Immediate Superiors by Active Duty Leaders.



More than three-fourths of AC leaders (79%) agree with the statement “my immediate superior looks out for my welfare” (9% disagree). Benevolent behaviors are commonly cited as a prerequisite for followers’ ability to trust their leader, as evidenced in leader comments from the 2012 CASAL (Riley et al., 2013). Benevolent behaviors positively relate with a leader’s demonstration of *Empathy* ($r = .74$, $p <.001$), which reflects care and concern shown to Soldiers and others.

More than two-thirds of AC leaders (72%) agree their immediate superior corrects conditions in the unit that hinder trust (13% disagree). Army leadership doctrine states that leaders build and sustain climates of trust by assessing factors or conditions that promote or hinder trust, and correct team members who undermine trust with their attitudes or actions (Department of the Army, 2012b). Previous CASAL findings identified poor communication (or lack of communication), discipline problems, and favoritism or inconsistent standards as conditions in units that hinder trust. Importantly, leaders who demonstrate effective leadership (i.e., character, leading by example, empathy and care for others) and uphold standards, enforce discipline, and hold others accountable promote trust in environments where negative conditions may threaten it.

Leader demonstration of favoritism is the only behavior in Figure 21 that falls below a two-thirds favorability threshold; 21% of AC leaders agree their immediate superior displays favoritism while 62% disagree. Favoritism is negatively related to effective demonstration of the leader competencies and attributes, particularly *Creates a Positive Environment* ($r = -.41, p < .001$). Favoritism, preferential treatment, inconsistent enforcement, and double standards are factors that hinder trust by creating climates of perceived inequality. Displaying favoritism can degrade a leader's perceived trustworthiness. Among AC leaders, company grade officers (22%) and Jr NCOs (27%) report the highest levels of agreement that their immediate superior displays favoritism. Leader comments from the 2012 CASAL frequently referenced favoritism as reflecting 'good ol boy' systems or cliques within units and organizations. Examples of unit issues included promoting friends or 'favorites' in lieu of the most qualified personnel, unequal enforcement of standards and discipline, and use of discretion in workplace justice.

Trust and Effective Leadership

A composite scale score¹⁴ was used to examine the relationships between trust building behavior, effective leadership and important outcomes. A majority of Army leaders are rated favorably in demonstrating a combination of behaviors associated with building trust, and perceptions of leader effectiveness increase with rank. Leaders who rate their immediate superior favorably across the six behaviors (the trust composite scale) also rate their superior effective in demonstrating the core leader competencies ($r = .88, p < .001$), the leader attributes ($r = .86, p < .001$), and indicate agreement that their immediate superior is an effective leader ($r = .84, p < .001$).

Trust building is positively related to favorable subordinate and organizational outcomes that impact mission accomplishment. Results show a strong positive relationship between leader demonstration of positive trust building behavior (i.e., the favorable end of the leader trust composite scale), effects on unit cohesion and unit discipline, getting results to accomplish the mission successfully, and an overall

Leaders effective at building trust have a positive effect on unit cohesion and discipline and subordinate work quality, motivation, commitment and morale.

¹⁴ Six items that reflect behaviors associated with immediate superior effectiveness in demonstrating trust were combined into a single scale composite score. The composite variable included the items presented in Figure 21. Values across these six items were summed and then divided by six to produce a single score with a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 5. Scale scores of '5' indicate a respondent's average rating across all five items = 5 (highest rating that immediate superior demonstrates mission command behaviors). A composite score was only generated for respondents who rated their immediate superior on all six items. A reliability analysis showed that this set of items demonstrates very strong internal consistency ($\alpha = .92$). Reliability indices above .80 are generally considered acceptable for a measurement scale while values greater than .90 are considered very strong (Guion, 1998).

assessment of the level of trust within units and organizations (see Table 12). Similarly, favorable assessments of building trust are positively related with superiors' impact on subordinate work quality, motivation, commitment and morale (see Table 13). These findings continue to reflect the importance of building trust, as leaders who are effective in building trust have a positive effect on their followers and on mission accomplishment.

Table 12. Correlations of Leader Trust with Organizational Outcomes.

Relationship between Immediate Superior Demonstrating Trust and the Effect on Unit or Organizational Outcomes		
	AC (n=5,907)	RC (n=4,566)
Effect on Unit or Team Cohesion	.82**	.81**
Effect on Unit or Team Discipline	.79**	.80**
Immediate Superior effectiveness in getting results to accomplish the mission successfully	.71**	.72**
Current level of trust among members of unit/organization	.51**	.53**

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 13. Correlations of Leader Trust with Soldier Outcomes.

Relationship between Immediate Superior Demonstrating Trust and the Effect on Subordinate Outcomes		
	AC (n=5,907)	RC (n=4,566)
Effect on Subordinate Work Quality	.75**	.76**
Effect on Subordinate Motivation	.81**	.81**
Effect on Subordinate Commitment to the Army	.74**	.74**
Current level of morale	.49**	.49**

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).


Trust in Leaders

Sixty-eight percent of AC leaders (69% RC) report having high or very high trust in their immediate superior while 12% rate the trust as low or very low (11% RC). Subordinate ratings of trust in their immediate superior (by superiors' rank) are presented in Figure 22. Large percentages of participants report high or very high trust in superiors in the ranks of sergeant major, chief warrant officer, and lieutenant colonel and above. In comparison, smaller percentages of participants report high or very high trust in their Jr NCO superiors. Trust in one's superior is significantly related to the extent the superior exhibits three leadership competencies and three attributes. Specifically, a leader's effectiveness in *Builds Trust*, demonstrating *Mental Agility*, living the *Army Values*, *Leading Others*, demonstrating *Empathy*, and *Leading by*

Two-thirds of AC leaders report having a high level of trust in their immediate superior. Just over half report high trust in their superior two levels up.

Example explains a significant amount of variance in the level of trust subordinates have in that leader ($R^2 = .55, p < .001$)¹⁵. These are characteristics that exemplify a leader's trustworthiness.

Figure 22. AC Leader Trust in Immediate Superiors by Rank.



Overall, just over half of AC leaders (55%) report having high or very high trust in their superior two levels higher; 31% report moderate trust and 14% report low or very low trust. For officers and NCOs in a traditional setting, this individual would be their senior rater.¹⁶ Low trust in one's superior two levels higher was reported by 9% of field grade officers, 15% of company grade officers, 11% of warrant officers, 14% of Sr NCOs and 20% of Jr NCOs. This subset of participants commented on reasons why their trust is low. Subordinate perceptions about their superior two levels higher (reasons for low and very low trust) were reflected in the following themes:

- Self-interest or self-serving behaviors
- Character or integrity issues (e.g., dishonesty, ethical breaches, inconsistent standards)
- Lack of concern for subordinate welfare and development
- Communication issues (e.g., lack of communication, ineffective or unclear guidance)

¹⁵ A stepwise multiple regression was conducted to identify the core leader competencies and leader attributes that account for the largest percentage of variance in participant ratings of trust in their immediate superior.

¹⁶ The 2013 CASAL did not collect the rank or cohort of participants' superior two levels up.

- Disconnected, absentee or apathetic leadership (e.g., lack of presence or interaction)
- Favoritism and partiality (e.g., cronyism, nepotism, unequal treatment)

Less frequently cited were comments about superiors two levels higher micromanaging subordinates (i.e., failing to empower subordinates to lead); failing to hold others accountable (i.e., not taking corrective action, being dismissive of problems); and demonstrating negative leadership behaviors. Overall, these comments show that subordinates hold low levels of trust in superiors they perceive to demonstrate ineffective leadership.


Trust in Army Units and Organizations

In units and organizations, trust means having faith that others will do their part to help the team accomplish its mission and be secure. Higher levels of trust relate to better upholding of standards, confidence in unit capabilities, effective communication, and higher cohesion. Perceptions of trust at the unit or organization level are moderately favorable, as demonstrated by several positive indicators. Two-thirds of AC leaders report having high or very high trust in their peers (66%) and their subordinates (65%). Between 2% and 14% of AC rank groups report having low or very low trust in their peers and subordinates. Figure 23 displays results for the reported levels of trust AC leaders have in others.

Two-thirds of AC leaders have high trust in their peers and subordinates.

CASAL also assessed a broader measure of trust-related attitudes and found that 46% of AC leaders rate the trust among members of their unit or organization (inclusive of everyone) as high or very high, 37% rate it moderate and 17% rate it low. A change to how trust questions were posed in 2013 precludes direct comparisons of these results to previous CASAL results about trust. However, one notable trend is that ratings show some consistency on the low end; the percentage of leaders indicating low or very low trust among unit members in 2013 (17%) is comparable to the percentage of leaders who disagreed that members of their unit or organization trust one another in 2012 (17%).

Figure 23. Active Duty Leader Ratings of Trust in Subordinates, Peers, Immediate Superior, and Superiors Two Levels Higher.




Leaders hold favorable perceptions about unit member behaviors that are supportive of trust in units (see Figure 24). Specifically, there is strong agreement that unit members help protect others, both from physical harm (88%) and from threats to psychological well-being (80%). The level of disagreement to these two behaviors is very low (2-6%). Many leaders also agree that respect is shown to others, and that unit members do their share of the work and deliver on what they say they will do.

Importantly, each of these unit characteristics shows a moderate to strong positive relationship with the overall perceived level of trust among unit members:

- Unit members treat others with respect ($r = .61, p < .001$)
- Unit members deliver on what they say they will do ($r = .57, p < .001$)
- Unit members help protect others from psychological harm ($r = .55, p < .001$)
- Unit members do their share of work ($r = .50, p < .001$)
- Unit members help protect others from physical harm ($r = .48, p < .001$)

Figure 24. Indicators of Trust in Units and Organizations.



The results of the 2012 CASAL demonstrated that trust among members of units is strongly related to unit climate and characteristics of working environments, including accountability (i.e., upholding standards and enforcing discipline), open and honest communication, social cohesion, cooperative performance and shared experiences (Riley et al., 2013). Results of the 2013 CASAL also confirm that these and other factors within the working environment positively relate to high levels of trust among members of units and organizations (see Table 14).

The two characteristics with the strongest relationships to high levels of trust are the empowerment of unit members to make decisions pertaining to the performance of their duties, and unit climates that allow and encourage learning from honest mistakes. These reflect elements of effective mission command and leader development. Through mission orders, subordinates are provided with maximum freedom of action to determine how best to accomplish missions. Individual initiative is maximized while commanders supervise but without micromanagement. Similarly, unit climates where honest mistakes and failure are underwritten as part of the learning process capitalize on the leader development that occurs in the operational domain.

Table 14. Correlations of Perceived Organizational Trust with Various Outcomes.

Relationship between Characteristics of Army Working Environments and the Perceived Level of Trust in Units and Organizations		
Characteristics of Army Working Environments	Perceived Level of Trust	
	AC Leaders (n=8,908)	RC Leaders (n=6,485)
Members of my unit/organization are empowered to make decisions pertaining to the performance of their duties. [Leader Empowerment]	.59	.57
Members of my unit/organization are allowed and encouraged to learn from honest mistakes. [Learning Climate]	.59	.56
I am proud to tell others I am a member of my unit or organization. [Esprit de Corps]	.58	.54
Members of my unit/organization are committed to performing at a high level. [Social Cohesion]	.56	.53
Current level of morale	.56	.54
In my unit or organization, standards are upheld (e.g., professional bearing, adherence to regulations) [Accountability]	.56	.59
I am confident in the ability of my unit/organization to perform its mission [Unit Efficacy]	.52	.50
I feel informed about decisions that affect my work responsibilities [Communication]	.50	.47
Members of my team or immediate work group collaborate effectively to achieve results. [Cooperative Performance]	.47	.48
There is a discipline problem in my unit or organization [Accountability]	-.47	-.51

Note. All correlations significant $p < .01$ (2-tailed).

Each of the other factors in Table 14 is important to understand characteristics of Army units with high trust. In particular, where trust is high, leaders agree that standards are upheld and disagree that discipline problems exist. Several social aspects within units are associated with trust, including unit member collaboration to achieve results and commitment to performing at a high level. There are positive relationships between unit trust and unit outcomes related to esprit de corps, including pride in identifying with one's unit, high morale, and confidence in the unit's ability to achieve its mission goals. As expected, where trust is low, units lack these characteristics. Further, leader comments from the 2012 CASAL most frequently noted that the major factors hindering trust in units included a lack of communication, a lack of discipline or adherence to standards, a lack of cohesion or loyalty among unit members, inconsistent or double standards, and a lack of accountability for holding people to standards (Riley et al., 2013).

Trust exists in units where leaders are empowered to make decisions pertaining to the performance of their duties and are allowed and encouraged to learn from honest mistakes.

Summary of Findings on Trust in the Army

Trust is an important component to building and sustaining effective organizations. CASAL findings confirm numerous linkages between trust, effective leadership and organizational and subordinate outcomes. Subordinates trust superiors who effectively *Build Trust*, demonstrate *Mental Agility*, live the *Army Values*, *Lead Others*, demonstrate *Empathy*, and *Lead by Example*. Leaders who build trust are perceived as effective and positively impact subordinate work quality, motivation, commitment and morale.

Army units with high levels of trust consist of members who treat one another with respect, deliver on what they say they will do (including their share of the work) and protect others from physical and psychological harm. These units also have leaders who uphold standards and enforce discipline, empower subordinates to make decisions pertaining to their duties and allow and encourage learning from honest mistakes. Working environments with strong bonds of trust achieve mission objectives.

1.3.5 Negative Leadership

In recent years, there has been increased attention on the presence of negative leadership in the Army and its effects on Soldier and mission outcomes (Reed, 2004; Steele, 2011; Ulmer, 2012). One form of negative leadership is toxic leadership, which is a combination of self-centered attitudes, motivations, and behaviors that have adverse effects on subordinates, the organization and mission performance. Toxic leaders hold an inflated sense of self-worth and a lack of concern for others and the climate of the organization. Toxic leaders tend to operate at the bottom of the continuum of commitment, where followers respond to the positional power of the leader to fulfill requests. This permits a toxic leader to gain results in the short-term, but disregards other important competencies that Army leaders must demonstrate. Effective leadership is characterized by encouragement and inspiration, while coercive techniques run counter to the Army's leadership principles (Department of the Army, 2012b).

Prevalence of Negative Leadership Behaviors in the Army

CASAL has assessed and tracked trends in the prevalence of negative leadership behavior since 2010. Assessments are based on subordinate ratings of their immediate superior in demonstrating negative behaviors that are associated with toxic leadership. While the term 'toxic leadership' has been popularized in the media in recent years, past CASAL studies have found that this term is not consistently understood in the Army. Therefore, the term 'toxic leadership' does not appear anywhere in the survey. Rather, ratings are focused on observable

behaviors known to be associated with toxic leadership. This method prevents participants from making holistic assessments about their immediate superior.

CASAL results spanning the past four years show that the occurrence of negative leadership in the Army remains limited.

- The prevalence of several negative leadership behaviors shows no change from 2010 to 2013.
- Perceptions of negative behaviors continue to be more prevalent among junior-level leaders and are less pronounced at senior levels.
- The detrimental impact that negative leadership has on organizational and Soldier outcomes is strong.

The proportion of Army leaders who express agreement that their immediate superior demonstrates any specific negative behavior is one-fifth or less (see Table 15). While the specific behavior items included in CASAL have varied slightly over the past 4 years, levels of agreement toward negative behaviors have remained within this threshold. The most commonly displayed negative leadership behaviors are setting misplaced priorities that interfere with accomplishing goals and doing little to help teams be more cohesive. Importantly, **these behaviors alone do not constitute toxic leadership**, but rather are characteristics of toxic leaders.

The proportion of leaders who express agreement that their immediate superior demonstrates any of eight negative behaviors is one-fifth or less.

Table 15. Ratings of Immediate Superior Demonstration of Negative Leadership Behaviors.

AC Leader Perceptions of their Immediate Superior's Exhibition of Negative Leadership Behaviors	% Agree/Strongly Agree	
My immediate superior...	2012	2013
Sets misplaced priorities that interfere with accomplishing goals	19%	20%
Does little to help his/her team be more cohesive	18%	19%
Blames other people to save himself/herself embarrassment	16%	16%
Berates subordinates for small mistakes	16%	15%

CASAL also assesses leader behaviors that provide evidence for the absence of negative leadership. Results show that positive leadership behaviors related to ethical conduct, selfless service and communication are prevalent in the Army:

- 86% of AC leaders agree their immediate superior upholds ethical standards (5% disagree).
- 82% of AC leaders agree their immediate superior puts the needs of the unit/organization and mission ahead of self (7% disagree).

- 75% of AC leaders agree their immediate superior promotes good communication among team members (11% disagree).
- Agreement that immediate superiors demonstrate these three positive behaviors shows no change since 2010.

As a broad assessment, 75% of AC leaders agree their immediate superior is an effective leader (12% disagree).

As toxic leadership reflects self-centered attitudes and motivations that are manifested in a combination of behaviors, CASAL examines negative leadership using a scaled composite score.¹⁷ Figure 25 displays the distribution of scores on the composite scale where most leaders fall across the continuum of values. Results show that small percentages of AC leaders rate their immediate superior as demonstrating most of the negative leadership behaviors in the composite. The high frequency of scores at 5.00 is very encouraging, as it indicates strong disagreement that superiors are demonstrating negative leadership behaviors. The average score of 3.00 serves as the neutral mid-point, indicating subordinates neither agree nor disagree that their superior demonstrates the behaviors, or are balanced between demonstrating some negative and some positive behaviors.

¹⁷ The eight items that reflect behaviors associated with negative leadership were combined into a single scale composite variable. The four negatively worded behavior items (i.e., presented in Table 15), were reverse coded to assign negative behaviors with a small response value (i.e., strong agreement that a leader engages in a negative behavior is coded '1'). Positive behaviors are represented by higher response values (i.e., strong agreement that a leader engages in a positive behavior is coded '5'). After recoding responses, values across all eight items were summed and then divided by eight. This created a single scale composite score with a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 5. Scale scores of '1' indicate a respondent's average rating across all eight items = 1 (the strongest agreement that one's immediate superior engages in all eight negative leadership behaviors). A composite score was only generated for respondents who rated their immediate superior on all eight items. A reliability analysis was conducted on the eight items comprising this composite variable and was found to demonstrate strong internal consistency ($\alpha = .92$).

Negative Leadership by Rank and Position

The prevalence of negative leadership behaviors by rank shows slight differences across the levels of leadership (see Figure 26). Average scores for senior officers (LTC, COL, and GO) and sergeants major (E-9) indicate they are less often viewed by their subordinates as exhibiting a combination of behaviors associated with negative leadership. Overall, the lowest (and least favorable) average composite scores are found among ratings for NCOs, indicating a more prevalent occurrence of negative behaviors by these leaders. Sergeants (E-5) and staff sergeants (E-6) are rated least favorably across the negative leadership behaviors by their subordinates, a finding consistent with results of previous CASAL. Again, less favorable ratings for immediate superiors at lower ranks is a consistent pattern observed across CASAL results.

The proportion of leaders demonstrating a combination of negative behaviors to the degree they would be deemed toxic continues to be low.

Figure 25. Frequency of Composite Score for Eight Negative Leadership Behaviors.






Figure 26. Perceptions of Negative Leadership by Rank.



Examination of negative leadership behavior at key leadership positions shows consistency with the previously mentioned findings on rank (see Figure 27).

- Brigade and battalion commanders are generally viewed as demonstrating positive leadership behavior. Average scores for command sergeants major at these levels are only slightly less favorable than commanders.
- Junior officer positions (company commanders and platoon leaders) are rated less favorably in terms of demonstrating a combination of negative leadership behaviors.
- Platoon sergeants and squad/section leaders have the lowest average scores on the negative leadership behavior composite scale based on ratings by their subordinates.

Figure 27. Perceptions of Negative Leadership by Position.



Relationship between Negative Behaviors, Effective Leadership and Influence

Perceptions of effective leadership are negatively associated with the demonstration of negative leadership behaviors. Specifically, results show strong positive relationships between perceptions that one's immediate superior does not demonstrate negative leadership behavior and agreement that the superior is an effective leader ($r = .81, p < .001$) and ratings for that superior as 'best or among the best' compared to other leaders in a comparable rank or position ($r = .75, p < .001$).

Leaders who demonstrate negative leadership behavior are also viewed as ineffective in using various methods of influence, particularly approaches that gain commitment from others. Results show strong positive relationships between perceptions that one's immediate superior does not demonstrate negative leadership behavior and the leaders' effectiveness in using nine methods of influence ($r = .41$ to $.71, p < .001$). Of immediate superiors

Leaders who demonstrate negative leadership behaviors are ineffective at using influence, especially to gain follower commitment.

who rate among the lowest on the negative leadership scale (leaders with composite scale scores of 2.00 and below), ratings for their effectiveness in using influence are very low compared to the baseline of all AC leaders (see Table 16).

Table 16. Comparison of Effective Use of Influence between All Active Duty Leaders and Leaders Demonstrating a Combination of Negative Leadership Behaviors.

Methods of Influence	Percentage Rated Effective or Very Effective in Using Various Methods of Influence	
	All AC Leaders (n = 8,593)	AC Leaders Rated as Demonstrating a Combination of Negative Leadership Behaviors (composite score ≤ 2.00; n = 247)
Pressure	71%	40%
Legitimating	76%	34%
Exchange	63%	7%
Personal Appeals	70%	9%
Collaboration	77%	5%
Rational Persuasion	78%	9%
Apprising	77%	4%
Inspirational Appeals	68%	2%
Participation	75%	9%

As shown in Table 16, more than one-third of leaders who demonstrate negative leadership behaviors are rated effective at using *pressure* and *legitimating* to influence other, methods that constitute the compliance end of the influence continuum. In contrast, less than one-tenth of negative leaders are rated effective at using other methods of influence. Only 2% of negative leaders are viewed effective in using *inspirational appeals*, the influence method found to be most strongly associated with effective leadership.

Impact of Negative Leadership

There are strong positive relationships between a leader's assessment of their immediate superior exhibiting positive leadership behavior (i.e., the favorable end of the negative leadership behavior composite score) and their assessment of their immediate superior's effect on the organizational outcomes presented in Table 17. The presence of negative leadership behaviors is associated with adverse effects on unit cohesion, unit discipline, and the level of trust among members of units and organizations. Subordinates of negative leaders show less agreement that they would be proud to tell others they are a member of the organization.

Table 17. Correlations of Negative Leadership Behaviors with Organizational Outcomes.

Relationship between the Extent of Immediate Superior Not Demonstrating Negative Leadership Behaviors and the Effect on Unit or Organizational Outcomes		
	AC (n=8,282)	RC (n=5,331)
Effect on Unit or Team Cohesion	.74**	.74**
Effect on Unit or Team Discipline	.72**	.73**
Current level of trust among members of unit/organization	.45**	.46**
Subordinate proud to tell others of membership of current unit	.38**	.36**

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Leaders who demonstrate a combination of negative behaviors have similar detrimental effects on subordinate outcomes (see Table 18), including adverse effects on work quality, motivation and commitment to the Army; subordinates also report lower levels of morale. Further, subordinates of leaders who display negative behaviors show lower levels of trust in their superior, and report less agreement that their superior keeps his/her word or follows through on commitments to others; looks out for subordinate welfare; or demonstrates trust in subordinate abilities.

Table 18. Correlations of Negative Leadership Behaviors with Subordinate Outcomes.

Relationship between the Extent of Immediate Superior Not Demonstrating Negative Leadership Behaviors and the Effect on Subordinate Outcomes		
	AC (n=7,096)	RC (n=6,194)
Effect on Subordinate Work Quality	.67**	.68**
Effect on Subordinate Motivation	.71**	.71**
Effect on Subordinate Commitment to the Army	.63**	.65**
Current level of morale	.41**	.41**
Level of trust in immediate superior	.67**	.65**
Agreement immediate superior keeps his/her word or follows through on commitments to others	.76**	.74**
Agreement immediate superior looks out for subordinate welfare	.72**	.72**
Agreement immediate superior demonstrates trust in subordinate abilities	.67**	.67**

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Summary of Findings on Negative Leadership

In summary, small percentages of leaders (one-fifth or less) are viewed as demonstrating specific behaviors associated with negative leadership. The prevalence of these negative behaviors remains relatively unchanged since first assessed in 2010. More importantly, the percentage of leaders demonstrating a combination of negative behaviors continues to be low. While negative leaders may attain compliance from followers in the short term, they are ineffective at using influence to gain commitment. Results have consistently shown that leaders

who demonstrate a combination of negative behaviors are harmful to organizational outcomes and have a detrimental impact on their subordinates. Negative leaders have adverse effects on the motivation, commitment, and work quality of subordinates as well as unit cohesion and discipline. Subordinates show low levels of trust in leaders they perceive to demonstrate negative leadership.

2. Quality of Leader Development

CASAL assesses and tracks trends in the quality of leader development in the Army. Essential findings on leader development are organized by the following topic areas:

- Army Leader Development
- Subordinate Development
- Mentoring
- Leader Development Practices and Programs
- Personnel Management System
- Institutional Education
- Distributed Learning
- Unit-based Training

Key findings for each topic area provide an assessment of the current quality, engagement, effectiveness, role and level of support for leader development in the Army.

2.1 Army Leader Development

Leader development is a continuous and progressive process, and spans a leader's entire career. The Army's leader development model comprises training, education and experience gained through three mutually supporting domains: operational, self-development, and institutional. By design, a majority of leader development occurs in operational assignments and through self-development, as limited time is allotted for schoolhouse learning (Department of the Army, 2012c).

CASAL has tracked the effectiveness and relative positive impact of the three leader development domains since 2008. Consistent with the model's intent, operational experience and self-development have been rated most favorably, while favorable ratings for institutional education has lagged behind these domains. An important trend observed by CASAL in recent years is a decline in favorable ratings for the effectiveness of self-development. The downturn was first observed in 2011 for AC leaders and in 2012 for RC leaders (see Figures 28 and 29). For RC leaders, the percentage of favorable ratings for the effectiveness of self-development (68%

in 2013) is now slightly lower than for institutional education (71% in 2013). Closer examination shows that these changes (at the component level) are driven heavily by NCO ratings for self-development effectiveness.

Figure 28. AC Leader Ratings of the Army Leader Development Domains (2008-2013).






Figure 29. RC Leader Ratings about the Army Leader Development Domains (2008-2013).



Operational Experience

Operational experiences continue to be the favored and highest impact method for developing Army leaders. The value of 'learning by doing' is reflected in the high percentage of leaders at all levels (in both active and reserve components) who report operational work experience as being effective or very effective in preparing them to assume new levels of leadership or responsibility. Favorable ratings by rank group generally run parallel over time (see Figure 30).

Figure 30. Ratings of Effectiveness for Operational Experience from 2008-2013.



Effective development occurs on an ongoing basis, and operational assignments provide opportunities for this to occur. CASAL results from past years show that large percentages of leaders report 'frequently or very frequently' engaging in opportunities to lead others and to train on-the-job, as reported in the 2011 CASAL (Riley et al., 2012). These practices are also consistently rated among the most favorable in terms of their 'large' or 'great' positive impact on leader development (85% and 84%, respectively, in 2013).

Deployment operations offer rich opportunities for leader development. Eighty-three percent of leaders report their deployment experience has had a large or great positive impact on their development. Past CASAL findings have noted several factors that positively impact leader development during deployed operations, including increased opportunities to lead in higher level positions; increased responsibilities; more time to directly interact with others (superiors,

peers and subordinates); and opportunities to operate in conditions that impose stress, test one's physical and mental toughness, and put training into real world perspective.

Self-Development


Self-development encompasses the planned, goal-oriented learning that reinforces and expands the depth and breadth of an individual's knowledge base, self-awareness, and situational awareness to enhance professional competence and meet personal objectives (Department of the Army, 2012c). Self-development is a continuous, life-long process that is used to supplement and enhance knowledge and skills Army leaders gain through their operational experiences and institutional education and training (Day, Harrison, & Halpin, 2009).

In recent years, CASAL has captured a shift in attitudes toward self-development. While a majority of Army leaders view self-development as an effective method for preparing for new levels of leadership and responsibility, favorable ratings have declined since 2010. In 2012 and 2013, two-thirds of AC and RC leaders rate their self-development as effective or very effective in preparing them to assume new levels of leadership or responsibility. In years prior to 2012, more than three-fourths of leaders rated their self-development effective (see Figures 28 and 29). Despite the noted decline, no more than 10% of leaders (at the component level) have rated their self-development ineffective.

Attitudes about the effectiveness of self-development have declined in recent years, especially among NCOs.

Closer examination of these trends shows that favorable ratings by NCOs have had the largest decline (see Figure 31). From 2008 to 2010, more than three-fourths of Jr NCOs (79% – 83%) rated their self-development effective for preparing them for leadership. This decreased to 72% in 2011 before falling to 58% in 2012 and then 54% in 2013. Favorable ratings by Sr NCOs have also declined, from more than three-fourths favorable in 2008 to 2011, to 71% in 2012 and 65% in 2013. The decline in favorable ratings for officers and warrant officers has been more subtle and still sit near three-fourths favorability.

Figure 31. Ratings of Effectiveness for Self-Development from 2008-2013.



Increased requirements for self-development have likely contributed to this decline in leader attitudes. While self-development largely encompasses activities at the discretion of the individual leader, there has been increased emphasis on mandatory training, Structured Self Development (SSD) for NCOs, and other prerequisite study for institutional education. In past CASAL studies (2007 and 2009), results showed that Army leaders held broad views of what constituted self-development (e.g., seeking out new responsibilities, volunteering for deployment, taking college classes, observing other leaders) (Riley, Hatfield, & Keller-Glaze, 2008; Keller-Glaze, Riley, Steele, Harvey, Hatfield, & Bryson, 2010). A potential effect of the more recent emphasis on formalized self-development is a change in Army leader impressions of what constitutes self-development, and thus a change in its perceived effectiveness for developing leaders.

Despite the slight decline in views on its effectiveness as a leader development domain, self-development has been consistently viewed by a majority of leaders as having a moderate to strong positive impact on development. More than half of leaders (58%) indicate self-development has had a large or great positive impact on their development as a leader, while about just over one-fourth (28%) rate the impact as moderate.


Institutional Education

While education is an important component of Army leader development, CASAL has consistently found that favorable attitudes toward the institutional domain have lagged behind operational experience and self-development. In 2013, 61% of active duty leaders rate institutional education effective or very effective in preparing them to assume new levels of leadership or responsibility, while 16% rate it ineffective. In comparison, 71% of RC leaders rate institutional education effective and 10% rate it ineffective. Notably, 2013 is the first year in which a larger percentage of RC leaders rate institutional education effective compared to self-development (though only a 3% difference).

CASAL results have consistently shown that leader attitudes toward the effectiveness of institutional education increase with rank and generally run parallel over time (see Figure 32). Notably, these results represent global assessments about the effectiveness of the institutional domain as a whole and not about specific schools or courses that leaders attend.

61% of active duty leaders rate institutional education effective in preparing them for increased leadership.

Figure 32. Ratings of Effectiveness for Institutional Education from 2008-2013.



Nearly half of AC leaders (48%) rate resident course attendance as having a large or great positive impact on their development, while about 30% indicate it has had a moderate impact.

A consistent trend in CASAL results has been that larger percentages of leaders view resident course attendance as having a large or great impact on their development compared to nonresident or distributed learning (DL) (23%). A more in-depth discussion of Army education and current attitudes toward officer, warrant officer and NCO courses and their contributions to leader development is presented in a later section of this report.

2.2 Subordinate Development

The practice of subordinate development (i.e., leaders' abilities to develop others) has been known from past CASAL surveys as an area for improvement, and should continue to receive the Army's attention and focus. Given the importance of preparing tomorrow's leaders to assume increased levels of leadership, subordinate leader development requires a concerted effort in both enabling superiors to do it well and holding them accountable for this leadership responsibility. Also, given the frequent percentage of superiors who are rated ineffective or neutral, the subordinate's role in their own development is elevated in importance.

CASAL results have consistently found that nearly two-thirds of leaders report that leader development occurs to a slight or moderate extent in their units, while only one-fourth to one-third of the respondent groups believes this occurs to a great or very great extent. Senior leaders are charged with promoting and emphasizing leader development as a priority in their units and organizations. However, it is critical that leaders at all levels follow through and develop those junior to them to the fullest extent possible. Just over two-thirds of senior-level officers, warrant officers and NCOs agree that leaders in their unit or organization understand the importance of developing the leadership skills of their subordinates, and this represents a stable trend since 2011.


Two-thirds of active duty leaders report leader development occurs to a slight or moderate extent in their unit or organization.

While Army leader development occurs through experience, education and training in three mutually supportive domains (operational, institutional, and self-development), this model relies on action by committed leaders to ensure development occurs. Less than half of senior-level leaders agree that the Army successfully provides leaders with an individualized approach to their development (nearly one-third disagree), attitudes that may stem from a perception that all leaders are expected to undergo the same programs of instruction and education in leader development. Great leaders fill the gap by providing a tailored approach to their subordinates (and others junior to them), through coaching, counseling, and mentoring. Leaders emphasize and ensure their subordinates receive formal development through institutional education, civilian education and relevant training, but also foster growth using

informal development through methods such as challenging job assignments and providing feedback.

Figure 33 provides a dashboard of results for 2013 CASAL indicators of subordinate development. At a broad level, most indicators fall below a two-thirds favorability threshold, and, are at or above one-fifth unfavorable.

Figure 33. Indicators of Subordinate Leader Development in the Army.



Leader Effectiveness in Developing Others


The leadership competency that consistently receives the least favorable ratings is that of developing others. Less than two-thirds of leaders across the Army (63%) rate their immediate superior effective at developing the leadership skills of their subordinates. Since 2009, the percentage of AC leaders rated effective or very effective on the competency *Develops Others* has ranged from 59% to 63% (about three in five), while the percentage of leaders rated ineffective has ranged from 18% to 21% (about one in five).

Over the past several years, CASAL has assessed leader effectiveness in creating or calling attention to leader development opportunities in subordinates' assignments, an effective method of informal leader development. In 2013, just over half of leaders (55%) are rated effective in doing so, though favorable ratings have ranged from 45% to 55% over the past six years. One-fifth to one-fourth of leaders (19%-24%) are rated ineffective in creating or calling attention to development opportunities for their subordinates.

Develops Others continues to be an area for improvement. Many leaders recognize its importance though it is not perceived to be optimally occurring.

Figure 34 shows that at all levels, leader effectiveness in developing subordinates falls below a two-thirds threshold of favorability. The percentage of leaders rated effective in creating or calling attention to leader development opportunities is even less favorable, and results for both items are consistent with past years.

Figure 34. Ratings for Active Duty Leaders in Developing Subordinates by Rank Group.



Formal and Informal Counseling

As a leader development practice, performance counseling is rated relatively low by Army leaders in terms of its positive impact on development. In 2013, only one in three leaders from both components (33% AC and 36% RC) rate the developmental counseling received from their immediate superior as having a large or great impact on their development. Thirty percent rate the impact as moderate while 37% report it as having a small, very little, or no positive impact (for RC leaders, 30% and 34%, respectively). In comparison, larger percentages of leaders rate practices such as informal learning from superiors or peers, and on-the-job training as having a large or great impact on their development.

About one-half of leaders (53% AC; 52% RC) agree the feedback they received during their last performance counseling was useful in helping them set performance goals for improvement. A consistent pattern observed in CASAL is that larger percentages of AC company grade officers and Sr NCOs favor the counseling they receive than do leaders in other rank cohorts. CASAL results show that favorable attitudes toward the usefulness of counseling feedback have fluctuated slightly in recent years, but are lower than observed in 2008 (see Figure 35).

Figure 35. Ratings of Effectiveness for Performance Counseling (2008-2013).




Table 19 shows the frequency with which Army leaders report receiving formal or informal performance counseling in 2013. Of persistent concern is the percentage of AC leaders who indicate they 'Never or almost never' receive formal or informal counseling, which ranges from about one-sixth of company grade officers to one-fourth of field grade officers.

Table 19. Frequency at which Active Duty Leaders Report Receiving Formal or Informal Performance Counseling (2013).

How often do you receive formal or informal performance counseling? (2013 CASAL)					
Active Duty Leaders	Monthly or More Often	Quarterly	Semi-Annually	At Rating Time	Never or Almost Never
MAJ-COL	29%	18%	8%	21%	24%
2LT-CPT	32%	25%	7%	19%	17%
WO1-CW5	22%	24%	7%	24%	23%
SFC-CSM	30%	32%	4%	14%	20%
SGT-SSG	26%	28%	3%	20%	23%
Total	27%	26%	6%	20%	21%

Reasons Counseling Does Not Occur

About two-thirds of uniformed leaders (67% AC; 68% RC) know of one or more instances when performance counseling did not occur when or as it should have. This subset of leaders indicated reasons as to why performance counseling does not occur as required (see Table 20). The results indicate a key reason counseling does not occur is because leaders are not held accountable when it does not occur. The lack of accountability could mean that there are no consequences on the leaders who do not conduct counseling and no concrete reinforcement of those who follow formal procedures. Other factors that affect the occurrence of proper counseling are a lack of time, a lack of knowledge and skills for proper counseling, leaders avoiding situations that might lead to conflict, and beliefs that sufficient informal feedback and guidance are provided (separate from formal counseling). One-third of the leaders in this subset indicated counseling is not emphasized or valued by the chain of command, attitudes which are likely associated with the perceived lack of leader accountability for counseling.

Table 20. Reasons Performance Counseling Does Not Occur As It Should.

Rank Ordered Reasons Why Counseling Does Not Occur When/As it Should For Some in the Army		
	Active Component	Reserve Component
1. Leaders are not held accountable when counseling does not occur	63%	60%
2. Leaders do not have time	50%	51%
3. Leaders do not demonstrate the knowledge or skills of proper counseling	39%	38%
4. Leaders avoid situations that might lead to conflict	34%	37%
5. Leaders provide sufficient informal feedback and guidance on performance separate from formal counseling	31%	25%
6. Counseling is not emphasized or valued by the chain of command	30%	30%
7. Formal counseling is overemphasized in the Army	17%	12%
8. Counseling does not have a positive impact on performance	10%	10%

A sub-set of respondents (19% AC; 18% RC) also commented on other reasons why counseling does not occur when/as it should for some in the Army. The most frequent themes in these comments related to workload demands and time available (consistent with the high frequency of response to “Leaders do not have time”). When units and organizations experience high OPTEMPOs and workloads, counseling is a practice that often receives a lower priority. Many comments simply indicated that leaders do not have time to conduct proper counseling. However, about an equal number of comments indicated that leaders do not ‘make’ or ‘take’ the time to conduct proper counseling, inferring that despite high workload demands, counseling could still be accomplished. The comments also reflected beliefs that some leaders do not make counseling a priority or do not care enough about counseling to do it or do it well. Some simply indicated that ‘laziness’ is the reason counseling does not occur when/as it should.


A second major theme in these comments related to perceptions that the use of counseling is corrective in nature, or that counseling only occurs when behavior or performance needs to be addressed or documented. Some comments reflected views that counseling is not used to convey positive feedback or for the purpose of growth or development, but rather to address subordinate deficiencies. Other comments simply stated that counseling has a negative connotation, and if a Soldier is performing to standard they likely would not receive counseling.

Other, less frequently mentioned comments suggested that counseling does not occur because of ineffective or poor leadership (i.e., self-interested, not focused on developing others); that leaders do not know how to counsel properly, either due to not having the proper training or experience or both; and that some leaders are unaware of their subordinate’s job duties or performance, stemming from a lack of opportunities to observe subordinates, or leaders not making the effort to observe subordinate performance nor counsel them.

Informal Leader Development

In recent years, CASAL has assessed the frequency with which less formal developmental interactions are occurring between superiors and subordinates. Results show that supervisor-subordinate discussions on job performance, performance improvement and preparing for future roles are more common than traditional counseling. However, and as first observed in 2012, these types of interactions do not occur in equal frequency. Sixty-three percent of AC leaders agree their immediate superior takes time to talk to them about how they are doing in their work; 54% agree they discuss how they could improve their duty performance; and 49% agree they talk about what they should do to prepare for future assignments. These results are consistent with those observed in 2012. Figure 36 displays the levels of agreement for these types of informal interactions and are presented by immediate superior rank group (e.g., 64% of AC leaders agree that their immediate superior, a field grade officer, takes time to talk to them about how they are doing in their work).

Figure 36. Developmental Interactions between Superiors and Subordinates.



There is a positive relationship between the frequency with which AC leaders report receiving formal or informal counseling and their level of agreement that their immediate superior takes time to talk with them about how they are doing in their work ($r = .59, p < .001$). Similarly, AC leaders who agree their immediate superior takes time to talk with them about how they could improve their duty performance also agree the feedback they received from their performance counseling was useful in helping them set performance goals for improvement ($r = .62, p < .001$).

An important finding is that these day-to-day interactions with subordinates are also positively associated with effective leadership. Leaders who agree their immediate superior takes time to talk with them about their work, how they could improve duty performance, and what they should do to prepare for future assignments also rate their immediate superior effective in the competency *Develops Others* ($r = .64$ to $.64, p < .001$) and in creating or calling attention to leader development opportunities for them ($r = .65$ to $.67, p < .001$), and agree their immediate superior is an effective leader ($r = .53$ to $.57, p < .001$). Notably, leaders who take time to engage their subordinates in these types of interactions are also viewed as having a positive effect on subordinate work quality, motivation and commitment to the Army ($r = .53$ to $.59, p < .001$).

Leaders who talk with subordinates about current and future jobs have a positive impact on their work quality, motivation and commitment.

Finally, multiple profile tests¹⁸ were conducted to identify common factors related to participants who consistently rated indicators of subordinate development (i.e., the items presented in Figure 33) as neutral or unfavorable. These tests examined characteristics of the participant (i.e., current assignment, deployment status, having a mentor), attitudes about their current unit or organization (i.e., proud to tell others they are members of the unit, agreement unit members are allowed and encouraged to learn from honest mistakes, disagreement that discipline problems exist in the unit) and characteristics of participants' immediate superior or supervisor (i.e., grade or rank, overall effectiveness as a leader) against the subordinate development indicators. Results indicate that AC leaders who tend to rate the indicators of subordinate development as neutral or unfavorable (i.e., ineffective or disagreement) also tend to disagree their immediate superior is an effective leader, disagree their immediate superior demonstrates reciprocal trust, disagree that members of their unit are allowed or encouraged to learn from honest mistakes, disagree they are proud to tell others they are a member of

¹⁸ A profile analysis is a special application of multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) in which multiple dependent variables are examined using the same scale at multiple points or at the same time. Scores across dependent variable are compared to determine whether different levels of each factor score differently across the dependent variables.

their unit, and are less likely to have a mentor. All other factors that were examined failed to demonstrate meaningful differences for ratings on the subordinate development indicators.

Summary of Findings on Subordinate Development

One in five Army leaders is rated ineffective in developing their subordinates, a consistent trend. Formal and informal counseling occurs monthly or more often for between one-fourth and one-third of Army leaders, while one in five reports never or almost never receiving counseling. Formal or informal performance counseling is viewed as effective by about half of leaders who receive it though only one in three believes it has a large or great impact on their development.

A majority of leaders agree that their immediate superior takes time to talk with them about their job performance. Fewer leaders agree their superior talks with them about how to improve their duty performance or what they should do to prepare for future assignments. These informal developmental discussions are not occurring for about one-fourth of leaders. Given the positive association these day-to-day interactions have with a superior's effect on subordinates, subordinate development remains an important area for improvement.

2.3 Mentoring

The Army defines mentoring as the voluntary developmental relationship that exists between a person of greater experience and a person of lesser experience that is characterized by mutual trust and respect (Department of the Army, 2007). *Army Leadership* (ADRP 6-22) expounds on this definition by identifying general characteristics of a mentoring relationship. Namely, mentorship affects both personal and professional development; both individuals must be active participants; and contrary to common belief, mentoring is not limited to superior-subordinate relationships.

This section addresses the extent to which Army leaders engage in mentoring relationships as a mentee and as a mentor and the perceived benefits of mentoring. CASAL also captured insights from leaders not currently engaged in mentoring as to why they do not have a mentor or do not mentor others.

Characteristics of Mentoring in the Army

More than half of Army leaders (62% AC and 58% RC) report currently receiving mentoring from one or more mentors. For AC leaders, Sr NCOs (68%) most frequently report having a mentor, followed by warrant officers (65%), Jr NCOs (62%) and company grade officers (59%). A smaller

percentage of AC field grade officers (55%) report having a mentor. In the reserve component, company grade officers (62%) most frequently report receiving mentoring, followed by Sr NCOs (58%), Jr NCOs (58%), warrant officers (56%) and field grade officers (56%).

The percentage of Army leaders who report having a mentor in the 2013 CASAL is higher than reported during the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) study conducted from 2000-2004 (Fallesen et al., 2005). During ATLDP, less than one-half of uniformed leaders (40%) reported having a mentor. Of those leaders, nearly two-thirds rated the mentoring they received as effective (61% – 69%). The study also found that over 80% of leaders agreed mentoring had a positive effect on their development, with more than three-fourths of officers agreeing that mentoring is important for their personal and professional development. Most NCOs agreed mentoring was important for their development, and specifically, NCO-to-NCO mentoring relationships were reported as being more beneficial compared to NCO-to-officer relationships.

In the 2013 CASAL, 62% of AC leaders report having one or more mentors. During ATLDP (2000-2004) 40% of leaders reported having a mentor.

The 2013 CASAL found that nearly an equal percentage of AC leaders report their primary mentor is a person either within their unit or chain of command (42%) or outside their unit or chain of command (43%). Small percentages of AC leaders indicate their mentor is retired or formal military (12%) or a person without military experience (1%). Jr NCOs more frequently identify their mentor as a person within their current unit or chain of command (59%), which is not unexpected, as leaders in junior ranks have had fewer opportunities to develop relationships with others outside their current assignment. Overall, more than half of RC leaders (55%) indicate their current mentor is someone from within their current unit or chain of command.

Most AC leaders report frequent interaction with their current mentor, but again there are differences by rank group and level. Also not unexpected is that leaders at junior levels interact more frequently with their mentor(s) than do leaders at more senior levels.

- Most AC Jr NCOs (71%) interact with their mentor weekly or more often (and 47% report it is a daily occurrence).
- Half of company grade officers (53%), warrant officers (52%) and Sr NCOs (48%) interact with their mentor weekly or more often.
- Mentoring interactions occur less frequently for AC field grade officers, as 49% report interacting with their mentor 'monthly' or 'quarterly', while 21% indicate it is less often than quarterly.

- In the reserve component, a majority of leaders (85%) report interacting with their mentor monthly or more often.

Perceived Benefits of Mentoring

Army leaders who receive mentoring view the relationship as beneficial and impactful on their development. Three-fourths of leaders (76% AC and 75% RC) indicate having a mentor has had a 'large or great impact' on their development as a leader, and this is generally consistent across rank groups (see Figure 37). The following are ways that mentoring benefits Army leaders who receive it:


- Mentor provides firsthand knowledge and experience specific to mentee's field (71% AC; 68% RC)
- Mentor provides mentee with a sounding board for their ideas (67% AC; 67% RC)
- Mentor helps mentee know how best to advance in their career (64% AC; 60% RC)
- Mentor informs mentee of visionary or big picture dynamic in the Army (63% AC; 58% RC)
- Mentor help mentee set and maintain focus on developmental goals (61% AC; 59% RC)

Leaders who receive mentoring view the relationship as impactful on their development.

Leaders who provided additional comments on the benefits of mentoring conveyed two main themes: that they benefit by 'receiving feedback, advice or guidance on personal or professional topics' and by 'gaining friendship and support' from their mentor.

- Comments related to 'receiving feedback, advice or guidance' covered a broad range of topics, from professional development (e.g., "provides guidance on leadership and organizational challenges," "how to communicate effectively with senior leaders" and "mentors me on being a supervisor and dealing with troublesome staff") to personal (i.e., "spiritual mentorship," "how to be a good father and husband" and "how to maintain balance overall").
- Comments related to 'gained friendship and support' often mentioned that the mentor provided encouragement to the leader (e.g., "encouragement to persevere in challenging job situations, a listening ear and support toward promotion").
- Other, less frequently mentioned comments indicated mentors serve as someone to go to and candidly share a problem or concerns (e.g., a place to vent, or to seek social support); as a source for networking opportunities or as an advocate for the leader's next level; or more generally as a role model for the mentee to emulate.

Figure 37. The Level of Positive Impact that Mentoring has had on Active Duty Leaders (who Report having a Mentor).



There are also implicit benefits of receiving mentoring, as CASAL results show that leaders who report having a mentor also tend to report significantly higher levels of morale and career satisfaction. Results from *t*-tests demonstrate that leaders who currently report having a mentor, on average, report higher levels of morale $t(9,359) = 25.90, p < .001$, and career satisfaction, $t(9,362) = 21.44, p < .001$, compared to leaders who do not currently have a mentor.

Providing Mentoring

Nearly two-thirds of uniformed leaders (65% AC and RC) report they provide mentoring to one or more individuals. Active duty Sr NCOs are the cohort with the largest percentage providing mentoring (83%), followed by warrant officers (72%), field grade officers (70%), and Jr NCOs (64%). Notably, a majority of company grade officers indicate they do not mentor others. Only about half of AC captains (50%) and smaller percentages of lieutenants (39% of 1LT, 28% of 2LT) currently serve as mentors. A majority of Sr NCOs provide mentoring (83% Active and 76% Reserve), though the percentage of Jr NCOs who do is smaller (65% Active and 58% Reserve).

65% of AC leaders provide mentoring to one or more individuals.

An interesting finding is that a majority of leaders who identify themselves as supervisors (to direct-report subordinates) also indicate they mentor (72% AC and 73% RC). This is significantly higher than the percentage of leaders who do not currently hold supervisory duties but indicate they serve as a mentor (48% AC; 47% RC). There are several potential reasons why this difference exists. First, leaders who supervise subordinates may interpret mentorship as a part of their responsibilities: to coach, counsel and also mentor their subordinates on future-oriented goals. This notion is supported by Army guidance that states mentorship is not any one behavior or set of behaviors, but rather incorporates all of the leader development behaviors (e.g., counseling, teaching, coaching and role modeling) used by a trusted advisor to assist less experienced Soldiers (Department of the Army, 2008). Secondly, it is also likely that leaders with supervisory responsibilities have established relationships with subordinates, making it less challenging (and possibly more natural) to establish mentoring relationships. In contrast, leaders that do not have the same level of regular contact with those junior to them may not internalize the same need to develop others.

Reasons Mentoring Does Not Occur

There are several reasons why more than one-third of Army leaders (38% AC; 42% RC) do not currently have a mentor nor receive mentoring:

- About one-half (54% AC; 45% RC) indicate they 'have not found a suitable mentor.'
- About one-third (36% AC; 27% RC) indicate they 'have not had sufficient time to forge a mentoring relationship'.
- About one-fifth (19% AC; 17% RC) indicate 'they do not know how to find a suitable mentor'.
- Small percentages of leaders indicate they 'perceive little value in receiving mentoring' (8% AC; 7% RC) or were 'concerned that having a mentor might be perceived negatively by others' (4% AC; 4% RC).
- About one-fourth of leaders ($n = 1,254$) commented on other reasons why they do not currently have a mentor. Two notable themes included not needing a mentor (e.g., no developmental needs, already an expert in one's field, currently the most senior person in the organization, or at end of career) and lack of support from the unit or organization for mentoring.

Similarly, there are several reasons why one-third of Army leaders (36% AC; 34% RC) do not provide mentoring to others:

- One-half (50% AC; 49%) indicate they 'have not identified a person(s) to mentor.'
- One-third (34% AC; 35% RC) indicate they 'have not had sufficient time to forge a mentoring relationship.'

- Seventeen percent (AC and RC) indicate they 'do not know how to select someone to mentor.'
- Smaller percentages of leaders indicate they are 'concerned having a mentee might be perceived negatively by others' (3% AC; 3% RC) or they 'perceive little value in providing mentoring' (2% AC; 2% RC).
- Comments reflect other reasons why leaders do not provide mentoring (n = 904) such as leaders have not been approached and ask to be a mentor (or do not currently supervise subordinates whom they would mentor), that they lacked knowledge and experience in how to mentor, or that they themselves were never mentored.

Taken together, these results show that in situations where mentoring is not occurring in the Army, it is primarily because leaders have not identified a mentor or a person to mentor, and secondly that this is due to time constraints and/or challenges to forging these relationships. Nearly one in five Army leaders who do not participate in mentoring indicates not knowing how to find a mentor or a person to mentor. By exception, a small percentage of leaders do not feel they need mentoring (e.g., already developed, an expert in their field, or near the end of their career), do not feel they have expertise to offer a mentee, or do not have access to personnel junior to them to mentor.

Leaders who supervise others are almost twice as likely to report they serve as mentors compared to non-supervisors.

Both numeric and qualitative CASAL data suggest that mentorship is strongly associated with supervisor-subordinate relationships. Leaders who supervise others are almost twice as likely to report that they serve as a mentor compared to leaders without supervisory responsibilities. Additionally, leaders who do not serve as mentors frequently indicated they do not have subordinates or personnel junior to them in their current assignment to mentor.

There are notable limitations with current CASAL data on mentoring. For instance, it is not known whether mentoring relationships were formed within the chain of command or through formal means such as the Army's Mentorship Program¹⁹. However, the majority of leaders that receive mentoring indicate it has had a positive impact on their development as a leader.

¹⁹ Since 2005, the Army Mentorship Program has been a voluntary program that provides the Army community (Soldiers, civilians, spouses, veterans, retirees, and contractors) with a single access portal focused on mentoring outside of the chain of command. This informal program provides users with multiple resources to connect with a mentor or mentee, as well as training, guides and reference tools to promote an effective mentoring relationship.

Leaders who mentor others commented on ways for more effective mentoring in the Army. A few general themes from the comments include the following:

- Increase mentorship within organizations by emphasizing it as a priority.
- Provide training or other resource material to reinforce effective mentoring strategies.
- Create more informal situations to introduce potential mentors and mentees.
- Allow both mentors and mentees more time (in the context of their work day) to forge relationships.
- Formalize a mentoring program (cited more frequently by junior leaders).

Summary of Findings on Mentoring

A majority of Army leaders report they are currently in a mentoring relationship, as either the mentor or the mentee, or are engaged as both. The percentage of leaders who report having a mentor is higher in the 2013 CASAL than was observed a decade ago during ATLD.

Several indications in CASAL data suggest that many leaders (especially those at junior levels) associate mentorship as part of the supervisor-subordinate relationship. Thus, it remains unclear the degree to which leaders perceive mentoring to be a unique approach to leader development (e.g., separate from coaching, counseling and teaching) or as an extension of developmental feedback in general. Regardless, most leaders who receive mentoring view the relationship as beneficial to their development. The most frequently cited reasons for not providing or receiving mentoring include leaders not having identified or having ready access to a person to mentor or to seek out as a mentor.

There continue to be opportunities for the Army to promote mentorship in units and organizations. As with other methods of leader development, subordinate leaders are more likely to emulate or follow what senior leaders *do* more so than what they *say*. Therefore increased emphasis on mentoring should focus on conveying action (i.e., showing how it is done) to leaders rather than preaching the importance of finding or being a mentor.

2.4 Leader Development Practices and Programs

Since 2005, CASAL has assessed and tracked trends on the relative contribution that various practices have had on leader development. Given a list of 15 developmental practices, leaders rate the positive impact each has had on their development as a leader. As findings on the positive impact of these practices are integrated into results discussions throughout this report, a brief overview and summary is provided here. Leader development practices are activities

such as opportunities to lead others, on-the-job training, self-development, resident and nonresident course attendance, and broadening experiences.

The 2011 CASAL was the last survey to collect data on the frequency of various leader development practices. About half to two-thirds of AC leaders in 2011 reported frequently or very frequently engaging in opportunities to lead others (66%), learning from peers (66%), on the job training (58%), and self-development (49%). Smaller percentages of leaders reported frequently or very frequently learning from superiors (44%) or engaging in formal leader development programs within the unit (35%). Receiving developmental counseling from one's immediate superior was reported to occur least often (26% frequently/very frequently, 55% rarely/occasionally) (Riley et al., 2012).

CASAL trends show that the relative ranking of positive impact each practice has on development has remained consistent across the past several years. Findings are also generally consistent between active and reserve components. 2013 results show that the perceived positive impact of leader development practices fall within three tiers that were determined statistically through pair-wise comparison of means²⁰:


- Highest impact – practices include opportunities to lead others, on-the-job training, deployment operations, learning from peers, and mentoring²¹. Notably, three of these are practices that the largest percentage of leaders reported engaging in frequently or very frequently.
- Moderate impact – practices include learning from superiors, self-development, civilian (non-military) education, broadening experiences, unit training activities, and resident institutional education.
- Lowest impact – practices include formal leader development programs within units, developmental counseling from immediate superior, multisource 360 assessment feedback, and distributed learning (DL).

As noted, the trend in the relative ordering of these practices (lowest to highest impact) has remained fairly consistent across years. Full results of AC leader ratings in the 2013 CASAL are presented in Figure 38.

²⁰ The three tiers of impact also fit the following practical rules of thumb: Highest impact – 75% or more Large/Great impact, and less than 10% Small/No impact; Moderate impact – About 50-75% Large/Great and between 10-25% Small/No impact; Lowest impact – Less than 50% Large/Great and more than 33% Small/No impact.

²¹ Ratings for the positive impact of mentoring are more favorable in the 2013 CASAL compared to past years, as only the participants who reported currently having one or more mentors were presented with this item. In past iterations of CASAL, ratings for 'mentoring from someone outside the chain of command' showed less favorability due to the item wording.

Figure 38. The Impact of Various Practices on the Development of Active Duty Leaders.



In addition to the contribution of broad practices on development, the 2013 CASAL also assessed current Army programs and resources that support leader development and training. These include the America's Army – Our Profession Program (AA-OP) and associated training materials, the Army's Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback Program (Army 360/MSAF), and three web-based portals that serve as online resources for Army leaders: the Virtual Improvement Center (VIC), Army Career Tracker (ACT), and the Army Training Network (ATN).

The America's Army – Our Profession Program

The *America's Army – Our Profession* “Stand Strong” Program was established in FY14 to enhance understanding of the five essential characteristics of the Army Profession; the certification criteria for Army Professionals; and the principles of the Army Ethic as described in Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1, Chapter 2. The intent of this program is to develop a shared professional identity, motivate ethical conduct, and drive character development for Soldiers and Army civilians. This program reinforces trust among Army Professionals and with the American people, inspires Honorable Service, strengthens Stewardship of the Army Profession

and enhances Esprit de Corps. The Center for Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE) has fielded education and training materials (including doctrine, pamphlets, videos, brochures, and lesson plans available online) to assist Army leaders in executing this program (The FY14 America's Army-Our Profession "Stand Strong" Program information paper, 2013).

2013 CASAL results show strong agreement among active and reserve component leaders that the Army is a profession (94% and 95%, respectively), and a majority of leaders (86% AC and 88% RC) report it is important to them that they be referred to as professionals. Further, more than two-thirds of leaders (72% AC and 70% RC) believe they have a high or very high understanding of the essential characteristics of the Army Profession (i.e., Trust, Military Expertise, Honorable Service, Esprit de Corps and Stewardship), while one in four has some understanding of these characteristics (23% AC and 24% RC).

Leader awareness of the *America's Army – Our Profession* Program (AA-OP) is still growing. At the time of the 2013 CASAL data collection (November-December 2013), 26% of active duty leaders and 14% in the reserve component indicated they were aware of the program. The highest level of awareness of the program was among Sr NCOs (49% AC and 23% RC). Overall, 14% of AC respondents (including 30% of Sr NCOs) indicated their unit or organization has sponsored or conducted training on the AA-OP program, though 42% were not sure. In the RC, 4% had conducted AA-OP training while 39% were not sure. Similar levels of engagement in supporting or conducting training related to the Army Profession were observed in the 2012 CASAL (13% AC and 6% RC).

Sr NCOs show the highest levels of awareness of the *America's Army – Our Profession* program.

For the AC leaders who conducted or engaged in AA-OP training in 2013, 30% report the training had a large or great impact on their organization (e.g., climate, resilience, readiness, morale), while 38% report the impact was moderate and 32% report it had a small, very little or no impact. Twenty-four percent of AC leaders (12% in the RC) indicate they or their unit/organization have used CAPE training materials (e.g., video simulations, case studies, Master Army Profession and Ethic Trainer), which is a slight increase from the results of the 2012 CASAL (10% AC and 5% RC). Again, reported usage is highest among Sr NCOs (42% AC and 18% RC). Of users, 72% rate these materials as effective for helping to achieve training objectives (78% in the RC). No more than 11% of any rank group of those who have received the AA-OP training rate the materials as ineffective.

The Army 360/MSAF Program

The Army 360/MSAF program provides uniformed and civilian leaders a validated 360-degree approach to garnering feedback from superiors, peers, and subordinates, and comparing that feedback to the leader's self-assessment on a variety of leadership behaviors based on the Army Leadership Requirements Model (ADP 6-22). One of the major goals of the program is to increase leaders' self-awareness of their abilities and to help them improve their leadership. The program features: individual and unit-level feedback reports; confidential and anonymous feedback from others; developmental resources available online (i.e., the Virtual Improvement Center); at no cost to the user (other than time); and dedicated support staff. The program is complemented by a professional coaching component whereby MSAF participants interact with a coach (in person, via telephone, or via e-mail) to receive assistance in interpreting their feedback report; in creating an individual leadership development plan (ILDP); and suggestions on resources and activities for developing their leadership skills.

The 2013 CASAL captured modest ratings for the MSAF program. Fifty-nine percent of AC participants rate the program effective for making them more aware of their strengths and developmental needs (compared to 62% of RC leaders). NCOs view MSAF most favorably, as 77% of Sr NCOs and 75% of Jr NCOs rate the program effective or very effective for increasing their self-awareness (compared to a little over half of AC field grade officers, company grade officers, and warrant officers).

59% of active duty MSAF participants rate the program effective for increasing their awareness of strengths and developmental needs.

More than two-thirds of AC Sr NCOs and Jr NCOs (67% and 71%, respectively) rate the program effective for improving their leadership capabilities. Smaller percentages of AC field grade officers (41%), company grade officers (44%) and warrant officers (44%) rate the program effective for improving their leadership capabilities. Finally, about one-third of AC participants (36%) rate the program effective for improving their unit or organization, while another third (34%) rate it neither effective nor ineffective. These findings are consistent with results of the 2012 CASAL.

The imbalance in favorable ratings for the MSAF program between rank groups (i.e., NCOs and officers) was addressed in program evaluation research by Freeman, Foster and Brittain (2012). The study noted that while nearly half of NCOs (48%) initiated an MSAF assessment for their own self-development (i.e., to increase their personal insight), more than half of officers and warrant officers (59% and 51%, respectively) participated in MSAF to fulfill an OER requirement (i.e., box check for initiating an assessment). While the OER requirement for MSAF was implemented to increase participation, the mandate may have inadvertently spurred a culture

of resistance to its value as a developmental tool. In response to participant feedback, recent program improvements include a shortened survey instrument (requiring less time to complete) and enhancements to the online portal.

Virtual Improvement Center

The Virtual Improvement Center (VIC) is a web-based portal accessible through the Army MSAF website that offers a collection of self-development resources. The VIC enables leaders to target and improve their specific developmental needs (identified through their MSAF feedback interpretation) or interests by engaging in digital resources for development. Current VIC resources include videos, digital versions of leadership handbooks, training aids, and simulations and interactive media instruction (IMI) tailored to the Army Leadership Requirements Model (ADRP 6-22). Descriptions of the resources available through the VIC are presented in the reference *Virtual Improvement Center (VIC) Catalog: A Guide to Leadership Development Materials* (Center for Army Leadership, 2012).

Awareness and usage of the VIC is still growing among uniformed leaders. Ten percent of AC leaders (8% RC) report having accessed and used the VIC, while about one-third (35% AC and 36% RC) have heard of it but have not accessed it. Usage varies slightly by rank group. AC Sr NCOs (14%) and warrant officers (11%) report the highest percentage of users, compared to smaller percentages of field grade officers (9%), company grade officers (7%) and Jr NCOs (7%). Levels of reported usage of the VIC show no change from the 2012 CASAL. Program evaluation research by Freeman, Foster & Brittain (2012) reported that the VIC is underutilized by participants of the Army 360/MSAF program.

The VIC is currently underutilized. Leaders who access the resources rate them effective for improving their leadership capabilities.

Of the CASAL participants who report having accessed and used the VIC (AC, n = 749; RC, n = 405), just under two-thirds (61% AC; 65% RC) rate it as effective or very effective for improving their leadership capabilities. Twenty-five percent of users in the AC rate the VIC as neither effective nor ineffective, while 14% rate it as ineffective (24% and 11%, respectively, for RC). Consistent with findings of the 2012 CASAL, VIC resources are well received by the enlisted leaders, as three-fourths of Sr NCO (73%) and Jr NCO (77%) users rate the VIC effective or very effective for improving their leadership capabilities. Smaller percentages of company grade officers (55%), warrant officers (56%) and field grade officers (49%) rate the VIC effective for improving their leadership capabilities. Overall, results continue to show the VIC's potential as a leader development resource. VIC resources are generally rated effective by the leaders who access and use them, though both CASAL and MSAF program evaluation results show the portal is currently underutilized.

Army Career Tracker

The Army Career Tracker (ACT) provides a cross-functional approach to integrate an array of services and resources into a program focused through the lens of career-long learning and the continuum of service. This web-based portal is a leader development enabler, designed to change the way training, education and experiential learning support is provided to Army enlisted members, officers, civilians, and their leaders (Department of the Army, 2013d). Users can search multiple education and training resources, monitor career development and receive advice from their leadership. ACT allows users to track individual progress of Individualized Development Plan (IDP) goals; view skill and competency career progressions across multiple career maps; search training catalogs and educational resources; and connect with peers through My Journal knowledge collaboration. The system also provides an unofficial “lifelong learning transcript” that represents the accumulation of all assignment, training, and education accomplishments by the user (Army Career Tracker information paper, 2011).

Reported usage of the ACT has increased steadily since first assessed by CASAL in 2011. In 2013, 53% of AC leaders report having accessed and used the ACT (compared to 20% in 2011 and 34% in 2012). Results for RC leaders also show an increase in usage compared to past years (13% in 2011; 24% in 2012; 42% in 2013). Usage of the ACT has increased the most among active duty NCOs. In 2013, more than three-fourths of AC Sr NCOs (79%) and Jr NCOs (75%) report having accessed the ACT, up from 56% and 52%, respectively, the prior year. Smaller percentages of field grade officers (35%), company grade officers (34%) and warrant officers (44%) report having used the ACT, though these percentages have also increased since 2011.

Usage of the Army Career Tracker has increased steadily since 2011.

Just under two-thirds of AC Sr NCOs (64%) and Jr NCOs (62%) rate the ACT as effective for providing a single point of access to career development information, while only 12% rate it ineffective. Similar levels of favorable ratings are observed for RC NCOs. Half of warrant officers (52% AC and 48% RC) rate the ACT as effective for their career development. Ratings by field grade officers and company grade officers show less favorability, though as previously mentioned, these leaders are not the primary users of the ACT.

Army Training Network

The Army Training Network (ATN) is a web-based portal that serves as the Army's single source for training management processes. The portal relies on direct input from Soldiers and leaders to provide ATN the latest in digital tools and training management best practices from the field. Through ATN, Army leaders collaborate and share the most current training management doctrine, processes, and products. (Army Training Network information paper, 2012). Recent updates to the portal have streamlined access and sped up information delivery. Features include direct access to unit training management information; the "NCO Corner" which focuses on the NCO's role in training management; and the "What's Hot" in training section that provides Soldiers a quick way to review current issues.

Reported usage of ATN has increased since first assessed by CASAL in 2012. Forty percent of AC leaders and 36% in the RC report they have accessed and used the ATN (up from 26% and 28%, respectively, in 2012). Usage is highest among senior leaders, to include 53% of AC Sr NCOs (43% RC), 46% of AC company grade officers (41% RC), and 42% of AC field grade officers (41% RC). In comparison, reported usage of ATN is lower among warrant officers (26% AC and 25% RC) and Jr NCOs (30% AC and 27% RC).

Usage of the Army Training Network has increased steadily since 2012

Ratings for the ATN's effectiveness in providing leaders with relevant resources are moderately favorable. Of AC leaders who have accessed and used the ATN portal:

- 71% rate ATN effective at providing resources for planning and executing unit training (66% in 2012).
- 66% rate ATN effective at providing resources for planning and executing self-development (68% in 2012).
- 62% rate ATN effective at providing resources for planning and executing unit leader development (60% in 2012).
- Larger percentages of Sr NCOs rate the ATN effective in supporting these three activities than do other rank groups.

As first noted in 2012 CASAL findings, slightly larger percentages of RC leaders rate ATN effective in supporting these training and development activities (unit training—74%; self-development—70%; unit leader development—65%) compared to AC leaders.

Past CASAL results have consistently indicated that the leader development that occurs in units shows room for improvement. In prior years, comment data have suggested that in cases where the conduct of unit leader development is less than optimal, unit leaders would benefit from being shown 'what right looks like' through exemplars and tools. As more than one-fourth

of leaders in both components (27% AC and 26% RC) continue to rate ATN as 'neither effective nor ineffective' in providing resources for unit leader development, there appears to be opportunity for improvement in this regard.

2.5 Personnel Management System

The 2013 CASAL addressed the effectiveness of Army personnel management systems through examination of leader attitudes regarding personnel evaluations and promotions, the developmental impact of assignments and the assignment process.

As a broad assessment, 49% of AC leaders (54% RC) rate the Army effective at supporting the development of individuals through personnel management practices (e.g., evaluations, promotions, assignments). Nearly one-third of AC company grade officers and Jr NCOs (30% and 32%, respectively) rate the Army ineffective in supporting the development of individuals through personnel management practices. These results are consistent with those observed in 2012.


Evaluations and Promotions

CASAL findings continue to indicate that Army leaders do not hold overwhelmingly positive views about the fairness and accuracy of personnel management actions, a finding first reported in the 2011 CASAL (Riley et al., 2012). In 2013:

- About half of leaders (54% AC; 58% RC) agree personnel evaluations are accurate, while about one-fourth disagree (26% AC; 22% RC). The highest levels of disagreement are among AC Jr NCOs (31% disagree).
- Regarding promotions, 40% of AC leaders agree that the most capable personnel are promoted, while nearly one-third (33%) disagree. Again, the highest levels of disagreement are among AC Jr NCOs (44% disagree).

The results for AC leader perceptions about personnel management are presented in Figure 39.

Figure 39. Active Duty Leader Attitudes about the Personnel Management System.



Assignment Practices


As discussed earlier in this report, operational work experience is uniquely valuable for developing leadership skills and for preparing leaders for increased responsibility. The assignment process is a mechanism by which the Army can deliberately develop leaders: to ensure that leaders receive experiences through an appropriate mix of assignments and through serving in assignments for an adequate duration to develop for future positions. For example, the officer assignment process is based on several factors and considerations, including the needs of the Army, force stabilization and availability, but also an officer's professional development needs. As each branch and functional area has a life-cycle development model, an officer's career needs are examined to ensure the next assignment is progressive, sequential and achieves professional development goals for that grade (Department of the Army, 2010).

A majority of AC leaders feel they have received the right mix of assignments and appropriate dwell time, but fewer agree they have had predictability and input into the selection of assignments.

Figure 40 provides an overview of 2013 CASAL ratings for assignment practices. These results are useful for broader interpretation of AC leader attitudes toward assignments. Namely, that serving in an appropriate mix of assignments and serving for a sufficient amount of time in key developmental assignments are the most favorably rated aspects. Assignment predictability

and leader input into the selection of assignments are aspects of the process rated least favorably. Allowing input into the selection of assignments can enhance leaders' sense of control over their careers. A benefit of assignment predictability is that it may mitigate leaders' stress associated with work and family balance. Predictability can also allow leaders to better plan and prepare for their next assignment(s) even without much input or the final say into assignment selection.

Figure 40. Active Duty Leader Ratings for Assignment Histories.



Importantly, prior CASAL results (Riley et al., 2013) have found that favorable perceptions toward assignment histories and practices (i.e., the perceived impact on development and views toward the assignment process) increase with rank. Overall, these findings are not unexpected, as leaders at more junior levels have served in fewer assignments and thus have less to base their attitudes on than do leaders with more extensive assignment histories.

Attitudes about the developmental nature of assignments are generally favorable. Results show there are important differences by rank group:

- Most AC leaders agree they have had an appropriate mix of assignment to support their development. Agreement is generally high among field grade officers (81%), warrant officers (72%) and Sr NCOs (76%). Leaders with shorter length of service show lower levels of agreement about their mix of assignments, including 63% of company grade officers and 54% of Jr NCOs. These leaders are much more likely to have experienced a smaller mix of assignments in their careers.

- About two-thirds or more of field grade officers (81%), company grade officers (65%), warrant officers (68%) and Sr NCOs (67%) agree the time spent in their most recent key developmental assignment was sufficient to prepare them for future assignments. In comparison, only about half of Jr NCOs (49%) agree they spent enough time in their most recent developmental assignment while 22% disagree.
- Three-fourths of field grade officers (74%) agree their assignments have followed an appropriate sequence to prepare them for future assignments. Smaller percentages of warrant officers (65%), Sr NCOs (65%) and company grade officers agree (61%) they've had an appropriate assignment sequence. Less than one-half of Jr NCOs (44%) agree their assignments have followed an appropriate sequence (27% disagree). Again, Jr NCOs have held comparatively fewer assignments and thus had fewer opportunities to develop from these experiences.

AC leader attitudes about the assignment process are slightly less favorable, and again there are notable differences between rank groups:

- Seventy-one percent of field grade officers agree they have had sufficient input into the selection of their assignments. In comparison, 60% of warrant officers and 48% of company grade officers agree.
- Less than half of Sr NCOs and Jr NCOs (45% and 40%, respectively) agree they have had sufficient input into the selection of their assignments; 39% of both Sr NCOs and Jr NCOs disagree they have had sufficient input.
- Two-thirds of field grade officers (66%) agree they have had sufficient predictability in their series of assignments, compared to about half of company grade officers (52%), warrant officers (57%) and Sr NCOs (51%). Thirty-nine percent of Jr NCOs agree their series of assignments have been sufficiently predictable while about one-third disagree (32%).

2.6 Institutional Education

This section summarizes the quality of Army education, perceptions about the instructive process, and the effectiveness of education systems in preparing Army leaders.

Quality of Army Education

- 61% of active duty leaders and 71% in the reserve component rate institutional education as effective or very effective for preparing them to assume new levels of leadership or responsibility.
- The quality of Army courses and schools is generally viewed favorably. Overall, 74% of recent active component graduates rate the quality of the education received at their

most recent course as good or very good (80% in the reserve component). More than two-thirds of recent graduates agree the course content was up to date with the current operating environment at the time they attended (see Table 21).

- Recent graduates hold favorable views of course cadre, as 74% agree or strongly agree that instructors, faculty and staff set an appropriate example by modeling doctrinal leadership competencies and attributes, and 66% agree instructors and faculty provided constructive feedback on student leadership capabilities.
- About half of recent graduates rate their most recent course effective for improving their leadership capabilities; more than one-fifth rate the course ineffective in this regard.
- Transfer of knowledge and skills gained in courses to duty assignments continues to be an area rated low. Fifty-five percent of recent graduates rate what they learned in the course as effective for their current duties. Fifty-nine percent agree the course content was relevant to their next jobs, though notably, the purpose of Army courses is to improve leaders' knowledge and skills through education rather than to provide job training for their next position.

Table 21. Metrics for the Quality of Army Courses and Schools.

Qualities of Army Courses/Schools	2013 CASAL Metric – Ratings by Recent Graduates (2012-2013)	2012 CASAL (change from 2012 to 2013)	2011 CASAL (change from 2011 to 2013)	2010 CASAL (change from 2010 to 2013)
Quality of education received	74% Good or Very good	69% (+5%)	–	–
Course content was current with COE	70% Agree or Strongly agree	66% (+4%)	68% (+2%)	63% (+7%)
Content relevant to next job	59% Agree or Strongly agree	54% (+5%)	52% (+7%)	52% (+7%)
Course improved leadership capabilities	49% Effective or Very effective	47% (+2%)	48% (+1%)	52% (-3%)

Education Systems

- Consistent with results of past CASAL, ratings for the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) B and Captains Career Course (CCC) show room for improvement in effectively improving leadership capabilities. Findings also suggest recent graduates see opportunity to increase the degree of rigor or challenge presented in these courses, to challenge learners to perform at a higher level and to separate high performers from low performing students.
- A majority of warrant officer course graduates rate the quality of the education they received as good or very good, and course cadre receive favorable ratings for modeling leadership competencies and attributes. However, warrant officer courses are not generally viewed as effective in improving learners' leadership capabilities.

- The Warrior Leader Course (WLC), Advanced Leader Course (ALC) common core, and Senior Leader Course (SLC) continue to show room for improvement with regard to the perceived level of rigor or challenge offered by the courses. Many NCOs do not feel these courses challenged them to perform at a higher level, or that course activities and activity assessments were sufficiently challenging to separate high performers from low performing students.
- Rank group differences for various quality metrics for PME are presented in Table 22.

Table 22. Metrics for Education System Quality by Rank Cohort.


Quality of Army Education System	2013 CASAL Metric – Recent Course Graduates (2012-2013)	Officer	Warrant Officer	NCO
Quality of education received	Good or Very Good	77%	73%	72%
Challenging students to perform at a higher level	Effective or Very effective	64%	54%	56%
Improving leadership capabilities	Effective or Very effective	50%	37%	54%
Usefulness of what was learned	Of considerable use or Extremely useful	57%	56%	51%

2.6.1 Quality of Army Education

At a broad level, ratings for the quality of education that Army leaders receive at courses and schools show slight improvement since 2012²². As observed in previous years, attitudes about course quality increase with rank. Most field grade officers (89%) and Sr NCOs (79%) rate the quality of the education they received in their most recent course as ‘good’ or ‘very good’ while only 3% and 10%, respectively, indicate it was ‘poor’ or ‘very poor.’ In comparison, just over two-thirds of leaders in other rank groups rate the quality of education received as ‘good’ or ‘very good’, while around one-tenth rate it poor (see Figure 41). This is a slight improvement from the 2012 CASAL which found 69% of recent graduates rated the quality of education as ‘good’ or ‘very good.’ Prior to 2012, CASAL assessed attitudes about the quality of the leader development received at courses and schools and found a similar pattern in ratings by rank group, though overall the percentage of favorable ratings was lower.

²² To facilitate year-to-year trend analysis for indicators of the quality of Army education, the percentage values representing recent graduates includes leaders who graduated in the two most recent years of the survey. For the 2013 CASAL, this includes Army course graduates from 2012 and 2013.

Figure 41. Perceptions of Recent Graduates about the Quality of Education Received at Courses/Schools.



Course Instruction

A majority of recent graduates (74%) agree that course instructors, faculty and staff set an appropriate example by modeling doctrinal leadership competencies and attributes. Only 11% of recent graduates disagree this occurred during their most recent course attendance. Further, about two-thirds of recent graduates agree course instructors and faculty provided them with constructive feedback on their leadership capabilities (19% disagree). Smaller percentages of warrant officers (61%) agree they received constructive feedback on their leadership while at their most recent course. This finding fits a pattern whereby the leadership aspects of warrant officer courses are consistently rated less favorably than officer and NCO courses.

Recent graduates agree that course instructors set an appropriate example by modeling sound leadership.


Favorable ratings for course instruction were also observed in past CASAL results. In 2012, nearly three-fourths of recent graduates rated their instructors effective at helping learners meet or surpass the learning objectives of the course, and nearly two-thirds agreed course instruction focused on ensuring learners could apply what was taught. In 2011, 78% of recent graduates rated the quality of their instructors as 'good' or 'very good.' Taken together, these findings indicate there are no widespread deficiencies with the quality of instruction at current Army education systems.

Course Challenge

An area that continues to show less favorability is the perceived level of rigor or challenge posed by Army courses and schools. Fifty-nine percent of recent graduates rate their course effective at challenging them to perform at a higher level, while one in five (19%) rates it ineffective. Similarly, just over half of recent graduates (56%) agree that course activities and activity assessments were sufficiently challenging to separate high performers from low performing students (26% disagree). These findings are consistent with those observed in the 2012 CASAL. Granted, a potential bias to these results is that these CASAL respondents are graduates of their respective courses and not representative of leaders that attended but did not successfully complete a course. A summary of ratings by recent graduates of characteristics of Army courses/schools is presented in Figure 42.

The level of rigor or challenge continues to be an area rated relatively low for Army courses and schools.


Figure 42. Ratings for Characteristics of Course Instruction and Quality by Recent Graduates (2012-2013).



Improving Leadership Capabilities

Half of recent graduates (49%) rate their most recent course effective at improving their leadership capabilities, while more than one-fifth (22%) rate it ineffective. These results reflect a consistent pattern of moderate ratings first observed in the 2007 CASAL, which has shown only slight fluctuation over the past 7 years (from a high of 55% in 2007 to a low of 46% in 2009). As depicted in Figure 43, field grade officers hold the most positive views on course effectiveness in improving leadership capabilities, while warrant officers hold the least positive views.

Figure 43. Army Course Effectiveness in Improving Leadership Capabilities.



AR 350-1 identifies the role of the Army institutional training and education system is to provide Soldiers and leaders with the appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) to operate successfully in any operational environment (Department of the Army, 2009). Results of previous CASAL have shown mixed attitudes about the effectiveness of courses in preparing learners for leadership. As observed in 2012 CASAL findings²³, several broad indicators of course effectiveness show room for improvement:

- 61% rated their most recent course effective in preparing them to understand the complexities of the operational environment.

²³ These items on leadership outcomes were not assessed in the 2013 CASAL. Results are presented here as a reference.

- About half agreed their most recent course or school increased their awareness of their own leadership strengths and weaknesses, and effectively prepared them to address ethical challenges in the Army.
- Less than half rated their most recent course effective at preparing them to develop the leadership skills of their subordinate leaders.

Utility of Course Learning to Army Duties

The Army Learning Concept for 2015 (ALC 2015, TRADOC PAM 525-8-2) states that courses need to provide learners with novel and appropriate content and provide experiences that allow leaders to reflect upon and develop their knowledge, skills and abilities (Department of the Army, 2011). Thus, the intent of Army education is to arm learners with knowledge and skills that will help them to successfully perform their duties. CASAL results have consistently shown mixed attitudes about the usefulness and relevance of what courses offer learners, and notable differences exist by rank level (see Table 23).

Results of the 2013 CASAL show little change in leader attitudes about the utility of courses in preparing them to perform their duties. Overall, half of recent graduates (52%) rate what they learned in the course as being 'of considerable use' or 'extremely useful', while 34% indicate 'of some use.' Fifty-six percent of graduates agree their course was relevant to their current duties, though more than one-fourth in most rank groups disagree. Finally, 55% of recent graduates rate what they learned in the course as effective for their current duties, while 22% rate it ineffective.

Recent graduates report mixed attitudes regarding the usefulness and relevance of Army courses.

Table 23. Perceptions by Recent Graduates about the Relevance and Utility of Courses by Rank Cohort.

Ratings for the Relevance and Utility of Army Courses/Schools (Recent Graduates from 2012-2013)					
	SGT - SSG	SFC - CSM	WO1 – CW5	2LT-CPT	MAJ-COL
Agreement course content was relevant to current job	55%	63%	56%	59%	70%
Usefulness of what was learned ('Of considerable use' or 'Extremely useful')	49%	55%	45%	52%	73%
Effectiveness of what was learned for current duties	53%	59%	50%	53%	72%

Trend results show that ratings by field grade officers on these and similar course assessments have consistently been more favorable than other rank groups.

2.6.2 Course-Specific Findings

The following sections summarize CASAL findings for officer, warrant officer and NCO courses. Interpretation of these results requires a note of caution. The intent of CASAL has been to identify and track trends in the quality of Army education as it pertains to educating and preparing leaders for increased responsibilities (i.e., developing their leadership skills and abilities). The CASAL assessment of course characteristics and learning outcomes is not tailored to the instruction or objectives specific to a given course. Rather, these data offer a broad look at the quality of the education, the relevance and utility of what is learned, and the contribution of Army education to developing leadership skills and capabilities.

Results are discussed here for select courses and schools where a sufficient number of recent graduates (i.e., > 100) provided ratings on the 2013 CASAL. The results presented in this section are constrained to the respondents who completed the specified course within the past three years (i.e., results reflect perceptions of 2013 CASAL participants who graduated the course in 2011, 2012 and 2013)²⁴. For clarity in interpretation, percentages reflect ratings by active component leaders.

Officer Courses

This section reviews CASAL results for the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) B, Captains Career Course (CCC), Intermediate Level Education (ILE) resident, and the Army War College (AWC) or other Senior Service College Program (SSC). A consistent pattern observed in the ratings of recent officer course graduates is that courses for junior officers are rated less favorably compared to later courses. For example, smaller percentages of company grade officers rate BOLC B and CCC favorably compared to the percentage of field grade officers that rate ILE and the AWC favorably.

- The quality of education received at BOLC B and CCC is very positive (70% and 76%, respectively) while even higher proportions of ILE and AWC graduates rate quality positively (90% and 95%, respectively).
- Course cadre at BOLC B and CCC are viewed as effectively modeling leadership competencies and attributes. The levels of agreement that instructors provide constructive feedback on student leadership sit near the two-thirds threshold of favorability.

²⁴ This section discusses course ratings by recent graduates (i.e., 2011-2013). The level of sampling in CASAL does not allow for examination of results for a single course year (e.g., 2013 course graduates). Where applicable, patterns in item favorability across CASAL years are discussed.

- Just over half of recent graduates of BOLC B (55%) and CCC (54%) agree that the course was sufficiently challenging to separate high performers from low performing students. Similar percentages of graduates (58% and 55%, respectively) rate the course effective at challenging them to perform at a higher level, indicating a potential area for improvement.
- The quality of education received at ILE is rated very favorably. However, smaller percentages of recent graduates (56%) believe the course increased their leadership capabilities and attitudes toward the relevance of what is learned at ILE and its effectiveness for subsequent duties sits near the two-thirds threshold of favorability.
- AWC graduates continue to report high marks for their course experience and the relevance and effectiveness of what is learned.
- Ratings across these officer courses show that the content is generally up to date with the current operating environment.

The 2012 CASAL reported that expectations of most officer course graduates were being met, exceeded or greatly exceeded (Riley et al., 2013). Notably, one-fifth of recent graduates of ILE resident and about one-third from BOLC B (35%) and CCC (31%) indicated their respective course fell short or fell well short of their expectations. Across the board, the most frequently cited reason by this sub-group of leaders related to a lack of rigor or challenge in the course. 2013 CASAL results also indicate the level of challenge in courses should continue to be a point of consideration for officer education system improvement.


Percentages of favorable ratings for officer course characteristics are presented in Table 24.²⁵ Ratings for attitudes about course outcomes are presented in Figure 44.

²⁵ Percentages that are bolded and underlined in Table 24 represent areas within officer courses that received favorable ratings below 65% (e.g., agreement, effectiveness, or good/very good quality).

Table 24. Ratings for Officer Courses and Schools by Recent AC Graduates (2011-2013).

	Quality of Education Received (% Good or Very Good)	Agreement course content was up to date with COE	Effectiveness of course at challenging learner to perform at higher level	Agreement course instructors provided constructive feedback on leadership	Agreement course cadre appropriately model leadership competencies and attributes
Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC) B	70%	69%	58%	64%	73%
Captains Career Course (CCC)	76%	71%	55%	66%	75%
Intermediate Level Education (ILE) resident	90%	87%	69%	71%	79%
Army War College (AWC) or other SSC	95%	93%	93%	71%	88%

Figure 44. Ratings for Officer Course Relevance, Applicability and Effectiveness in Preparing Leaders (2011-2013).



Warrant Officer Courses

This section reviews CASAL results for the Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC) or BOLC B, the Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC), the Warrant Officer Staff Course (WOSC), and the Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course (WOSSC). Ratings by recent graduates of warrant officer courses have consistently shown less favorability compared to officer and NCO courses. Overall, ratings for the WOBC/BOLC B and WOSSC tend to be slightly more positive than the other courses.

- The quality of the education received at WOBC/BOLC B, WOSC, and WOSSC is generally favorable. In comparison, 62% of WOAC graduates rate the education received as being of 'good' or 'very good' quality.
- Across courses, warrant officers report strong agreement that instructors appropriately model leadership competencies and attributes, which is positive.
- Warrant officer courses are generally viewed as up to date with the current operating environment, with the exception of WOAC (54% agreement). WOAC graduates also rate the course lowest in the effectiveness of what they learned for their current duties.
- Less than half of WOAC and WOSC graduates rate the courses effective at challenging them to perform at a higher level; only 40% and 46%, respectively, agree the course was sufficiently challenging to separate high performers from low performing students. In 2012, a 'lack of rigor or challenge' was the key reason given as to why these courses fell short of the expectations of over 40% of recent graduates.
- Warrant officers consistently rate the leadership aspects of courses they attend as low. Across courses, less than half of recent graduates (ranging from 30% to 46%) rate their course experience as effective for improving their leadership capabilities. However, this is a slight improvement compared to 2012 (range of 25% to 38% effective). Less than two-thirds of warrant officers agree course instructors provided them with constructive feedback on leadership.

Given the predominantly technical orientation of the warrant officer cohort, low ratings on the perceived contribution of warrant officer courses for improving leadership capabilities are not unexpected. However, Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, states that a goal of warrant officer training and education within OES is to produce highly specialized expert officers, leaders and trainers who are fully competent in technical, tactical and leadership skills (2010). Recent research (Lamphear et al., 2012) concluded that the role of warrant officers serving as technical experts is expanding to include greater leadership and strategic-level functions. Warrant officers hold formal and informal leadership responsibilities at platoon, company, battalion and higher

echelons, and as members of staffs. Thus, it is important that warrant officers receive the appropriate preparation for these roles at the courses they attend.


Percentages of favorable ratings for warrant officer course characteristics are presented in Table 25.²⁶ Ratings for attitudes about course outcomes are presented in Figure 45.

Table 25. Ratings for Warrant Officer Courses by Recent AC Graduates (2011-2013).

	Quality of Education Received (% Good or Very Good)	Agreement course content was up to date with COE	Effectiveness of course at challenging learner to perform at higher level	Agreement course instructors provided constructive feedback on leadership	Agreement course cadre appropriately model leadership competencies and attributes
Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC) or BOLC B	79%	68%	<u>64%</u>	66%	80%
Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC)	<u>62%</u>	<u>54%</u>	<u>40%</u>	<u>61%</u>	74%
Warrant Officer Staff Course (WOSC)	71%	75%	<u>46%</u>	<u>51%</u>	71%
Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course (WOSSC)	83%	86%	66%	<u>61%</u>	83%

²⁶ Percentages that are bolded and underlined in Table 25 represent areas within warrant officer courses that received favorable ratings below 65% (e.g., agreement, effectiveness, or good/very good quality).

Figure 45. Ratings for Warrant Officer Course Relevance, Applicability and Effectiveness in Preparing Leaders (2011-2013).



Noncommissioned Officer Courses

This section reviews CASAL results for the Warrior Leader Course (WLC), Advanced Leader Course (ALC) common core, Senior Leader Course (SLC), and Sergeants Major Course (SMC). The SMC continues to be the most favorably rated and well received course within NCOES, while courses for junior NCOs continue to show room for improvement in various respects.

- The quality of education at WLC is rated favorably (76% good or very good), and recent graduates show strong agreement that course cadre provide constructive feedback on leadership and appropriately model leadership competencies and attributes.
- Ratings for ALC common core show the quality of education meets a two-thirds favorability threshold (67%) though fewer leaders (63%) agree the course content is up to date with the current operating environment. The relevance and effectiveness of what is learned is viewed favorably by about half of recent graduates (55% and 51%, respectively). Notably, the common core DL portion of ALC is preparation for the MOS-specific resident phase of the course. ALC is well attended but not generally viewed as challenging by many NCOs.

- The SLC also meets a two-thirds favorability threshold with regard to course quality (68%). Just over half of recent SLC graduates agree the course content was up to date with the current operating environment (56%), which is the lowest for NCOES courses.
- Eighty percent of recent SMC graduates rate the course effective at challenging them to perform at a higher level. More than two thirds rate the course effective for improving their leadership capabilities (69%) and agree the content was relevant to their current job (71%). Results of the 2012 CASAL previously showed that other favorable aspects of SMC are in preparing learners to understand the complexity of the operational environment (76% effective); preparing learners to address ethical challenges they face in the Army (69%); and in preparing learners to perform staff functions (67%).

A common theme observed in the ratings across several NCOES courses is that the level of rigor or challenge is not perceived to be at an optimal level. Only about half of recent graduates of ALC (50%) and SLC (53%) rate their course effective at challenging them to perform at a higher level and agree activities and activity assessments separated high performing students from low (52% and 53%, respectively). Ratings for WLC are only slightly more favorable. The 2012 CASAL assessed the degree with which courses met graduate expectations, and found that one-third of recent graduates from these three courses (WLC, ALC and SLC) indicated the course fell short or fell well short of expectations (Riley et al., 2013). The most frequent reason cited was a ‘lack of rigor or challenge (e.g., the course felt like a check-the-box activity)’ – a response given by about two-thirds of this sub-group. Also noted was that information presented in these courses was not new to the learner (e.g., covered in previous course, learned through self-development, or through experiences), a factor that would contribute to a lack of perceived challenge in the courses.

A current research initiative by the Institute of NCO Professional Development is investigating ways to improve NCOES. A more in-depth examination of historical CASAL results in support of this effort is described in the CAL technical report, *2005-2012 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): Annex of NCO Findings* (Gunther & Fallesen, 2014).


Percentages of favorable ratings for NCO course characteristics are presented in Table 26.²⁷ Ratings for attitudes about course outcomes are presented in Figure 46.

²⁷ Percentages that are bolded and underlined in Table 26 represent areas within NCO courses that received favorable ratings below 65% (e.g., agreement, effectiveness, or good/very good quality).

Table 26. Ratings for Noncommissioned Officer Courses by Recent AC Graduates (2011-2013).

	Quality of Education Received (% Good or Very Good)	Agreement course content was up to date with COE	Effectiveness of course at challenging learner to perform at higher level	Agreement course instructors provided constructive feedback on leadership	Agreement course cadre appropriately model leadership competencies and attributes
Warrior Leader Course (WLC)	76%	76%	61%	78%	74%
Advanced Leader Course (ALC) common core	67%	63%	50%	64%	70%
Senior Leader Course (SLC)	68%	56%	53%	70%	72%
Sergeants Major Course (SMC)	87%	80%	80%	77%	76%

Figure 46. Ratings for NCO Course Relevance, Applicability and Effectiveness in Preparing Leaders (2011-2013).



Summary of Findings on Institutional Education

The quality of the education received in Army courses and schools is rated favorably by 74% of recent course graduates, and shows a positive increase since assessed in 2012. Also favorable are overall perceptions of course content being up to date with the current operating environment (70%) to the highest level observed since 2010.

Course instructors and cadre are also viewed favorably by a majority of recent graduates, specifically in setting an appropriate example by modeling doctrinal leadership competencies and attributes. About two-thirds of graduates also agree that course instructors and faculty provided them with constructive feedback on their leadership capabilities.

As observed in results from past CASAL studies, the effectiveness of courses in preparing learners for leadership tends to be rated less favorably than other aspects of the course. It is notable that overall, only about half of recent graduates have rated their course effective at improving their leadership capabilities, a consistent trend observed since 2007. In fact, the only courses that exceed a two-thirds favorability threshold are the Army War College, Warrior Leader Course, and Sergeants Major Course.

CASAL results point to the level of rigor or challenge (associated with several courses) as the most persistent area for improvement. Specifically, course effectiveness at challenging learners to perform at a higher level falls below a two-thirds favorability threshold for each course examined with the exception of ILE, AWC, and SMC. Additionally, course content for many of these courses is not seen as sufficiently challenging to separate high performing students from low.

2.7 Distributed Learning (DL)


The Army defines distributed learning (DL) as *technology-delivered training and education where the instructor and learners are separated by time or distance or both*. Required DL encompasses distributed training and education that is required by directive, policy, course completion requirements or other mandate and is not what is taken voluntarily.

The following discussion summarizes leader attitudes toward required DL as assessed by the 2013 CASAL. When responding to the survey, CASAL participants were presented with the above definition of required DL. The survey did not otherwise prime participants to consider any specific DL courses, modules or trainings when making their ratings.

Attitudes about Required DL

Army leaders show mixed attitudes about the value of required DL, access to sufficient infrastructure to complete required DL, and opportunities to complete required DL during duty time. A summary of 2013 CASAL results on required DL is presented in Figure 47.

Figure 47. Active Duty Leader Attitudes about Required DL.



Leaders show moderate to weak agreement that required DL activities enhance the abilities of their subordinates to perform their duties. Only 40% of AC and RC leaders agree DL is valuable in this regard, while almost one-third (29% AC and 28% RC) disagree. These findings are consistent with leader attitudes about the impact of distributed learning on development.

Twenty-three percent of AC leaders believe DL has had a 'large or great' impact on their personal development, while nearly half (48%) indicate DL has had a 'small, very little or no impact.' Similar results are found among RC leaders and ratings from both components show level trends over time.


Competing demands for duty time pose the biggest challenge to completing required DL.

Time available is the biggest challenge in completing required DL for all rank groups (see Figure 48). Overall, only 40% of AC leaders agree they have sufficient opportunity during duty time to

complete required DL, while 43% disagree. Army supervisors are also challenged to allow adequate duty time for their subordinates to complete required DL, and 22% of AC leaders disagree they are able to do so. The most frequently cited reason for not allowing subordinate DL during duty time is too many competing demands (82%). Smaller percentages of AC leaders also indicate their superiors and/or chain of command does not emphasize required DL as a priority (25%) and that they do not have direct control over subordinates' duty time (22%).

Time for activities like DL is even more constrained in the reserve component and results suggest many RC leaders must fulfill DL requirements outside of duty time. Only one-third of RC leaders (32%) agree they have sufficient opportunity for required DL during duty time while more than half (55%) disagree. Again, competing demands (81%) is the most frequently cited reason RC leaders are not able to allow subordinates adequate duty time for DL.

Figure 48. Active Duty Leader Perceptions about Opportunities to Complete Required DL during Duty Time.




Most AC field grade officers (78%), warrant officers (71%) and Sr NCOs (75%) agree they have access to sufficient technology infrastructure (e.g., computers, tele-video, VTC, remote classrooms) to complete required DL. Smaller percentages of AC company grade officers and Jr NCOs (65% and 57%, respectively) agree they have access to sufficient infrastructure to complete required DL. These findings are not unexpected given fewer junior level leaders hold duties that put them in traditional office settings with access to a work computer.

In the RC, access to sufficient technology infrastructure to complete required DL is more limited, as 50% of company grade officers, 56% of Sr NCOs and 53% of Jr NCOs agree they have sufficient access. Less than half of RC Jr NCOs (40%) agree their subordinates (junior enlisted Soldiers) have sufficient access to technology to complete required DL. Though not specifically assessed by CASAL, it is presumed that many RC leaders complete required DL outside of duty time using personal technology assets.

Time Spent Completing Required DL

On average, AC leaders estimate they spend about 4 hours per month completing required DL. The average number of hours reported by Jr NCOs ($m = 4.8$) and Sr NCOs ($m = 4.3$) are slightly higher than averages for field grade officers ($m = 3.5$), company grade officers ($m = 3.3$) and warrant officers ($m = 4.0$). It is important to note that nearly half of AC leaders (46% overall) in several cohorts report they completed no required DL (i.e., zero hours) in the past month. This includes 46% of AC field grade officers, 53% of company grade officers, 47% of warrant officers and 44% of Sr NCOs. In comparison, 39% of AC Jr NCOs report not completing any required DL in the past month. Almost all Army supervisors report that they are willing to allocate some amount of time each month for their subordinates' to complete required DL (see Figure 49).

Figure 49. Active Duty Leader Estimates for Time Devoted to Required DL.



Overall, more than one-third of supervisors (36%) would support 13 or more hours per month for a subordinate to complete required DL, though this is likely situational based on competing demands of the unit or organization.

Taken together, CASAL results indicate that while Army leaders average about 4 hours of required DL per month, many leaders have not completed any DL in the past month (at the time of the survey). Results also show that competing demands for duty time pose the biggest challenge to completing required DL. Army supervisors are willing to allocate some amount of subordinates' duty time for required DL (only 4% report they support 0 hours per month) despite moderate to weak attitudes about DL's effect on enhancing subordinates' abilities to perform their duties. Inadequate access to technology or infrastructure for DL is currently an issue for less than one-fifth of AC leaders. Competing demands, time available and a lack of technology access are more prevalent issues for RC leaders.

2.8 Unit-based Training

The operational training domain of leader development includes activities that organizations undertake while at home station, at maneuver combat training centers, during joint exercises, at mobilization centers, and while operationally deployed (ADRP 7-0, 2012). Unit training is dual purposed; to both prepare units for operations and to exercise and improve individual skills of leading and developing units. This section summarizes CASAL results on unit-level training and combat training center experiences.

Unit-Level Training

The use of challenging and realistic training in units continues to show some room for improvement. Of leaders currently serving in TOE units, about two-thirds (67% AC and 70% RC) agree that exercises use realistic scenarios to prepare their unit for successful mission performance. However, one in four Jr NCOs disagree that training uses realistic scenarios. Similarly, just under two-thirds of leaders (64% AC and 65% RC) agree that unit training is sufficiently challenging to prepare their unit for successful mission performance. Only half of Jr NCOs agree that training consists of sufficient challenge, while one in five disagrees. Notably, while a majority of commanders at the battalion (76%) and company (76%) level hold favorable views about the current level of training challenge, smaller percentages of platoon leaders (63%), platoon sergeants (54%) and squad leaders (52%) agree that training is sufficiently challenging.

When examining these indicators by unit type, attitudes about the lack of realistic training scenarios and challenge appear to be more prevalent among leaders serving in Operational

Support (OS) and Force Sustainment (FS) units when compared to those in Maneuver, Fires & Effects (MFE) and Special Branches (SP) units (see Table 27).

Table 27. Ratings for Unit-Based Training by Unit Type.

Active Component (RC in parentheses) Percent Agree/Strongly Agree	TOE Assignment Type			
	Maneuver Fires & Effects	Operational Support	Force Sustainment	Special Branches
Unit Training exercises use realistic scenarios to prepare my unit for successful mission performance	71% (76%)	62% (69%)	63% (65%)	70% (79%)
Unit Training is sufficiently challenging to prepare my unit for successful mission performance	68% (71%)	59% (63%)	59% (57%)	66% (73%)

Overall, unit training activities and events are viewed as having a smaller positive impact on leader development compared to other methods such as on the job training, opportunities to lead, receiving feedback from others, and deployment experiences. About half of AC and RC leaders (51% and 54%, respectively) indicate unit training activities or events have had a large or great positive impact on their development. Nearly one-third of leaders (29% AC and 30% RC) indicate on their development has been moderate. Again, a larger percentage of leaders in MFE units (57%) rate unit training activities as having a large or great impact on their development compared to leaders in other types of TOE units (45-49%).

Given the disparity in the perceived challenge of unit training, commanders should seek input from junior level leaders on how to optimize the activities and events to promote leader growth and prepare for successful mission performance. Further, unit-based training activities and events can be enhanced by integrating other leader development practices such as providing junior leaders opportunities to lead and providing formal and informal leadership feedback (including peer feedback).

Results of the 2012 Status of the Forces Survey (SOFS) (Human Resources Strategic Assessment Program, 2012) provides broader indications of unit training readiness. In SOFS it is reported that large percentages of Army officers (89%) and enlisted members (83%) felt they were well prepared to perform their wartime job. Slightly smaller percentages (76% and 71%, respectively) felt that their training had prepared them well to perform their wartime jobs, while even fewer (67% of officers and 55% of enlisted) believed their unit was well prepared to perform its wartime mission. There were two notable and positive trends in these results. First, larger percentages of deployed Soldiers (officers and enlisted) felt they were well prepared regarding their personal readiness to perform their wartime job than did non-deployed Soldiers. Second, in 2012, the overall ratings by Soldiers for the effectiveness of training to

prepare to perform wartime jobs reached its highest level of favorability (72%) in the past 8 years (from a low of 62% in 2004).

Combat Training Centers


The percentage of Army leaders with combat training center (CTC) experience continues to be fairly stable over the past several years. In 2013, 55% of AC leaders report having participated as part of the training audience at a CTC in their career (compared to 58% in 2012, 59% in 2011, 61% in 2010, and 58% in 2009). Smaller percentages of RC leaders report having participated at a CTC during their career (38% in 2013, 44% in 2012, 44% in 2011, 47% in 2010, and 39% in 2009).

The key components of the CTC Program's mission are to provide commanders, staffs, and units an operational experience focused on unit readiness balanced with leader development requirements (Department of the Army, 2013c). CASAL ratings on the effectiveness of CTCs in developing leaders remain moderate to strong, and are consistent across the past five years. With respect to leaders who had trained at a CTC within the past 12 months (from the time of the survey):

- 68% rate the CTC experience as effective or very effective for improving their leadership skills.
- 75% rate the CTC experience as effective or very effective for improving their unit's mission readiness.
- Past CASAL (2009-2012) consistently found that about two-thirds of leaders rate CTC experiences effective for leadership improvement and providing effective leadership feedback (66% to 71% effective or very effective).
- Results of 2013 CASAL indicators of unit-based training are presented in Figure 50.

CTC experiences are viewed as moderate to strong in developing leaders.

Figure 50. Army Leader Attitudes about the Quality of Unit-Based Training.



Summary of Findings on Unit-Based Training

Unit-based training continues to be viewed as moderately favorable and shows some room for improvement. Of active duty and reserve component leaders currently serving in TOE assignments, two-thirds or fewer rate the training their unit conducts as sufficiently challenging and inclusive of realistic scenarios. Further, a smaller percentage of leaders view unit training activities and events as having a large positive impact on their development compared to other methods. Combat training centers offer realistic training environments to improve leadership skills and unit mission readiness, and a majority of leaders view CTCs effective in doing so.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Findings from the 2013 CASAL provide the Army with several new insights on the quality of leadership and leader development within the Army. The following points highlight new insights, important trends observed across multiple years, and areas that warrant further consideration.

New Findings and Insights

- Overall, a majority of leaders are rated effective in demonstrating principles of the mission command philosophy. There are strong relationships between effectively exercising mission command, high levels of trust, and perceptions of leader effectiveness. Field grade officers report the most familiarity with mission command doctrine, while smaller percentages of junior officers and NCOs are familiar with it.
- Leaders effectively demonstrate a variety of influence methods. Larger percentages of leaders are reported to use methods of influence aimed at gaining commitment from others as opposed to compliance-gaining methods. Most leaders who demonstrate negative leadership behaviors are viewed as ineffective at using methods of influence, though some are viewed effective in using compliance techniques such as pressure and legitimating.
- It continues to be shown that negative leadership has a measurable, significant detrimental effect on subordinate motivation, work quality, commitment and morale. Leaders who demonstrate negative leadership behaviors tend to be viewed as ineffective at building trust and exercising mission command.
- Leaders who follow through on commitments to others, look out for subordinate welfare, promote good communication among team members and uphold ethical standards are viewed effective at the leadership competency of *Builds Trust*. Leader trust-building behaviors are positively associated with subordinate motivation, work quality, commitment, and morale.
- Two-thirds of leaders report having high or very high trust in their subordinates, in their peers and in their immediate superior. Just over half of leaders report high or very high trust in their superior two levels up. Trust exists in units where members treat others with respect, deliver on what they say they will do and help protect others from physical and psychological harm.
- The frequency and quality of counseling (formal and informal) shows room for improvement. For instances where proper counseling does not occur, common reasons include a lack of accountability for those who do not counsel, not enough time available, lack of knowledge and skills, and leader avoidance of situations that might lead to conflict.

- Almost two-thirds of leaders report they engage in mentoring, either as a mentor or mentee or both, which is higher than levels reported during ATLDp a decade ago. The majority of leaders who currently have mentors indicate the relationship has had a large or great impact on their development.

Key Findings across Years (Trends)

- An overwhelming majority of Army leaders continue to show strong commitment to their teams or immediate work groups due to a sense of personal loyalty. The level of morale in the Army is moderate and remains largely unchanged in recent years.
- Army leaders continue to be rated favorably in demonstrating all leader attributes. The competencies *Gets Results*, *Prepares Self*, and *Stewards the Profession* continue to be leader strengths.
- The competency *Develops Others* requires continued focus and attention. Less than two-thirds of leaders are rated effective at developing subordinates, and fewer are rated effective at creating or calling attention to leader development opportunities in assignments.
- Small percentages of leaders are perceived as demonstrating negative behaviors associated with toxic leadership, and this has remained unchanged since 2010. Jr NCOs are more frequently reported to demonstrate negative leadership, while the incidence at brigade, battalion and company command levels remains low. Negative behaviors continue to have significant detrimental effect on subordinates' motivation, work quality, commitment and morale.
- Stress from a high workload persists as a problem for about one-fifth of Army leaders. In recent years, smaller percentages of leaders have indicated workload stress is not a problem at all, and more report it as a moderate problem.
- The Army leader development model continues to be well supported, though favorable attitudes toward the effectiveness of self-development continue to decline, especially among NCOs. Increased emphasis on mandatory training such as Structured Self Development (SSD) is a potential reason for the downturn.
- Overall attitudes toward Army education have improved slightly over the past 4 years. Larger percentages of recent graduates now view the quality of the education received as favorable.
- With the exception of senior officer and NCO schools, perceptions on the level of rigor or challenge offered in Army courses continue to show room for improvement. About half of recent graduates agree course activities and activity assessments were sufficiently challenging to separate high performers from lower performing students.
- Intentions to remain in the Army continue to be high for leaders not currently eligible for retirement. More than half of active duty captains report they intend to stay until

retirement eligible or beyond 20 years, which is the highest percentage observed since 2000.

Considerations for Improvement

The 2013 CASAL identified numerous areas where the Army is strong, and, where improvements could be made. From considering recurring problems, under-tapped opportunities, and greatest risks, the following considerations identify areas where the Army can take actionable steps to improve the quality of leadership and leader development.

Recurring problem. Developing others continues to be done less than recommended by regulations for counseling and as a required part of a leader's responsibility. Developing others has a lower impact than desired. The percentage of leaders who receive informal feedback, have a mentor and participate in 360° assessments is not so high that these approaches compensate for shortcomings of developmental counseling.

1. Improve the culture regarding leader involvement in developing others.

Only one-third of leaders rate the developmental counseling they receive from their immediate superior as having a large or great impact on their development. Further, nearly one-in-five indicate they never or almost never receive formal or informal performance counseling. Leaders report that the primary reasons why counseling does not occur as it is supposed to, or when it is supposed to, are because leaders are not held accountable when it does not occur and that leaders do not have (or take) the time to do it. Results also suggest counseling is viewed by many to be a punitive exercise when a Soldier needs correction.

- a. Recommendation: Enhance one-on-one interactions between superiors and subordinates on individual duty performance. Leverage existing developmental materials to encourage a culture of informal counseling and development. Field and promote the new Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 6-22.1 to emphasize leader preparation and planning for counseling interactions with subordinates to increase its impact and effect. Increase awareness and usage of Virtual Improvement Center (VIC) materials that enhance the delivery of informal feedback (e.g., 'Every Leader as a Coach', 'Seeking and Delivering Face-to-Face Feedback' and 'Supporting the Developing Leader'). Use the new OER and forthcoming NCOER to increase emphasis on the developmental aspects of performance evaluation.
- b. Recommendation: Increase junior leader propensity to seek development from leaders who are senior to them. Seeking development includes asking for coaching, counseling and performance feedback on current duties and performance, as well as seeking out mentorship to help prepare for future roles. Enhance junior leader

understanding that all Soldiers are responsible for their own development. Promote a culture that recognizes that the self-development domain extends beyond independent study, college courses, online training and SSD requirements.

- c. Recommendation: Continue to endorse and advertise resources for development. Institute a communication plan to reach junior leaders (officer and enlisted) in the active and reserve components, especially those receiving commissions and promotions to their initial leadership roles. Continue to promote learning modules on counseling and the new *Performance Evaluation Guide* that describes behaviors typical of expected performance, above average and below par performance. Also increase senior leader awareness of developmental resources, to both promote usage of the tools by these leaders and to inform them of self-development methods they can suggest to their subordinates.
- d. Recommendation: Enhance the Army's culture of mentorship through example (i.e., senior leaders do it, show that it is important). As with other methods of leader development, subordinate leaders are more likely to emulate or follow what senior leaders *do* more so than what they *say*. Mentoring should be promoted through participation (e.g., showing how it is done, sharing experiences) with junior leaders rather than talking about the importance of finding a mentor. Also senior and mid-level leaders should seek to participate as a mentor outside of their formal supervisory duties. Research has demonstrated that mentees can benefit from receiving advice, guidance and career feedback from individuals outside of their organization. These opportunities allow mentees to gain competencies outside of formal training processes and can increase their likelihood for career advancement (Allen, Eby, Poteet, Lentz & Lima, 2004). When a leader receives mentorship from a person outside their chain of command, he/she is able to seek feedback, advice and guidance on potentially contentious issues such as supervisor-subordinate challenges. In such cases, mentors can serve as advisors when leaders encounter problems with their direct supervisor and prefer more confidentiality than peers can offer. Mentors outside of the organization can also provide advice and share experiences that help mentees resolve problems and build and restore relationships in a confidential and thoughtful manner.

Under-utilized opportunity. The operational assignment domain is where the greatest development of leadership occurs. Informal practices that occur in the operational domain have been consistently perceived to provide the greatest value for the development of leaders, yet what and how development occurs is not codified and used in an intentional, systematic way. The Army pays attention to key developmental and broadening assignments but does not provide guidance or support to shape the conditions for individual development during them

nor does it collect lessons learned or evaluate the degree development occurs. *Send them and they will learn* is an inefficient – if not flawed – principle.

2. Enhance opportunities for leaders to learn from operational experience.

CASAL findings have shown that several factors positively impact leader development during deployed operations, including increased opportunities to lead in higher level positions; increased responsibilities; more time to directly interact with others (superiors, peers and subordinates); and opportunities to operate in conditions that impose stress, test one's physical and mental toughness, and put training into real world perspective. Also CASAL results indicate unit commanders tend to view unit-based training as realistic and sufficiently challenging. However, subordinate leaders less often perceive unit-based training as realistic and challenging.

- a. Recommendation: Design into home station duties and task assignments opportunities for leaders to learn from high impact developmental conditions. For example, unit leaders delegate challenging but appropriate responsibilities to subordinates and assign tasks with development in mind. Research has demonstrated the positive impact developmental job assignments have on enhancing leadership skills (McCall, 2004). As a starting point, a leader should be assessed to determine the 'right' level of challenge needed to promote self-reflection and development (Day, 2001). Leverage developmental materials such as the *Commander's Handbook for Unit Leader Development*, which offers a sampling of applications and TTPs to promote leader development through assessment and challenging job assignments (e.g., 'SOAR observation and assessment tool' and 'Assignment Demands Assessment').
- b. Recommendation: Enhance commander preparation to solicit input from subordinate leaders and Soldiers on ways to increase challenge in unit training. Given the disparity in the perceived challenge of unit training, commanders should seek input from subordinate leaders on how to optimize the activities and events to promote leader development and prepare for successful mission performance. This should occur both informally and formally. These discussions can be integrated into already occurring unit-wide or unit leadership AARs at the conclusion of training. In addition to discussing the unit success in achieving training objectives, commanders and senior leaders discuss unit success in achieving unit leader development objectives.
- c. Recommendation: Integrate leader development practices into unit training. Unit-based training activities and events can be enhanced by integrating other leader development practices such as providing junior leaders opportunities to lead, assessing leaders on doctrinal requirements for leadership, and providing formal and informal leadership feedback (including peer feedback). As an

example, the handbook *Developing Leadership during Unit Training Exercises* outlines a methodology for deliberate and effective leadership observation and assessment. The handbook also describes approaches for providing indirect feedback to leaders while in a training environment.

High risk. The greatest risk in professionalism and the performance of leadership may be complacency given the high ratings on the quality of leadership, the demonstration of attributes, and the performance of leadership skills. The areas of highest average ratings may also be those which become most dangerous when they are lacking or fail, e.g., lack of commitment, lack of adherence to Army values, overconfidence/lack of humility, lack of desire to learn, unfair treatment of others and negative leadership behaviors. Lower quality leadership skills across the force are also important to target for improvement, such as the alignment of purpose across organizations, developing subordinates, applying influence effectively for commitment and improving the organization.

3. Increase leadership skill improvement across the three leader development domains.

- a. Recommendation: Integrate coverage of influence strategies such as inspiration into existing course content on leadership. One approach is to increase the focus on contemporary inspirational methods of leadership. Two-thirds of AC leaders are rated effective at using *inspiration* as a method of influence, while 16% are rated ineffective (overall, ranked in the bottom two of the nine methods of influence). Leaders that are effective in using *inspirational appeals* gain commitment from followers when accomplishing tasks and missions. CASAL results indicate that, of the influence methods, inspiration has the strongest relationship with effective leadership. Transformational leadership (Bass, 1985) is an approach that inspires followers by making them aware of the importance of their contributions to the end goals or outcomes, convinces them to put aside their own personal interests for the team or larger organization, and increases their engagement and commitment within the team. This improves a leader's ability to articulate a clear and appealing vision, explain how the vision can be attained, act confidently and optimistically, express confidence in others, use actions to emphasize key values, lead by example, and empower followers to achieve a vision. Becoming more skilled in this set of behaviors is also a way to promote mission command.
- b. Recommendation: Continue to increase leader awareness and understanding of the mission command philosophy through institutional, self-development and operational environments. Integrate appropriate instruction at schoolhouses and through DL modules. CASAL results indicate that larger percentages of field grade officers with recent PME experience report being familiar with mission command doctrine than do other officers. At PME courses, prepare senior leaders to model the

principles of mission command and to increase subordinate understanding of the mission command philosophy at their next unit.

- c. Recommendation: There are numerous resources currently available to leaders to improve their leadership skills, including the MSAF program's Virtual Improvement Center (VIC), the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic's training materials, and the FORSCOM Leader Development Toolbox. However, CASAL results indicate online resources for leader development are currently underutilized. The lowest rated leadership competencies and attributes all involve skills that can be learned and improved. Address readiness to learn and enhance leadership by promoting and using existing training materials. There are specific leadership skills that can improve individual and unit capabilities, such as: *Moral decision making in combat, building effective teams, dealing with unfamiliar situations, balancing subordinate needs and mission, innovation, interpersonal tact – recognizes how actions impact others, using appropriate influence methods matched to individuals involved and situational differences, assessing developmental needs, removing work barriers, and using appropriate communication techniques.*

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